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ABSTRACT 
AN INVESTIGATION OF NON-SPATIAL COGNITIVE ABILITIES IN AN 
ASOCIAL CORVID, THE CLARK'S NUTCRACKER (NUCIFRAGA COLUMBIANA) 
by 
Jan K. Tornick 
University of New Hampshire, May, 2012 
A great deal of research suggests that the cognitive abilities of birds in the family 
Corvidae (crows and jays) are comparable in many aspects to that of apes. Scientists have 
posited competing hypotheses to explain how complex cognitive abilities arise in a 
species or group of animals. One such hypothesis, the social-intelligence hypothesis, 
states that the demands of living in a large, dynamic group drive an animal's need for 
complex cognitive skills. Another, the ecological-intelligence hypothesis, predicts that 
generalist foragers develop more highly flexible behaviors and a wider cognitive 
repertoire than specialist foragers. To date, cognitive research on corvids has focused on 
corvids that are highly social and are generalist foragers. From a comparative standpoint, 
I examined the cognitive abilities of a corvid that is relatively asocial and a specialist 
forager. The Clarks' nutcracker (Nucifraga columbiana) is thought to be perhaps the least 
social corvid, and it largely specializes on the seeds of one species of pine (Pinus edulis). 
I tested nutcrackers using several tasks, in three broad areas of cognition: inferential 
reasoning, numerical discrimination, and social intelligence. These experiments represent 
novel tests of cognitive abilities in this species. I found that the nutcrackers performed in 
a similar manner as social mammals and corvid birds, in all three areas of cognition. This 
xii 
suggests that social group size may not have a large impact on the development of a 
broad range of problem solving skills. Rather, ecological pressures associated with 
finding, extracting, caching and protecting seeds from pilferage may have influenced the 
development of complex cognition in this species. 
xiii 
CHAPTER I 
BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE 
Cognition in Corvids 
A number of recent studies suggest that members of the family Corvidae (also 
'corvids', relatives of the crows and jays) have cognitive abilities that seem to surpass 
many other groups of birds, and are surprisingly similar to primates (Emery & Clayton 
2004). Comparative psychologists are interested in members of the corvid family because 
many species of corvids possess several of the characteristics considered important for 
advanced cognition, such as a large and complex social structure, mostly generalist 
foraging, a relatively large brain, and altricial young (Emery 2006). The corvid family is 
comprised of over 120 species, a third of which fall within the genus Corvus (jackdaws, 
crows and ravens) (Madge & Burn 1994). Many species of corvids are highly territorial, 
protecting territories either all year or only during the breeding season. Some corvid 
species roost communally, in very large groups of up 65,000 individuals (i.e. rooks 
Corvus frugilegus, Patterson et al. 1971). Others, including the jackdaw (Corvus 
monedula), also nest communally. Many form partner-bonds which are extremely strong, 
and in some cases are lifelong. Males often provision females during gestation and 
sometimes help with brooding the eggs; they may also help the females feed the helpless 
young. Some members of the corvid family breed cooperatively; that is, there are 
additional adults (usually older siblings) that help raise the nestlings (Goodwin 1976). 
l 
Furthermore, like monkeys and apes, corvids often have a strong dominance hierarchy 
within a group (Emery 2006). These characteristics make corvids a good model to 
compare with primates for insight into how convergent evolution may act to produce 
similar features (like complex cognitive traits) in distantly related organisms. 
Empirical studies with corvids suggest that they indeed possess many aspects of 
cognition previously ascribed only to humans and our close relatives (for review see 
Emery & Clayton 2004), such as an understanding of Piagetian object permanence 
(Pollok et al. 2000, Zucca et al. 2007, Salwiczek et al 2009), gaze following (Schloegl et 
al. 2007, Schloegl et al. 2008), transitive inference (Bond et al. 2003, Paz-y-Mino et al. 
2004), planning for the future/episodic-like memory (Clayton & Dickenson 1998), and 
tool use (Heinrich 1995, Hunt & Gary 2006, Hunt et al. 2006, Kenward et al. 2005). For 
example, New Caledonian crows (Corvus moneduloides) manufacture sticks and leaves 
into hooks and other regularly-shaped instruments. These are not crude tools; the birds 
actually sharpen and refine the tools with their bills, making wide, narrow and stepped 
type tools. They have a wider range of variety in their tools than any other species 
known, except humans. The design of these tools also shows evidence of evolution 
through diversification and cumulative changes (Hunt et al. 2006). In the laboratory, 
naive juvenile New Caledonian crows also spontaneously fashion tools out of materials 
that they have never encountered before (Weir et al. 2002, Kenward et al. 2005). 
Remarkably, they can even use tools to manipulate other tools (meta-tool use), a skill 
which only humans and perhaps a few primates were thought to possess (Taylor et al. 
2007). Other species of corvid also use objects in goal-directed tasks. American crows 
{Corvus brachyrhynchos) drop objects on humans to protect their nests and offspring 
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(Caffrey 2001). In addition, both American crows and Steller's jays {Cyanocitta stelleri) 
have been observed using a pointed twig in a weapon-like manner in a competitive 
feeding situation (Balda 2007). 
Another line of research that demonstrates the extraordinary mental capacities in 
corvids is the study of episodic-like memory. Episodic memory in humans has been 
defined as a record of a person's experience that holds temporally dated information 
(Tulving 1984). These records include the precise memory of "what", "when", and 
"where" for personal events that occurred in the past; furthermore, evidence of conscious 
recollection must be present. Clayton and Dickinson (1998) provided evidence that scrub 
jays (Aphelocoma californica) may possess episodic-like memory. The authors coined 
the term "episodic-like" because their research did not address phenomenological aspects 
of episodic memory. In the study, scrub jays remembered where they cached different 
food types and recovered them according to the perishability of the item and how long it 
had been since caching. Scrub jays appear to remember the "what", "where", and "when" 
of a caching event. Primates tested in the same manner show a similar pattern of results. 
Such performance meets Tulving's criteria for episodic memory. However, critics have 
argued that nonhuman animals can only act based on immediate needs, as opposed to 
future needs. This is known as the Bischof-Kohler hypothesis (1985). To test the Bischof-
Kohler hypothesis, Correia and colleagues (2007) demonstrated that scrub jays 
selectively cache different types of food depending on which type of food they will need 
at a future time. These findings provide evidence against the Bischof-Kohler hypothesis 
because the scrub jays flexibly adjust their behavior based on future needs. These and 
other discoveries have prompted scientists to explore complex cognitive abilities that 
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corvids (and other intelligent birds like parrots) might have in common with primates. 
Examination of multiple cognitive processes in birds may undermine the long-held notion 
that only primates possess advanced cognitive abilities. 
Clark's nutcrackers 
The Clark's nutcracker (Nucifraga columbiana) is a member of the corvid family 
of birds. Recent nucleotide sequence data for the family Corvidae (Ericson et al. 2005) 
suggest that nutcrackers are phylogenetically most closely related to crows and rooks 
(genus Corvus). In addition, phylogenies which were reconstructed based on social 
behavior (Ekman & Ericson 2006) and caching behavior (deKort & Clayton 2006, 
Ekman & Ericson 2006) also seem to concur that nutcrackers and crows shared a very 
recent common ancestor. If these species did evolve from a common ancestor, then they 
may share complex cognitive abilities (see above for examples). The nutcracker, 
however, possesses several unique ecological characteristics compared to other members 
of the corvid family. 
The nutcracker is a seed-caching corvid that lives in alpine regions of North 
America. It inhabits perhaps the harshest environment of all the corvids, living mostly at 
altitudes of 900-3,900 meters (3,000-12,900 ft) in high arid pine forests. The nutcracker 
is a specialist forager (unlike most generalist corvids) that depends largely on the seeds of 
one species of pine (Pinus edulis). These birds cache and recover an estimated 33,000 
pine seeds each autumn (Lanner 1996). As many as 2500 caches of 5-10 seeds are stored 
over an area of up to 20 square kilometers (13 square miles) (Balda & Kamil 2006). 
Research suggests that they are able to recover up to 90% of the cached seeds (Balda & 
Kamil 2006), which they rely on as their principle energy source over the harsh winter. 
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Surplus seeds often germinate and grow into new trees; thus the nutcracker is an 
important part of the ecology of the pine forest it inhabits. Nutcrackers relocate their 
caches with remarkable accuracy up to six months later, even under a meter (3 ft) of 
snow (Lanner 1996). To be able to do this, they must keep track of temporal and spatial 
cues to find seasonal seeds that are sensitive to decay. In fact, the nutcracker has become 
a textbook model of spatial memory and navigation; many studies have demonstrated its 
extraordinary spatial learning abilities. Nutcrackers seem to relocate their caches by 
developing a mental map of landmarks in their environment. Then they recall the location 
of the caches relative to these landmarks (Kamil & Balda 1985, Gibson & Kamil 2001a 
and b, Gibson & Shettleworth 2003). This "mental map" may help them to plan the most 
efficient routes between caches (to conserve energy). Research shows that nutcrackers 
have better spatial memory than related corvids that do not depend as heavily upon the 
recovery of food caches during the winter (Gibson & Kamil 2005). Although a great deal 
is known about spatial cognition, very little is known about other types of cognition in 
this species. 
The nutcracker is the least social of the corvid family (Templeton et al. 1999). It 
does not live in large flocks like some other corvids, nor does it nest cooperatively. 
Clark's nutcrackers are monogamous, forming long-term pair bonds. The pairs stay 
together on their territories all year and nest in late winter (Mewalt 1956). Both males and 
females jointly build the nest, incubate the 2-5 eggs, and feed the juveniles. The young 
remain with the parents until they are about 4 months old, during which time they learn 
about the intricacies of caching behavior (Lanner 1996). It is not yet known whether 
nutcrackers exhibit some of the social cache-protection strategies seen in other corvids. 
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Conspecifics are known to pilfer caches (Bednekoff & Balda 1997, deKort et al. 2005). 
However, it is not clear if nutcrackers cache fewer seeds or re-cache their seeds in new 
locations if they are observed by a conspecific, like the more social scrub jays (Dally et 
al. 2005a). 
Social- and Ecological-Intelligence Hypotheses 
Comparative and evolutionary psychologists seek to understand the 
environmental conditions that are responsible for the evolution of a cognitive trait. 
Several different hypotheses about these conditions have been proposed. For example, 
the "social-brain" hypothesis posits that animals living in large groups evolve a 
proportionally larger forebrain, an area which controls complex cognition and attention 
(deWaal 1982, Barrett et al. 2002). Another, the "social function of intellect" hypothesis 
(also called Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis, Byrne & Whiten 1988) suggests that 
animals develop a larger cognitive repertoire in response to challenges associated with 
social complexity (Humphrey 1976, Jolly 1996). Organisms that are exposed to complex 
social interactions (involving skills like keeping track of dominance hierarchies and 
altruistic acts, formation of coalitions, etc.) may have evolved superior problem solving 
skills; and individuals with exceptional skills may have had higher reproductive success 
(Owen 2009). To examine the effect of sociality on "intelligence", Jolly (1966) examined 
problem solving in several species of lemurs (a prosimian primate that is less social than 
other primates) by exposing them to wide variety of cognitive tasks ranging from object 
permanence to "insight" problems (i.e. opening boxes and pulling strings). The results 
indicate that the lemurs' performance falls below that of other primates. Thus, Jolly 
posits that the structure of primate society may have been the driving force for the 
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evolution of primate intelligence. Both Jolly (1966) and deWaal (1982) believe that 
additional research is needed to examine whether correlations exist across species 
between social complexity and individual "intelligence". 
Other scientists have hypothesized that complex cognitive traits arise (as adaptive 
specializations) for coping with ecological problems associated with foraging. For 
example, the "ecological-intelligence" hypothesis predicts that generalist foragers 
develop more highly flexible behaviors and a wider cognitive repertoire than specialist 
foragers (Altshuler & Nunn 2001). Advanced cognitive skills, like memory, planning, 
and complex food extraction strategies, could have been favored among animals that 
utilized resources in new ways. The "extractive foraging" hypothesis posits that difficulty 
extracting food from its casing may have driven the need for complex intelligence 
(Parker & Gibson 1977, Gibson 1986). The "ephemeral food supply" hypothesis states 
that utilizing food sources that are scarce or seasonal may lead to an increase in cognitive 
capacity (Clutton-Brock and Harvey 1980, Milton 1981). The "cognitive mapping" 
hypothesis suggests that locating patchily distributed but predictable food sources may 
drive complex cognition, due to the need for a mental representation of the environment 
(Milton 1988). In all of these models, more efficient foraging may have led to increased 
inclusive fitness (Owen 2009). Unfortunately, much of the evidence supporting these 
hypotheses is anecdotal, and empirical studies aimed at specifically testing them have 
been rare. This is especially true in groups other than primates. 
Purpose 
The overarching goal of this research was to examine social intelligence 
hypotheses, by conducting comparative experiments on a species of bird that is relatively 
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asocial. If social group size is an important predictor of complex cognition, then the 
asocial nutcrackers' performance on many cognitive tasks should fall below that of more 
social mammals and birds. Alternatively, evolutionary pressures related to foraging may 
promote the development of certain cognitive traits (adaptive specialization). If 
ecological pressures from finding, storing, retrieving, and protecting food influence the 
development of a particular cognitive trait, the nutcrackers' performance on a wide 
variety of cognitive tasks should be similar to that of closely related corvids that also 
cache food. The nutcrackers' performance may also be similar to that of distantly related 
animals whose ancestors faced similar socio-ecological pressures, and may have derived 
similar cognitive traits through the process of convergent evolution. This research 
allowed me to compare the performance of the nutcrackers on several tasks with that of 
primates and other corvids, to address potential hypotheses regarding the evolutionary 
origins of cognition in corvids. 
In this body of work I examined the nutcrackers performance on tests in three 
broad types of cognition: 1) inferential reasoning by exclusion, 2) numerical cognition, 
and 3) social cognition. In the first study, I examined inferential reasoning in the 
nutcrackers, to determine if sociality drove the need for complex reasoning abilities (like 
the ability to make inferences) that have been demonstrated in social mammals and birds 
including corvids. If sociality is important, the nutcrackers should not demonstrate the 
ability to reason using inference, like ravens and other more social caching corvids and 
highly social mammals that have been previously tested. Alternatively, if other 
evolutionary pressures (like keeping track of food) drove the need for complex reasoning 
abilities, the nutcracker should demonstrate the ability to reason using inference (like 
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ravens and other caching corvids), and other social mammals. The second study 
examined whether living in a large group drove the need for complex numerical abilities 
(due to the need to keep track of large number of individuals, complex dyadic 
relationships, etc.) that have been seen in social mammals (including humans), and 
somewhat in birds including corvids. If so, the nutcrackers should not show the ability to 
comprehend numbers as well as more social animals that have been previously tested. On 
the other hand, if other evolutionary pressures drove the need for numerical abilities (i.e. 
the need to keep track of large numbers of stored food items), the food-hoarding 
nutcracker should demonstrate number competence on par or exceeding that of other 
animals tested so far. The last study directly examined the effect of group size on social 
intelligence. The need to keep track of a myriad of dynamic social relationships may have 
driven group-living animals to develop social intelligence (including behavioral 
flexibility in the presence of others). In that case, the nutcrackers should not show the 
same sensitivity to an observer as more social scrub jays that have been previously tested. 
On the other hand, if both scrub jays and nutcrackers faced evolutionary pressure to keep 
track of potential pilferers, social intelligence may have arisen as an adaptive 
specialization for guarding food resources in the corvid family of birds. If so, the asocial 
nutcracker should demonstrate cache-protection strategies (alter its behavior when it is 
observed by a conspecific), that are similar to those seen in the scrub jay. These three 
areas of cognition have also been selected because they not have been previously 
examined in nutcrackers, and would therefore contribute to the literature on cognitive 
abilities (other than spatial memory) in these birds. 
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CHAPTER II 
TESTS OF INFERENTIAL REASONING BY EXCLUSION IN THE CLARK'S 
NUTCRACKER (NUCIFRAGA COLUMBIANA) 
Abstract 
I examined inferential reasoning by exclusion in the Clark's nutcracker (Nucifraga 
columbiana) using two-way object-choice procedures. While other, social corvids appear 
capable of engaging in inferential reasoning, it remained unclear if the relatively less 
social nutcracker is able to do so. In an initial experiment, food was hidden in one of two 
opaque containers. All of the birds immediately selected the baited container when shown 
only the empty container during testing. I subsequently examined the nutcrackers in two 
follow-up experiments using a task that may have been less likely to be solved by 
associative processes. The birds were trained that two distinctive objects were always 
found hidden in opaque containers that were always positioned at the same two locations. 
During testing, one of the two objects was found in a transparent 'trash bin', and was 
unavailable. The birds were required to infer that if one of the objects was in the "trash 
bin", then the other object should still be available in its hidden location. Five out of six 
birds were unable to make this inference, suggesting that associative mechanisms likely 
accounted for our earlier results. However, one bird consistently chose the object that was 
not seen in the "trash bin", demonstrating that nutcrackers may have the ability to use 
inferential reasoning by exclusion to solve inference tasks. These results suggest that the 
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evolutionary pressure of food-caching, rather than social organization, may have been an 
important factor in the ability of corvid birds to reason. 
Introduction 
Many cognitive scientists believe that the ability to reason is an important 
indicator of intelligence (Holyoak and Morrison 2005). Kohler (1925) described 
reasoning as involving "a mental reorganization of problem elements into a sudden 
solution". In one of Kohler's classical food gathering puzzles, chimpanzees {Pan 
troglodytes) were presented with bananas hanging above their reach. After a few 
unsuccessful attempts at obtaining the food, the chimps began to use tools such as boxes 
and poles in the enclosure to reach the food. To all appearances, the chimps were 
experimenting in their minds before manipulating the tools. The pattern of these 
behaviors would seem to involve insight and planning. Kohler suggested that insightful 
behavior allows an animal to bypass learning by trial and error. However, critics argue 
that insight is not fundamentally different from associative learning (Simonton 1999). 
Cognitive scientists have had considerable difficulty distinguishing between sudden 
insightful solutions and gradual development in performance due to associative learning. 
Although it is difficult to rule out associative explanations for insightful behavior (e.g., 
Simonton 1999), research suggests that animals may rely on processes that are more 
consistent with insight rather than learning. 
A specific type of insightful problem solving, inferential reasoning by exclusion 
(also called exclusion performance or EP), has been defined as "selecting the correct 
alternative by logically excluding other potential alternatives" (Premack and Premack 
1994). One way to study inferential reasoning by exclusion is to present a two-way 
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object-choice task, exposing subjects to either direct information (witnessing the hiding 
of a desired object) or indirect information (presenting an empty container), and 
providing them with sufficient but incomplete information to solve the problem 
(Erdohegyi et al. 2007). To test this type of reasoning, Premack and Premack (1994) 
presented a problem with missing information to chimpanzees. They tested three chimps 
by placing a banana and an apple into two different boxes while a chimp watched. An 
experimenter then secretly removed the banana from the box, and ate the banana in full 
view of a chimp. The chimp was then given a choice between the two boxes. One of the 
three chimps immediately selected the other box as the one containing food (the apple). 
The Premacks concluded that the chimp likely inferred the location of food by reasoning: 
if the experimenter ate the banana, then the box that held the banana is now empty and 
therefore it should be excluded as a choice. 
Likewise, Call (2004) used a simple two-way object-choice task to examine 
inferential capabilities in four primate species, chimpanzees, orangutans (Pongo abelii), 
gorillas (Gorilla gorilla gorilla), and bonobos (Pan paniscus). One of two containers was 
baited out of sight and then both containers were presented to an animal. In the baited 
condition, the contents of the baited cup were shown to the animals; in the empty 
condition, only the empty cup was shown; and in the control condition, the contents of 
neither cup were shown. Results from the empty condition indicate that all four species 
were able to choose the baited container, even when only the empty container was shown 
(often doing so on the very first trial). Since these primates were able to solve the 
problem immediately, Call suggested that the results are more consistent with reasoning 
than with a learning program. Likewise, in similar tests, several species of monkeys also 
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selected the baited cup when shown only the empty cup (i.e. capuchins, Cebus apella, 
Paukner et al. 2006; Sabbatini and Visalberghi 2008; Tonkean macaques, Macaca 
tonkeans, Petit et al. 2005; and baboons, Papio hamadryas, Schmitt and Fischer 2009). 
Indeed, many large social mammals seem to be able to use exclusion to solve various 
tasks (i.e. chimpanzees, Tomonaga 1993; Beran and Washburn 2002; bottlenose 
dolphins, Tursiops truncatus, Hermann et al. 1984; sea lions, Zalophus califomicus, 
Schustermann and Kreiger 1984; Kastak and Schustermann 2002; dogs, Canis familiaris, 
Kaminski et al. 2004; Pilley and Reid 2011; and pigeons, Columba livia,, Aust et al. 
2008). 
While mammals have historically been examined for their ability to make logical 
inferences given their large brain size, cognitive abilities, and relative evolutionary 
proximity to humans, birds have been less well studied. However, recent advances in 
avian neuroanatomy suggest that both avian and mammalian forebrains are both derived 
from the pallium, an area that controls higher functions such as spatial reasoning and 
planning for the future (Jarvis and Consortium 2005). Correspondingly, much behavioral 
work with avian species, particularly corvids, over the past decade has indicated a greater 
degree of cognitive sophistication than was once expected, and suggests that the 
cognitive abilities of corvids are on par with mammals (for reviews see Emery and 
Clayton 2004; Emery 2006; Shettleworth 2010). For example, magpies (Pica pica, Pollok 
et al. 2000) Western scrub jays (Aphelocoma californica, Salwiczek et al. 2009) and 
Eurasian jays (Garrulus glandarius, Zucca et al. 2007) demonstrate an understanding of 
Piagetian object permanence. Scrub jays have been shown to have an episodic-like 
memory (e.g., Clayton and Dickenson 1998), and the ability to plan ahead for the future, 
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a trait which was previous viewed as uniquely human (Correia et al. 2007). New 
Caledonian crows (Corvus moneduloides) make and use tools, a skill that until recently 
was attributed only to chimpanzees and humans. They also exhibit meta-tool use (using a 
tool to get another tool), which suggests that they have an understanding of the purpose 
of the tools (Hunt and Gary 2004, Hunt et al. 2006). Corvids also demonstrate a wide 
variety of behaviors suggesting a high degree of social intelligence. For example, pinyon 
jays (Gymnorhinus cyanocephalus) use transitive inference to assess social relationships 
(Bond et al. 2003; Paz-y-Mino et al. 2004); and ravens (Corvus corax) are able to follow 
a conspeciflcs' gaze to locate food (Schloegl et al. 2007; Schloegl et al. 2008). Also, 
many species of corvids behave as if they are aware of another individual's knowledge; 
they protect their food by modifying various caching behaviors when they are observed 
by a conspecific. Examples include increased caching when observed (Eurasian jays, 
Bossema 1979), decreased caching (Northwestern crows, Corvus caurinus, James and 
Verbeek 1984; ravens, Heinrich and Pepper 1998; Bugnyar and Kotrschal 2002; rooks, 
Corvus frugilegus, Simmons 1968; grey jays , Perisoreus canadensis, Burnell and 
Tomback 1985), alteration of cache spacing (magpies, Clarkson et al. 1986; grey jays, 
Waite and Reeve 1995), caching out-of-view (ravens, Bugnyar and Heinrich 2005; scrub 
jays, Dally et al. 2005 a and b) or in difficult-to-see locations (magpies, Clarkson et al. 
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1986; scrub jays, Dally et al. 2004), repeatedly moving caches when observed (Eurasian 
jay, Cramp and Perrins 1994; scrub jays, Dally et al. 2005 a and b), and privately moving 
caches that had been seen (Eurasian jays, Goodwin 1955; ravens, Heinrich and 
Pepperl998; scrub jays, Emery and Clayton 2001). 
In light of the qualitatively similar cognitive processes between mammals and 
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corvid birds reported above, researchers have recently started to test for the ability of 
corvid species to make logical inferences. Using two-way object-choice procedures 
similar to Call (2004), Schloegl and colleagues (2009) found that ravens, a seed-caching 
corvid, were able to choose correctly using exclusion. In contrast, keas {Nestor notabilis), 
a large alpine parrot indigenous to New Zealand, were unable to do so. In a follow up 
study, jackdaws (Corvus monedula), a non-caching corvid, also did not demonstrate EP 
(Schloegl 2011). Carrion crows (Corvus corone corone, another seed-caching corvid) 
were subsequently tested using similar procedures (Mikolasch et al. 201 la). Although the 
carrion crows strongly preferred the cup that was last manipulated by an experimenter, in 
the absence of local enhancement some of the birds were able to make choices using an 
exclusion inference. 
Two likely hypotheses for the evolution of cognitive abilities like inference by 
exclusion include the adaptive specialization hypothesis and the social intelligence 
hypothesis. The adaptive specialization hypothesis posits that species like corvid birds 
evolve specific cognitive abilities (e.g., tool use, cache protection, planning for the 
future) to adapt to problems in their socio-ecological environment (Kamil 1987; deKort 
and Clayton 2006). The ability of the corvids examined thus far to make an inference 
(ravens and carrion crows) also may arise through "adaptive specialization". Specifically, 
Mikolasch and colleagues (201 la) speculate that the adaptive specialization of caching 
food may lead seed-caching corvids to acquire the ability to infer. The finding that non-
caching jackdaws fail to make a logical inference tends to support the adaptive 
specialization hypothesis. If this hypothesis holds true, then we can expect that other 
seed-caching corvids should also be able to use inferential reasoning. 
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Other factors besides specialized foraging abilities also might also contribute to 
the development of reasoning abilities, however. The "social intelligence hypothesis" 
(Byrne and Whiten 1988) posits that animals living in large groups acquire advanced 
cognitive abilities due to the pressures of living in a complex social network. The social 
intelligence hypothesis has been generally supported in primates, but less data are 
available for other groups (e.g., Ball 1998). According to the social intelligence 
hypothesis, social species would be more likely to make logical inferences, while solitary 
species would be less likely to do so. All the corvids tested thus far on inference by 
exclusion tasks have been highly social, so the social intelligence hypothesis has not been 
well explored in this regard. A wider sample of corvid species that differ with regards to 
traits like foraging strategy and social structure need to be examined to better understand 
which of these two ecological factors may be important for predicting advanced cognitive 
abilities such as making inferences. 
Here I examined whether a member of the corvid family, the Clark's nutcracker 
(Nucifraga columbiana), can solve problems using inferential reasoning by exclusion. 
The Clark's nutcracker is a seed-caching corvid that is closely related to crows and 
jackdaws (Ericson et al. 2005; Ekman and Ericson 2006; deKort and Clayton 2006), 
which have been examined for their ability to make a logical inference. Like these other 
corvids, nutcrackers have had a strong selective pressure to cache food for survival. 
Unlike these other corvids, however, the nutcracker is a specialist that depends largely on 
the seeds of one species of pine tree (Lanner 1996). Nutcrackers also differ in that they 
are also one of the least social corvids, as they do not live in large flocks or nest 
cooperatively (Balda et al. 1996). I used a two-way object-choice task similar to that 
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employed by Call (2004) and Premack and Premack (1994) to examining inferential 
reasoning in Clark's nutcrackers. If foraging behavior (caching) contributes to the 
evolution of cognitive attributes such as making a logical inference, the nutcrackers 
should perform comparably to ravens and carrion crows on inference tasks. In contrast, if 
social factors play more of a role in the development of cognitive processes like making 
an inference, then nutcrackers should be less comparable to these birds, given that they 
are less social. 
Experiment 1 
Four nutcrackers were tested using a two-way object-choice task similar to that 
used by Call (2004). I initially trained the birds that only one of two opaque cups with 
removable covers contained food. Next, I administered tests in which the birds were 
given partial information (revealed the contents of either the baited or the empty cup) or 
no information (shown the contents of neither cup). Correct choices early during the 
partial information conditions may indicate an ability to infer by exclusion that has been 
shown in similar work with mammals (bottlenose dolphins, Tursiops truncatus, Hermann 
et al 1984; sea lions, Zalophus californicus, Schustermann and Kreiger 1984; Kastak and 
Schustermann 2002; dogs, Canis familiaris, Kaminski et al. 2004; Pilley and Reid 2011; 
monkeys, Paukner et al. 2006; Sabbatini and Visalberghi 2008; Petit et al. 2005; Schmitt 
and Fischer 2009; apes, Tomonaga 1993; Beran and Washburn 2002; Call 2004) and 
other social corvids that cache food (Schloegl et al. 2009; Mikolasch et al. 2011). 
Methods 
Animals. Adult nutcrackers were trapped in western North America, and housed 
at the University of New Hampshire. The birds were of undetermined sex and had 
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previously been used in several tests of spatial orientation and navigation (Gibson and 
Kamil 2001; Gibson and Kamil 2005) and the ability to use human gestures to locate 
food (Tornick et al. 2011). The birds were kept in individual cages in an environmentally 
controlled room (22° C, 14:10h light: dark cycle). Birds were maintained at 90% of their 
free-feeding weight, by regulating intake of turkey starter, pigeon pellets, striped 
sunflower seeds, and mealworms following experimental sessions. The birds had 
unlimited access to grit and water. 
Apparatus. The nutcrackers were individually trained and tested in a white 
melamine experimental chamber measuring 45 cm wide x 45 cm long x 60 cm high 
(Figure 1). A single perch sat 5 cm above the floor in the center of the chamber. The front 
of the chamber was a clear Plexiglas® panel with two holes near the base of the 
apparatus (one left and one right) measuring 5 cm in diameter. Through these two holes, 
the birds could access two identical opaque 5 cm diameter x 4 cm high cylindrical PVC 
food cups with pivoting lids. A tray with two 4.75 cm diameter holes (one left and one 
right) was fitted to hold the two food cups, and was positioned in front of the chamber. 
The experimenter could move the tray forward in a track, bringing both the food cups 
within reach of the birds. After a bird selected one of the cups by opening it, the 
experimenter quickly slid the whole food tray away, so that only one choice could be 
made per trial. Background white noise was projected into the room through an overhead 
speaker. An overhead Microsoft VX-6000 LifeCam video camera was used to view a 
bird's choice during each session via a Dell Inspiron 6400 laptop computer. 
Pre-training. The birds were taught to open the lids to the cups with their beaks in 
their home cages. Next, to acclimatize the birds to the experimental apparatus each bird 
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was housed individually in the chamber for a one-hour daily session for five consecutive 
days. Training commenced once the birds were readily opening cups and familiarized 
with the apparatus. 
Training. During each trial, a bird was placed in the chamber and a single pine nut 
(a favorite food) was first shown to a bird for three seconds. Two cups were always used: 
one of the cups contained food (pine nuts) and the other cup remained empty. A 
styrofoam partition (60 cm wide x 45 cm high x 5 cm deep) was used as a visual barrier 
to prevent the birds from seeing the experimenter bait one of the food cups. The 
experimenter placed several pine seeds randomly into one of the two identical cups out of 
sight behind the partition. The partition was then removed and the cups were placed into 
the sliding tray and moved toward the birds, yet just beyond their reach. The left cup was 
opened for three seconds and then closed. The right cup was then opened and closed so 
that the bird had seen the contents of both cups. Next, the tray holding the cups was 
pushed forward towards the holes in the Plexiglas®, and an opaque curtain between the 
birds and the experimenter was closed so that the birds could not see the experimenter 
during the choice phase. The birds were required to choose a food cup by approaching 
one of the holes in the Plexiglas® and opening the pivoting lid with its beak. The bird 
had to remember which cup held the food, and select that cup. If a correct choice was 
made, the bird received food reinforcement (a pine nut). If an incorrect choice was made, 
the tray was slid back and the bird received no food and a ten second time-out with the 
house lamp turned off. The position of the cup containing the food (the baited cup) was 
pseudo-randomized between the left and right positions in the sliding tray, with no more 
than two trials on the same side consecutively, and the number of times per side balanced 
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for each session. Also, the location of the food was pseudo-randomized between the two 
cups to ensure that the birds could not use any slight differences in the cups as a cue. 
Birds were given one session per day consisting of eight training trials. If a bird did not 
make a choice within 30 seconds, the trial was repeated. If the bird did not make a choice 
for three trials in a row, the session was ended. The criteria required to begin testing was 
seven out of eight correct choices for five consecutive days. Training lasted for a mean of 
13.2 (range = 12-15) days. 
Testing. I examined the birds in the following three test conditions: 1) baited-
birds were only shown the contents of the cup containing food, 2) empty- birds were only 
shown the contents of the empty cup (see video 1), and 3) no information/control - birds 
were not shown the contents of either cup. The purpose of the control condition was to 
eliminate the possibility of the birds using odor cues or inadvertent cues from the 
experimenter. Each bird encountered daily sessions of eight trials. Seven of these eight 
trials were the same as the training condition (the contents of both cups were shown). 
One of the eight trials was one of the three test conditions, randomized between the third 
and sixth trials. Each bird was tested a total of 16 times in each of the three conditions. 
Two birds (Susan and Fitz) encountered all 16 of the empty condition trials, then all 16 of 
the baited trials, and then all 16 of the control trials in sequence during testing. Two other 
birds (Starr and Betsy) encountered 16 trials in each of the three conditions in random 
order, with the exception that no more than two consecutive sessions repeated the same 
condition. 
Analysis. The dependent variable was the bird's choice (correct or incorrect). I 
pooled the data from all four birds and used Fisher exact tests to compare the following 
20 
pairs of conditions: empty versus baited, empty versus control, and baited versus control 
(see Call 2004). I also conducted a second set of analyses that focused on individual 
choices. For each bird the number of correct choices out of 16 for the empty, baited, and 
control conditions was compared to chance performance (8 of 16) using binomial tests 
(Call 2004; Tornick et al. 2011). Family-wise type I error rate was controlled using a 
step-down Holm-Bonferroni procedure (Holm 1979; Ludbrook 1998). Adjusted alphas 
(ciobt) are reported and all tests were two-tailed. 
Results and Discussion 
Collectively, the nutcrackers made more correct choices in both the Baited (Fisher 
exact test, P < 0.001) and Empty conditions (P < 0.001) than they did in the Control 
condition and there was no difference in the number of correct choices between the 
Empty and Baited conditions (P = 0.157) (Figure 2). Susan chose the correct cup in the 
Empty condition in 14 out of 16 sessions, and chose correctly for the first eight 
consecutive sessions before making an incorrect choice (Figure 3). Susan's performance 
was significantly better than chance across the 16 sessions in the Empty condition 
(87.5%, debt= 0.020, binomial test, P = 0.002). In the Baited condition, Susan also chose 
the correct cup significantly more often than chance (93.75%, a0bt= 0.033, P = 0.002). In 
the Control condition, Susan's performance was not significantly different than chance 
(50%, aobt= 0.025, P = 0.196). Starr also made more correct choices in the Empty and 
Baited conditions than the Control condition (Figure 3). Notably, Starr chose correctly in 
all 16 sessions (Figure 3). In the Empty condition, Starr's performance was significantly 
better than chance (100%, a0bt = 0.002, P < 0.001). In the Baited condition, Starr also 
chose the correct cup significantly more often than chance (93.75%, a0bt= 0.013, P < 
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0.001), but not in the Control condition (43.75%, a<,bt= 0.013, P = 0.175). Betsy too, 
made more correct choices in the Empty and Baited conditions than the Control condition 
(Figure 2). Betsy chose correctly in 14 out of the 16 sessions (Figure 3). Betsy's 
performance was significantly better than chance in the Empty (87.5%, debt - 0.020, P = 
0.002), and Baited conditions (93.75%, Oobt= 0.017, P < 0.001), but was not significant in 
the Control condition (50%, a0bt = 0.025, P = 0.196). Fitz also made more correct choices 
in the Empty and Baited conditions than the Control condition (Figure 2). Fitz chose the 
correct cup in the first seven sessions; however, after the first several sessions Fitz's 
performance declined (12 correct choices overall out of 16), perhaps due to a lack of 
motivation (Figure 3). However binomial tests indicated that, in Fitz's performance was 
still significantly better than chance in the Empty (75%, a0bt= 0.050, P = 0.028), and 
Baited (81.25%, a^t = 0.033, P = 0.009) conditions, but not significantly different than 
chance in the Control condition (50%, Oobt = 0.025, P = 0.196). 
A goal of Experiment 1 was to compare the ability of the relatively asocial 
Clark's nutcracker to make logical inferences with that of more social corvids (food-
caching ravens and carrion crows, and non-caching jackdaws) that have been examined 
previously in comparable inference tests. When the contents of only the empty cup were 
shown, all four nutcrackers were able to successfully choose the correct ("other") cup. 
Correct choices during the novel partial information test period also occurred early 
indicating that the nutcrackers had not learned a correct response pattern during testing. 
Thus, the nutcrackers' performance is comparable to the performance of related, but 
highly social corvids (ravens, Schloegl et al. 2009; carrion crows, Mikolasch et al. 201 la) 
in this test of inferential reasoning. Notably, non-caching jackdaws failed to solve a 
22 
similar two-way object task of logical reasoning (Schloegl 2011). Combined, the results 
suggest that food-caching in corvids may be a better predictor of the ability to make a 
logical inference than is social organization. 
However some critics (i.e. Aust et al. 2008) have argued that simpler associative 
mechanisms, rather than reasoning, may account for the ability of animals to correctly 
solve the two-choice inference task. Animals given these tests may rapidly learn or are 
predisposed to avoid an empty cup. Likewise, local enhancement of cues near the correct 
cup may also play a role. Carrion crows prefer a cup that was last manipulated by an 
experimenter (Mikolasch et al. 201 la). Therefore, in Experiment 2,1 examined the ability 
of nutcrackers to again make an inference-by-exclusion using a task that may be more 
difficult to solve quickly using associative mechanisms. 
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2,1 presented the birds with a task comparable to that used by 
Premack and Premack (1994). I first trained the birds that pine nuts were available 
always in a fixed location (a cup on the left side of the apparatus), and mealworms were 
available always in a second location (right cup). They simultaneously learned that food 
was unavailable when it was found in a clear glass beaker (the "trash can"), located in the 
center of the sliding tray in front of the apparatus. During the critical test, the two closed 
choice cups and the trash can were positioned in front of the nutcracker outside the 
apparatus. One type of food (e.g., pine nuts) was hidden at its learned location (left cup), 
and the other type of food (e.g., worms) was visible and unavailable in the trash can. 
Nutcrackers made a correct choice during this test if they correctly identified the type of 
food in the trash can and subsequently choose the other (available) food type hidden in 
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the learned location. 
Methods 
Animals. Seven Clark's nutcrackers, including the four nutcrackers from 
Experiment 1, plus three additional nutcrackers with a similar experimental history to 
those used in Experiment 1 were used in Experiment 2. The birds were maintained as in 
Experiment 1. 
Apparatus. I conducted Experiment 2 in the same apparatus that was used in 
Experiment 1, except that I added a trash can, a clear beaker that was 6 x 10 cm centered 
between the position of the left and right cups on the sliding tray. Any food in the trash 
can could be seen by the birds but was not accessible. 
Food Preference Pre-test. I initially examined whether each bird had a food 
preference for either mealworms or pine nuts. I presented the birds with one pine nut and 
one mealworm separated by a distance of 20cm on the floor of their home cage. The food 
item that they first picked up with their beak was deemed the more preferred of the two 
items. Preference testing occurred once a day prior to daily feeding for a total of twenty 
days. 
Training. During the first 6 of 18 trials of a daily session, I trained the birds that 
food that was placed in a trash can was unavailable. During these six trials I baited the 
two cups (in full view of the birds) with a small piece of a peanut left inside part of a 
peanut shell using the procedures described in Experiment 1.1 moved the sliding tray 
with the cups and the trash can toward the front of the apparatus, but out of reach of the 
nutcracker. I then raised the opaque visual barrier between the subject and the tray for 3s. 
Next, I removed the barrier and, within view of the bird, extracted the peanut from either 
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the left or the right cup and simultaneously activated a bell to indicate one of the items 
had been taken from a cup. The piece of peanut was held for 3s in the center of the front 
wall of the apparatus approximately 5cm above the trash can and until the bird appeared 
to make visual contact with the food. I then dropped the peanut into the trash can to 
render it inaccessible. The bird was then allowed to open either the left or right cup. The 
side/cup from which the nut was removed was randomized across trials with no more 
than two consecutive trials on the same side. The side in which I removed the nut also 
was counterbalanced across trials. If the nutcracker made a correct choice it was allowed 
to eat the peanut. If the bird made an incorrect choice (chose the same cup from which 
the nut had been removed) the tray was slid away and the bird was not allowed to make a 
second choice. Following an incorrect choice I indicated the correct location to the bird 
by opening the lid and tipping the cup to reveal the contents for 3s. Correction trials were 
given following incorrect choices. After each trial, the opaque white curtains were closed 
and the unused shells and nuts were removed. Nutcrackers were required to make 5 of 6 
correct responses for a minimum of two consecutive days to continue on to testing. After 
7-13 days (mean = 9.2 days, SD = 2.2) all of the birds reached this criteria, however 
training continued until all of the birds simultaneously completed 30 days of food-place 
training (see below). 
Food-place Training. The final 12 trials of the daily session were devoted to 
training the birds that a pine nut was located on the left side of the apparatus (the 
subject's right side) in a black and white dotted cup, and a mealworm was located on the 
right side of the apparatus (the subject's left) in an orange and white striped cup. These 
visually distinctive cups served to facilitate learning of the fixed food locations. The trash 
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can (though not used during this phase of training) was placed in the center of the sliding 
tray. 
The experimenter showed either a pine nut or a worm to the nutcracker for a 
minimum of 3 s and until it appeared that the nutcracker had made visual contact with the 
food item. I positioned the sliding tray close enough for the birds to see, but not access, 
the cups. Out of sight of the bird, the experimenter then baited either the left cup with a 
pine nut, or the right cup with a mealworm, using baiting procedures described 
previously. Across the 12 trails, whether a pine nut or worm was presented was balanced 
and pseudo-randomized, with the exception that there were no more than two consecutive 
trials using either food. Next, I moved the tray forward and the subject was allowed to 
investigate the cups for 3 min, and eat the food item found inside. After the bird had 
explored the cups, the food tray was retracted for a two minute delay. Food-place training 
continued for 30 days so that the birds could learn the location of each food type. 
Testing. Each daily session of testing consisted of two trials. The first type of trial 
was the inference test. During this type of trial I positioned the tray containing the two 
cups and trash can away from the apparatus and baited the left (black and white dotted) 
cup with 'A pine nut. I then baited the right (orange and white striped) cup with a small 
mealworm. The tray was moved half-way forward, but still out of reach of the subject. 
The opaque barrier was placed between the subject and the cups and the experimenter 
removed either the lA pine nut from the left, black and white dotted cup or the worm from 
the right orange and white stripped cup. Both cups were opened and closed using the 
procedures described previously. The bell also was rung to indicate that food and been 
extracted by the experimenter from one of the two cups. The type of food that was 
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removed was randomized across trials with the constraint that the same food item could 
not be removed for more than two consecutive trials. Next the opaque barrier was 
removed and the experimenter held the food that had been extracted in the center of the 
Plexiglas wall of the apparatus for 3 s and until the bird appeared to have seen it. The food 
item then was dropped into the clear trash can and the lid placed on top while the subject 
appeared to be watching. The tray was moved forward and the bird was allowed to open 
one of the two cups. To make a correct choice, a bird was required to choose the cup that 
was associated with the food that was not currently in the trash can. A bird made an 
incorrect choice when it chose the cup that had contained the food type that was currently 
in the trash can. Following an incorrect choice, the contents of the unchosen cup were 
revealed to the bird, and then the tray was moved away from the apparatus. 
I also ran a control test (second type of trial) to rule out the possibility that the 
experimenter was providing unwanted cues or that the birds were using odor as a cue to 
make their choices. During these trials the experimenter baited the left and right cups 
(note: different cup sleeves were used for these control trials) with peanuts in view, but 
out of reach of the nutcracker. Next, the opaque barrier was placed between the bird and 
the tray. Out of sight of the bird, the experimenter then removed one of the peanuts from 
either the left or right cup and rang the bell. Next, I removed the barrier and while the 
subject watched, the peanut was placed into the trash can between the two cups on the 
tray and the subject was allowed to make a choice between either the left or right cup. If 
the bird made an incorrect choice it found nothing. The bird was allowed to see inside the 
empty cup then the experimenter quickly slid the tray away so that it could not extract the 
other peanut. The bird was shown the remaining peanut by tipping the cup and opening 
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the lid (non-reward). One control and one inference test was presented to the birds in 
random order each day for ten consecutive days. 
Food preference post-test. To see if any individual bird's food preference had 
changed over the course of the experiment I repeated the food preference tests at the 
conclusion of testing. The procedures were identical to those described previously. 
Analysis. I pooled the data from all seven birds and ran binomial probability tests 
on the number of correct choices for both the inference tests and the control tests. I used 
Fisher exact test to compare the results from the inference test and control tests. 
Individual performance was also analyzed. For each individual bird, the number of 
correct choices (out of a total of ten) was compared to chance performance using 
binomial tests. To test for a side or food bias, the side chosen (left or right, number of 
choice out of 10) and type of food (pine nut or mealworm) were also compared using 
binomial probability tests. For these individual analyses, family-wise type I error rate was 
controlled using a step-down Holm-Bonferroni procedure, and adjusted alphas (a0bt) are 
reported, as in Experiment 1.1 analyzed each bird's potential preference for either the 
worms or pine nuts (both before and after testing) using binomial probability tests, as 
described in Experiment 1. 
Results and Discussion 
Food preference. At the time of the pre-test, six of the seven birds preferred pine 
nuts over mealworms. Susan and Fitz chose 17 out of 20 pine nuts (binomial tests, a0b, = 
0.033, P = 0.001), Sony chose 15 out of 20 pine nuts (a0bt = 0.017, P = 0.015), Starr, Artz 
and Puck chose 14 out of 20 (ou, = 0.0009, P = 0.037). Only Betsy preferred mealworms 
(14 out of 20, a0bt = 0.0009, P = 0.037). An analysis of the food preferences after the test 
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indicated that the food type that each bird preferred during the pre-test did not change 
over the course of the experiment. 
Inference tests. Collectively, during the inference tests, the birds did not choose 
the correct cup (the cup that contained the food type not seen in the trash can) more often 
than would be expected by chance (35 correct out of 70, binomial test, P - 0.095). They 
also choose either cup with equal probability during the control tests (38 correct out of 
70, P = 0.074). There was no reliable difference in number of correct choice between the 
inference and control tests (Fisher exact test, P = 0.096). Likewise, my analysis of the 
choices made by the individual birds revealed a similar trend, as none of the birds chose 
the correct cup (the food type not seen in the trash can) more often than the incorrect cup 
during the inference tests (Figure 4). Susan made 6 correct out of 10 correct choices 
(binomial tests, a0bt = 0.02, P = 0.205). Betsy, Artz, and Puck made 5 correct out of 10 
correct choices (a0bt = 0.008, Ps = 0.246)and Starr and Fitz made 4 correct choices out of 
10 (cu, = 0.02, Ps = 0.205). 
A proportion of the errors made during testing could be attributed to the fact that 
the birds had a strong preference to choose the cup that contained their most preferred 
food, regardless of which item was in the trash can. Susan, Starr, Artz and Puck chose the 
cup that contained the pine nuts on 10 out of 10 trials (a0bt = 0.02, Ps = 0.0009); Fitz and 
Sony chose the cup with the pine nuts 9 out of 10 inference test trials (a0bt= 0.009, Ps -
0.009). Likewise, Betsy (the only bird that preferred mealworms in the food preference 
pre-test) favored the cup with mealworms in the inference test, regardless of which food 
type was in the trash can (10 out of 10, a0bt~ 0.02, P = 0.0009). 
During the control test trials none of the birds located the peanut better than 
29 
would be expected by chance. Susan, Sony, and Puck found the peanut on 7 out of 10 
trials (binomial tests, a„bt= 0.02, Ps = 0.117). Starr and Artz found the peanut during 5 
out of 10 trials (a0bt= 0.008, Ps = 0.246), Betsy during 4 out of 10 trials (a0b, = 0.01, P = 
0.205); and Fitz during 3of 10 trials (a0b, = 0.02, P = 0.117). These results suggest that the 
birds were not able to use odor or experimenter-given cues to solve the problem. Rather, 
due to the potential ambiguity of the control tests the birds primarily selected the cup/side 
that was consistent with their food preference. Starr made 10 out of 10 choices to the left 
(pine nut) cup (out = 0.05, P = 0.0009); Artz made 9 such choices (a0bt = 0.02, P = 0.009) 
and Susan, Sony and Puck chose the left cup on 8 of 10 occasions (a0bt = 0.01, Ps = 
0.009); Fitz made 6 choices to the left cup (Oobt= 0.007, P = 0.205). Likewise, Betsy 
made 9 of 10 choices to the right cup, which had contained worms during training (a0bt = 
0.02, P = 0.009). 
Perhaps, because the birds had never seen either worms or nuts in the trash can 
before, the conditions of the test became ambiguous and the birds resorted to choosing 
the cup that was associated with their more preferred food item. Previous work has 
shown that it is sometimes difficult for food-deprived animals to inhibit responses toward 
their preferred food (human children, Mischel et al. 1989; chimpanzees, Boysen and 
Berntsonl995; humans, pigeons and rats Rattus norvegicus, Tobin and Logue 1994). In 
this experiment, the birds appeared to have a strong bias to go to the cup that was 
associated with their most preferred food, even if it was not available during a trial. 
Therefore, to eliminate the possibility that food preferences could be preventing the birds 
from demonstrating the use of inferential reasoning, I conducted a third experiment. 
Experiment 3 
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In this experiment, the birds would now be required to make an inference about 
the location of a non-food object. I used procedures that I developed in Experiment 2; 
however, to eliminate the problems previously caused by food preference biases, I 
replaced the two types of food used in Experiment 2 (pine nuts and worms) with two 
equivalent toys (ball and dolphin). 
Methods 
Animals. Six of the seven Clark's nutcrackers that were used in Experiment 2 
were used in Experiment 3. One bird was excluded because of health related issues. 
Apparatus. I used the same apparatus that had been used in the previous 
experiment. I made a few minor modifications to the apparatus. I created an additional 
choice hole in the center of the Plexiglas® wall in the front of the chamber, and added a 
.65 cm diameter clear plastic tube that was positioned at the top of the outside of the 
apparatus and went through an exterior wall into the apparatus. I used the tube to deliver 
pine nuts onto the floor near the front center of the apparatus. I also replaced the trash can 
used in Experiment 2 with a shorter one (6cm x 6 cm) that had a tightly fitting removable 
lid. 
Toy Familiarization and Tube Acclimatization. This training took place in the 
birds' home cage. The birds were presented with two novel objects, a plastic yellow 
porcupine  ba l l  (2 .5  cm in  d iameter )  and  a  b lue  and  whi te  p las t ic  dolphin  toy  (2x2x3 
cm). The birds were required to lift the object in the air with their beaks, and were 
reinforced with half of a pine nut for doing so. The presentation of the toys alternated so 
that the birds experienced an equal number of exposures to the ball and dolphin per day. 
Simultaneously, the birds were re-acclimated to the experimental test chamber with the 
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new food-delivery tube. I dropped a half of a pine nut down the clear plastic tube and into 
the front center of chamber and the bird was allowed to retrieve it. Familiarization lasted 
one to two weeks until all the birds were reliably manipulating both objects and retrieving 
food from the tube in the apparatus. 
Toy Preference Pre-test. I conducted preference tests as in Experiment 2, except 
that the two food items were replaced with the two toys. I recorded which toy the bird 
touched first for 18 days. Preference tests were also administered after testing, as 
described below. 
Trash Can Training. I initially trained the birds to open one of the opaque cups 
used in Experiment 2 that had one of the two toys inside (randomly determined). Training 
was conducted in their home cage and the birds were reinforced with a pine nut for 
opening the cup and picking up the toy inside. Next, I presented the birds with two 
additional different types of training trials in their home cage. These trials were 
interspersed with maintenance trials (as described above) in which the birds open the lid 
to extract a toy for reinforcement. During one of these two types of trials one of the toys 
(randomly determined) was placed in the trash can without the lid and the bird could 
extract the toy for reinforcement. During the other type of training trial I put one of the 
toys inside the trash can and then the lid was placed on top. I left the trash can in the cage 
for 30s and recorded the number of pecks the bird made to the trash can or lid. I expected 
the number of pecks to the lid to decrease over time as the birds learned about the 
inaccessibility of food when the lid was on. The birds encountered each of the three types 
of training trials four times in each daily session, for a total of 12 trials. The order of the 
trials was randomized with the constraint that no more than two trials of any type 
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occurred in a row. After a mean of 28.83 days (SD = 2.79) pecking at the trash can/lid 
appeared to reach asymptote (mean number of pecks at the beginning of training = 85.29 
pecks, SD = 39.73, mean number of pecks at the end of training = 14.19 pecks, SD = 
14.05), and testing began. 
Toy-place Training. The procedures were identical to those of the food-place 
training in Experiment 2 except that toys replaced the two types of food. I trained the 
birds that the ball was always located on the left side of the apparatus and the dolphin 
was always located on the right side. When a subject opened one of the opaque cups and 
manipulated the toy inside, a Vi pine nut was delivered down the clear tube. 
Testing. The procedures for the inference tests were similar to those used for 
Experiment 2 except that two toys were used instead of the two food types, and correct 
choices (opening the cup that contained the toy not seen in the trash can) resulted in the 
delivery of a Vi pine nut into the chamber via the plastic tube (see video 2). Each bird 
received one inference and one control test per day for 10 days. 
Analysis. Each bird's toy preference (ball or dolphin, before and after testing) was 
analyzed individually using binomial probability tests, as in Experiment 2.1 analyzed the 
pooled and individual choices during testing as described in Experiment 2. 
Results and Discussion 
Toy Preference. None of the birds demonstrated a preference for either the ball or 
the dolphin prior to testing. Five of the six birds touched the ball first 8 out of 18 times 
(a0bt = 0.017, Ps = 0.167). Starr touched the ball first 9 out of 18 times (a0bt = 0.008, P = 
0.185). The birds continued to fail to display a preference for either toy after testing (all 
ps >0.05). 
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Inference Test. Analysis of the choices made by all of the birds revealed that they 
did not choose the correct cup more than would be expected by chance (62 correct out of 
120 choices, binomial test, P = 0.068). However, an analysis of the bird's individual 
choices revealed that Starr correctly chose the cup that contained the toy that was not in 
the trash can during 17 of 20 trials (binomial test, a0bt= 0.009, P = 0.001, Figure 5). The 
other five birds did not make more correct choices than would be expected by chance. 
Sony made 11 of 20 (aobt =0.011, P = 0.160), Betsy, Artz, and Puck made 9 of 20 (a0bt = 
0.011, Ps = 0.160), and Susan made 7 out of 20 correct choices during the inference test 
(Oobt= 0.025, P = 0.074). In contrast to Experiment 2, only one of the six birds 
demonstrated a side bias (chose the cup containing the dolphin on the right) more than 
would be expected by chance (Artz 85%, a0bt= 0.009, P = 0.001). 
In this experiment, I attempted to eliminate the difficulties that occurred when 
two unequally favored foods were presented (Experiment 2). The pre-and post- toy 
preference tests indicate that the birds did not have a strong preference for choosing one 
of the toys (sides) over the other. However, even with this bias eliminated, only one of 
the six subjects was able to consistently make the correct inference about the location of 
the remaining toy. It would appear that my inference task was a difficult problem for the 
nutcrackers to solve, given the failure of all the birds to solve the task in Experiment 2 
and most of these same birds to do so in Experiment 3. Despite this fact, one bird (Starr) 
seemed to use inferential reasoning to solve the problem. Starr's behavior during the 
choice phase of each test may account for his ability to solve the problem. During each 
trial Starr moved in front of the trash bin and looked at the contents before making a 
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choice. The other birds did not appear to consistently exhibit this behavior. These issues 
will be discussed further in the General Discussion below. 
General Discussion 
Several features of the environment of the Clark's nutcrackers make them well 
suited for comparative investigations of intelligence, such as the ability to make a logical 
inference, in corvid birds. Unlike many other corvids, nutcrackers inhabit high pine 
forests and are specialist foragers, depending largely on the seeds of one species of pine 
(Pinus edulis) for their survival (Lanner 1996). Tens of thousands of these seeds are 
stored in the autumn; then are recovered over the winter as food for survival (Balda and 
Kamil 2006). This remarkable ability has made nutcrackers a textbook model of spatial 
cognition in animals. Likewise, while most corvids live in social groups and flock or nest 
cooperatively, nutcrackers are believed to be far less social than many other caching and 
non-caching corvids (Balda et al. 1996). Thus, I was interested in comparing the 
performance of nutcrackers with other corvid birds that have evolved in different social 
and physical environments to examine how a number of cognitive abilities may have 
evolved for this group of birds. 
I used the two-way object-choice procedure described by Call (2004) and 
employed by others to test inferential reasoning in Experiment 1. Two cups were baited 
out of sight and then either the baited or empty cup was shown to the birds. When the 
birds were shown only the contents of the empty cup (inference test), all of the 
nutcrackers immediately chose the baited cup. The performance of the nutcrackers on this 
task is similar to that of two other seed-caching corvids, ravens and carrion crows given 
comparable tasks. Schloegl and colleagues (2009) examined exclusion performance in 
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ravens and keas using a two-way object-choice task with food hidden in one of two 
bowls. Food was baited out of sight, and then an experimenter lifted either the baited or 
the empty bowl (or neither), to reveal the contents underneath. When only the empty 
bowl was lifted, the ravens (like the nutcrackers in the current study) but not the keas, 
were able to choose the baited bowl. These authors also tested both species in another 
task in which the birds were required to search for food in two differently shaped PVC 
tubes. There were several conditions in which the tubes were either straight or bent, and 
the food was either visible or out of view. Thus, they gave the birds partial information to 
make an inference about the content of the two tubes. Again, the ravens were more 
successful then the keas. In a follow up study (Schloegl 2011), non-caching jackdaws 
were tested with the same set of tasks. In contrast to the ravens, the jackdaws 
demonstrated very limited evidence of exclusion abilities, choosing at chance when they 
could not see the food. However another caching corvid, the carrion crow, was tested 
with the same procedure; many of the birds were able to choose by exclusion (Mikolasch 
et al 2011a). 
There are several possible explanations for the results of the current (and 
previous) studies. The subjects could have reasoned, "cup A is empty; therefore it should 
be excluded as a choice". Simpler associative mechanisms could also account for the 
results, however. One type of associative mechanism, local enhancement (i.e. tendency to 
search in the last place an experimenter touched), can sometimes influence animals' 
choices in these types of problems. Several past experimental paradigms examined the 
use of local enhancement to solve two-way object-choice tasks. Dogs seem to prefer to 
use human-generated cues to find food, but can also solve simple EP tasks in the absence 
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of such cues (Brauer et al. 2006, Erdohegyi et al. 2007). Mikolasch and colleagues 
(201 la) also found that carrion crows prefer a cup that was last manipulated by an 
experimenter. However, in my experiments local enhancement was less likely because 
the cups were baited out of view of the subjects. Alternatively, in the current study and 
many of the others mentioned above, the birds may have learned to avoid the empty cup 
(S-) during training since it was never paired with food. During testing with the empty 
cup condition, the birds may have made a learned response to the alternative cup after 
encountering the empty one. Indeed, in previous tests of EP animals such as apes (i.e. 
Call 2004) may also have used simple associative mechanisms (see Aust et al. 2008) to 
solve inference problems. The fact that nutcrackers (and the other corvids tested on this 
paradigm) acquired the task rapidly and also performed at a high level early during 
testing may suggest that something more than associative learning was involved, 
however. 
In Experiments 2 and 3,1 used procedures developed by Premack and Premack 
(1994) as an additional test of inferential reasoning. In these experiments, I tried to 
reduce the probability that learning history (such as avoiding an empty cup) could 
account for the success on the inference test. Specifically, the birds had to recognize that 
the item in the trash can was unavailable and select the alternative object in its learned 
location/cup. In both Experiments 2 and 3 most of the nutcrackers failed to solve the 
inference test and selected between the correct and incorrect cup at chance. In 
Experiment 2, the ambiguity of the inference test likely resulted in all of the birds 
selecting the cup that had been paired with their favorite food, regardless of which food 
was seen in the trash can. When the potential for a food preference was eliminated during 
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the inference test in Experiment 3, the nutcrackers still largely failed to make the correct 
choice. Notably however, one bird (Starr) successfully solved the problem in Experiment 
3. So are nutcrackers capable of making an inference by exclusion? 
The results from Experiment 1 are largely consistent with other tests of EP with 
other caching corvids; that is, after being shown and empty cup they select an alternative 
cup that contains food. While the nature of the mechanisms that account for this 
performance may be debated, the fact that seed caching nutcrackers performed similarly 
to other seed caching corvids suggests a strong role for caching as a selective pressure for 
such behavior (see below). Compared to Experiment 1, the gap between what was 
learned during training and the ability of the birds to use that learned information to 
directly solve the inference test in Experiments 2 and 3 was quite large making the 
inference test more challenging for these later experiments. As pointed out above, one 
bird (Starr) was able to solve the inference task in Experiment 3. My informal 
observations of Starr's behavior throughout testing indicated that it was much more 
attentive to the critical features of the task in Experiment 3 (e.g., trash can). Based on the 
gap between the training given in Experiment 3 and the inference test it would seem like 
Starr had attended to the critical feature of the problem and made an inference about 
where food was located. Thus, it would appear that the results from one bird indicate a 
relatively impressive ability to make a logical inference. Perhaps, the other nutcrackers 
failed to attend to the critical features of the task because they had not learned the role of 
the trash can or failed to attend to the identity of the item in the trash can (though the 
results from training would suggest otherwise). One important implication of the results 
from all three experiments is that animals may be capable of using multiple mechanisms 
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to solve problems of inference by exclusion. Indeed, the failure of many nutcrackers to 
solve the inference test during Experiment 3 may have been because the birds were trying 
to use associative mechanisms that may have been largely successful earlier in the study. 
If I accept the demonstration that one nutcracker is capable of a fairly 
sophisticated inference and that the other nutcrackers performed comparably to other 
seed caching corvids then I may be able to speculate about why this ability may have 
evolved for seed caching corvids more broadly. Mikolasch and colleagues (201 lb) have 
suggested that EP may have evolved as an adaptive specialization (Kamil 1987; 
Shettleworth and Hampton 1998; deKort and Clayton 2006) to the pressures of caching 
and recovering food. Such an explanation would account for why caching corvids 
generally succeed, but non-caching corvids generally fail on inference tests tasks. Non-
caching species like jackdaws (and also keas, Schloegl et al. 2009) may not pay close 
attention to food location or to the absence or presence of food; a trait which may have 
led to inferential reasoning abilities in caching species (Mikolasch et al. 2011). Gould-
Beierle (2000) suggests that non-caching species may be more likely than caching species 
to return to an empty cache site to see if food had been replenished. Thus, caching species 
may be predisposed to knowing more about an "empty" site. 
Another factor that might influence the development of complex cognition in a 
species is sociality, because the pressures of living in a large group might drive the need 
for complex problem-solving skills. The results of this study, however, do not support the 
social intelligence hypothesis. Even though nutcrackers are far less social than other 
corvids, in Experiment 1 their performance is on par with more social corvids like ravens. 
This may be the case because, although nutcrackers are less social, they need to be aware 
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of complex social interactions related to caching because they are still subject to pilfering 
by conspecifics, just as are ravens (Bugnyar and Kotrschal 2002). For the nutcracker 
though, because it inhabits such a harsh environment, being aware of potential pilferers 
may be extremely important for survival. It will be important to closely replicate this 
study using more social corvids to see if the majority of individuals excel compared to 
nutcrackers on the more complex inference task. My preliminary findings suggest, at 
least with the tasks tested here, that other factors (like foraging strategy or genetic 
relatedness) may be more important than sociality. It may also the case that several of 
these hypotheses work concurrently to shape cognitive abilities like EP (Rifkin 2007). 
Additional cognitive tests of the asocial Clark's nutcracker also will be extremely useful 
in further examining the social intelligence hypothesis. Like the more social corvids, the 
nutcracker may be capable of other higher cognitive processes, such as the use of human-
generated cues (Tornick et al. 2011), social cache-protection behavior (Clary and Kelly 
2011), and inferential reasoning (this study). 
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CHAPTER III 
AN INVESTIGATION OF NUMERICAL DISCRIMINATION BY THE CLARK'S 
NUTCRACKER (.NUCIFRAGA COLUMBIANA) 
Abstract 
I examined number discrimination in the Clark's nutcracker (Nucifraga 
columbiana), a relatively asocial seed-caching corvid. The nutcracker stores and recovers 
tens of thousands of pine nuts every winter using its exceptional spatial memory. 
Nutcrackers may have a relatively sophisticated ability to discriminate numbers of things, 
given their strong dependence upon caching and recovering nuts for their survival. I 
presented two sets of nuts simultaneously, in 21 different conditions, to see if the 
nutcrackers could choose the larger of the two quantities. The nutcrackers displayed a 
strong ability to discriminate quantities of nuts and successfully chose the larger of two 
quantities in 20 out of the 21 conditions. Like many other animals tested previously, the 
nutcrackers showed a ratio effect, with performance decreasing as the ratio of the two 
quantities approached 1. Interestingly, nutcrackers did not show a significant effect of 
magnitude; at constant distances they did not have more difficulty with contrasts 
containing larger numerosities. I speculate that nutcrackers, like several large brained 
social mammals, might be using an analog magnitude representational system. These 
birds may have developed a keen number sense as an adaptive specialization to cope with 
their unique ecological pressures. 
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Introduction 
The ability to discriminate numbers of things, far from being an exception, is 
widespread in the animal world. Laboratory and field experiments have shown that many 
diverse species demonstrate this basic understanding of numerosity (reviewed in Gallistel 
1989, Dehaene 1997, Uller 2008). The ability to discriminate "less" versus "more" has 
been demonstrated in many animals, such as lions {Panthera leo, McComb et al. 1994), 
howler monkeys (Alouatta caraya, Kitchen 2004), horses (Equus caballus, Uller and 
Lewis 2009), dolphins (Tursiops truncatus, Mitchell et al. 1985, Kilian et al. 2003, 
Jaakkola et al. 2005), dogs (Canis familiaris, Ward and Smuts 2007), sea lions (Otaria 
flavescens, Abramson et al. 2011), and salamanders (Plethodon cinereus, Uller et al. 
2003). A number of researchers have examined the underlying cognitive processes that 
would support relative number discriminations in non-human animals. Many studies have 
indicated that humans (i.e. Feigenson et al 2002) and animals (i.e. Hauser et al. 2003) 
represent numerosities in accordance with Weber's Law, which states that the larger the 
difference between two quantities to be discriminated, the easier it is to discriminate 
them. This is called the "distance" (or disparity) effect. Furthermore, the ratio of the two 
numbers is of paramount importance, with ratios of 1:2 being easier to discriminate than 
3:4. For example, 6-month-old human infants can discriminate 8 from 16 objects (ratio of 
1:2), but not 8 from 12 objects (ratio of 2:3; Xu and Spelke 2000). A variety of animals 
also show ratio and distance dependent behavior (e.g. Agrillo et al. 2009,2010; Brannon 
and Terrace 2000; Buckingham et al. 2007; Cantlon and Brannon 2006; Dehaene 1997; 
Gallistel 1989; Gomez-Laplaza and Gerlai 2011; Meek and Church 1983; Vallortigara et 
al. 2010). In addition to distance and ratio effects, animals also often exhibit a magnitude 
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effect. The magnitude effect describes the phenomenon that at a constant numerical 
distance, accuracy is better with small rather than large numerosities. In other words, 
larger numbers of things tend to be more difficult to discriminate. Beran (2007) tested 
rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatto) using a computer and joystick. Two different 
quantities of stimuli (red squares) dropped down into two simulated containers, and the 
monkeys were required to respond to the larger. The monkeys were tested on all 
combinations of the numbers 1 to 10 over many trials. At constant distances, they were 
more accurate with combinations that were of small magnitude (i.e. 1 v2) than of a large 
magnitude (i.e.7v8). 
While scientists are currently trying to understand how animals represent 
numbers, they are also interested in the evolutionary processes which might explain how 
number competence became so prevalent in the animal kingdom. The ability to 
discriminate among different quantities of objects could have arisen either through 
divergent or convergent evolutionary processes. If divergent evolution were the driving 
force, then an ancient common ancestor (possibly before the split of fish and amphibians 
or earlier) may have developed number sense, and then this homologous trait was passed 
to all future generations (Emery 2009). On the other hand, in a convergent evolution 
model, vastly different species could have developed number sense independently 
(homoplastic trait) to cope with common problems in their environment, like finding food 
and avoiding predators (Keeton & Gould 1986, Seed at al 2009, Scarf et al. 2011). 
Several convergent hypotheses may explain how factors in the environment might drive 
number cognition in various species, since the need to discriminate between large and 
small quantities may be ubiquitous. The "adaptive specialization" hypothesis posits that 
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animals may have evolved specific cognitive traits, such as numerical abilities, to adapt 
to problems in their environment (Kamil 1987; deKort and Clayton 2006). For example, 
unrelated animals that cache food (i.e. rodents, birds etc.) may have had increased 
pressure to keep track of quantities of food. Thus, for these animals, number sense might 
be an adaptive specialization (Mikolasch et al. 2011). In another model, animals living in 
large social groups may have acquired advanced cognitive abilities due to the pressures 
of living in a complex social network. According to "social intelligence" hypotheses (i.e. 
social function of intellect, Humphrey 1976; social brain hypothesis, Dunbar 1998), 
social species should be more likely to develop complex cognitive traits (like keeping 
track of the number of allies, etc.) than more solitary species. 
In the current study, I examined the ability of Clark's nutcrackers to discriminate 
between two quantities of pine nuts (Nucifraga columbiana). Nutcrackers cache 33, 000 
or more nuts each autumn (Lanner 1996), and are able to locate and recover most of them 
(Balda & Kamil 1992). Remembering where their nuts are hidden is crucial for the 
nutcracker's ability to survive during the course of the winter in the extreme cold of the 
high alpine regions where they dwell. Although empirical studies with birds in the family 
Corvidae (crows and their relatives) suggest that they possess many aspects of 
intelligence previously ascribed only to primates (i.e. manufacture and use of tools, 
inferential reasoning, etc.), few studies have examined numerical cognition in this family. 
In the only other study of numerical ability in nutcrackers, the birds were required to 
locate an object on the basis of its ordinal position in a series of identical objects. The 
nutcrackers were trained to locate the 4th and 6th object in a series of 16. They chose the 
correct object significantly above chance in both conditions, based on its ordinal position. 
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Interestingly, during this task the nutcrackers always began at the left and not the right 
end; in other words, they seem to count from left to right, as do humans (Rugani et al. 
2010). Because of their need to keep track of a large number of caches and items within a 
cache, a sense of numerosity may be particularly well developed for nutcrackers 
compared to other corvid birds. Indeed, spatial cognition (Kamil & Balda 1985, Gibson 
& Kamil 2001a and b, Gibson & Kamil 2005, Gibson & Shettleworth 2003) is believed 
to be controlled by the same brain areas or with the same neural circuits as numerical 
cognition (Dehaene 1997). Therefore, animals like the nutcracker, for which spatial 
memory is an adaptive specialization, might also be expected to be proficient in their 
knowledge of number. 
Methods 
Animals 
Five adult nutcrackers (undetermined sex) were trapped in western North America 
and housed individually at the University of New Hampshire, in an environmentally 
controlled room (22° C, 14:1 Oh light: dark cycle). The birds had previously been used in 
several different experiments, (Gibson and Kamil 2001a &b; Gibson and Kamil 2005; 
Tornick et al. 2011; Tomick and Gibson, inferential reasoning, under review); none of 
which examined number cognition. The birds were maintained at 90% of their free-
feeding weight, by regulating intake of turkey starter, pigeon pellets, striped sunflower 
nuts, and mealworms following experimental sessions, and had unlimited access to grit 
and water. For the duration of the experiment, their daily ration of pine nuts (a favorite 
food) was given during training or testing sessions only. 
Apparatus 
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For familiarization, training, and testing, I transported the birds from their home 
room to an adjacent testing room in the same building. I trained and tested the 
nutcrackers individually in a cage measuring 45 cm wide x 45 cm long x 60 cm high 
(Figure 6). A single wooden perch sat 10 cm above the floor of the cage. The whole cage 
sat on a small wooden table measuring 45 cm wide x 70 cm long x 80 cm high. I 
positioned two small wooden choice trays (12 cm wide x 8 cm long x 2 cm high) on the 
table in front of the cage. Each choice tray had a well (5 cm wide x 5 cm long x 0.6 cm 
deep) that was lined with black rubber matting and had a hinged transparent Plexiglas® 
cover. The purpose of the rubber matting was twofold, it provided a visual contrast to 
make the light colored pine nuts more prominent, and it kept the nuts from slipping in the 
wells when the trays were moved. The Plexiglas® lid allowed a subject to see into the 
food well, but had to be lifted by the bird in order to access the contents of the well. I 
attached a handle to the front edge of the choice trays, so that I could manually slide the 
trays into (made accessible to subject) or out of the cage (made inaccessible). I added a 
movable wooden barrier (45 cm long x 12 cm high x 0.6 cm thick) outside the cage at the 
bottom so that the birds could not escape through the front (where the choice trays would 
be slid in and out). I affixed an opaque black curtain at the top of the front of the cage. To 
prevent accidently cueing the birds, I lowered the curtain when the bird made a choice 
(see procedures below) so that the experimenter was out of sight. I mounted an overhead 
Microsoft VX-6000 LifeCam video camera to the top of the cage, which I used to view 
and record the birds' choices via a Dell Inspiron 6400 laptop computer. 
Familiarization 
During familiarization, I gave each bird one daily session consisting of 16 trials in 
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the experimental apparatus. I placed a single Vz pine nut under the Plexiglas lid in the well 
of one of the sliding trays, and slid the tray into the cage. The subject could approach the 
tray and lift the Plexiglas® lid with its beak to obtain the nut inside. After one week, all 
five birds were quickly opening the lid to extract the pine nut. 
Training 
During each trial, I placed the bird in the experimental cage and lowered the 
opaque curtain. The experimenter sat in a chair in front of the apparatus, and placed one, 
two or three pine nuts under the Plexiglas® lid in the well of one of the two sliding trays 
(the other tray remained empty). Even though only one of the two food wells in the trays 
was baited, the experimenter opened and closed the lid of the unbaited, as well as the 
baited food well (randomized which side was manipulated first). I also randomized which 
side was baited and the number of pine nuts (~5 trials per daily session for a total of 8-10 
pine nuts) that were placed into the food well of one of the trays. Once one of the trays 
was baited, the experimenter simultaneously slid both trays into the cage. The subject 
was allowed to make a single choice. I recorded a choice when a bird first touched a lid 
on one of the food wells with its beak. As soon as a choice was made, the experimenter 
slid the unchosen tray out of the cage. If the subject chose the baited food well 
(considered a correct choice), it was allowed to consume the pine nuts. If the bird chose 
the empty food well (an incorrect choice) it received no reinforcement, and I repeated the 
trial. I recorded the birds' choice (baited or empty, left or right side) for each trial. I 
required a minimum of 7 out of 8 correct choices for 5 consecutive days before 
proceeding to testing. 
Testing 
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Testing took place between 8 and 10 A.M. daily, prior to maintenance feeding. 
The testing procedures were the same as training except that, instead of one of the wells 
in one of the trays being empty, I baited the two food wells with different quantities of 
pine nuts. I distributed the nuts pseudo-randomly on the black matting in the food wells. 
Both sets of nuts were visible during the entire trial, a procedure that has previously been 
used for birds (e.g., African grey parrots, A1 Am et al. 2009). I added an additional clear 
Plexiglas® panel (40 cm long x 10 cm wide x 0.3 cm thick) on top of both choice trays. 
The purpose of this panel was to allow the birds to see the contents of the baited food 
wells, but prevent them from making a hasty choice. At the start of a trial, the 
experimenter placed the Plexiglas® panel over the two sliding trays. The experimenter 
then simultaneously slid the panel and the two choice trays into the cage. After a one 
minute delay the experimenter slid the Plexiglas® panel out of the cage and the bird was 
allowed to select one of the wells by lifting the Plexiglas® lid with its beak. Just as in the 
training phase, as soon as the bird made a choice, the experimenter slid the unselected 
food tray out of the cage, so that only one choice could be made per trial. After the bird 
ate the contents of the chosen food well, the experimenter slid that tray away and the trial 
ended. For each trial, I recorded the birds' choice (larger or smaller, left or right side). If 
a bird chose either the larger (designated a correct choice), or the smaller (designated an 
incorrect choice) of the two quantities, it was allowed to consume all of the pine nuts 
from that pile. I did not administer correction trials. 
I tested the birds' ability to discriminate the following ratios: lv2, lv3, lv4, lv5, 
2v3, 2v4, 2v5, 3v4, 3v5, 3v8,4v5,4v6,4v8, and 5v6.1 presented each bird with between 
three and five of these ratios (random order) per daily session, for a total of 8-10 pine 
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nuts each day. I counterbalanced the side holding the larger quantity, and the larger 
quantity was not presented on the same side for more than two consecutive trials. Each 
bird encountered each ratio eight times, over a period of 25 days. After I conducted these 
tests, I extended testing to include seven additional ratios: 6v7, 6v8, 6v9,6vl2, 8v9, 
8vl0, and 8vl6. To avoid overfeeding I presented lA instead of whole pine nuts, for these 
new ratios. I cut the pine nuts so that they were uniform in size (best visual estimate). 
Each bird encountered two or three of these conditions per day (random order) and 
encountered each of these new conditions a total of eight times (over an additional 25 
days). 
Control Tests 
To see what stimulus features were important for the birds' choices, I ran three 
types of control tests: Number, Volume, and Area. In the Number condition, I presented 
the birds with two quantities of food that had an equivalent volume, but one tray had a 
larger number of nuts; 1 whole nut vs. 2 halves, 2 whole vs. 4 halves, and 3 whole vs. 6 
halves. I attempted to ensure that the volumes of nuts in the two trays were equivalent 
(best visual estimate), and that the whole array took up the same amount of area. 
During the Volume control tests I wanted to know whether the birds would be able 
to choose by volume when the number of nuts and the area occupied by the food on the 
tray was held constant. I examined three conditions: 1 whole vs. 1 half nut, 2 whole vs. 2 
half nuts, and 3 whole vs. 3 half nuts. Here I tried to keep the area of the array constant 
(note that this is not possible in the case of 1 whole vs. 1 half, so volume may be 
confounded with area in that particular condition only). 
Using the Area control tests I wanted to know whether the area occupied by the 
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nuts on a tray, when the number and volume of the nuts were held constant, would 
control behavior. I tested the birds with three conditions: 2 whole nuts in a small array (~ 
5mm spacing between nuts) vs. 2 whole nuts in a large array (~3cm spacing between 
nuts), 3 whole nuts in small array vs. 3 whole nuts in large array, and 4 whole nuts in a 
small array vs. 4 whole nuts in a large array. 
I conducted the trials in the Number, Volume, and Area control conditions using 
the same procedures for testing described above. I randomized the order of presentation 
of the control type and the conditions, and randomized the tray in which the larger 
number, volume, or area of nuts was presented. I gave the birds 4 or 5 trials per daily 
session (for a total of 8-10 pine nuts), and tested them 8 times with each condition over a 
17 day period. For each trial, I recorded the birds' choice (larger or smaller, left or right 
side). The subject was allowed to consume all of the pine nuts from whichever pile it 
chose. I did not use correction trials during these control tests. 
Analysis 
I determined the percentage of occasions that a nutcracker selected the tray with 
the larger number of nuts for each of the conditions used during testing. I conducted 
binomial tests to examine whether the number of occasions that the nutcrackers selected 
the food well with the larger number of nuts was greater than expected by chance for 
each of the conditions used during testing. Next, I plotted the percentage of choices for 
the larger of two quantities of nuts as a function of the ratio index; a measure of the 
proportion of nuts in the two food wells during a test (ratio index = smaller number of 
nuts/ larger number of nuts). I then performed a linear regression using the percent choice 
scores as one factor and the ratio index as a second factor to assess if the choices made by 
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the nutcrackers changed as a function of task difficulty (increasing ratio index). I 
performed a second regression to determine if the distance (disparity) between the two 
quantities of nuts in each tray influenced the choices made by the birds. I created a 
distance index by determining the absolute difference in the number of nuts in the two 
trays. I then used the distance index and the percentage of tests that the birds selected the 
larger quantity of nuts as factors in the regression. I performed a third regression to 
determine if, at constant distances, the increasing magnitude of the numbers in the pair 
influenced the choices made by the birds. To do this I created a magnitude index by 
summing the two quantities of nuts in each tray for each test. Then I organized the data 
into three categories based on the distance of the two quantities: constant distance of 1 
(i.e. Iv2,2v3 etc., N=7), constant distance of 2 (i.e. Iv3,2v4 etc., N=6), and constant 
distance of 3 or more (N=8). For each of these three categories I used the magnitude 
index and the percentage of tests that the birds selected the larger quantity of nuts as 
factors in the regression. 
Finally, I used binomial tests (2-tailed) to examine if the percentage of choices for 
the larger of the two quantities in each food well was significantly more or less than 
expected by chance for each of the Number, Volume, and Area control conditions. 
Results 
The nutcrackers selected the larger of the two quantities of nuts significantly more 
often than would be expected by chance during all of the ratios (Table 1, all ps, < 0.05) 
except the 8 vs. 9 condition (during which they performed at a chance). The data from 
individual birds also is consistent with this trend. The regression analysis I performed 
using the ratio index for each condition and the percentage of choices for the larger 
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quantity of nuts revealed a significant negative linear relationship between these two 
factors (R2 = 0.429, p = -29.35,/? = 0.001; Figure 7, left panel). Thus, as the ratio 
between the numbers of nuts in the two food wells increased (became more difficult) the 
ability of the nutcrackers to discriminate between them became more difficult. The 
impact of distance, that is the difference in the number of nuts in the two piles, was less 
pronounced. The birds did show a trend of selecting the larger of the two quantities of 
nuts as the distance between the two quantities increased (Figure 7, right panel). 
However, the impact of distance on choice was just outside my criterion for statistical 
significance (R2 = 0.157, (3 = 1.923,/? = 0.076). As can be seen in Figure 8, at constant 
distances, the birds were just as good at discriminating conditions with small and large 
magnitudes. Correspondingly, there was no significant effect of magnitude at a constant 
distance of 1 (N = 7, R2= 0.275, p = -1.034,/? = 0.227; Figure 8), a constant distance of 2 
(N = 6, R2= 0.050, P = -0.311,/? = 0.669; Figure 8), or a constant distance of 3 or more 
(N = 8 R2= 0.150, p = -0.432,/? = 0.342; Figure 8). 
During the Number control condition (when the volume of the nuts and the area 
they occupied was held constant), the birds chose the food well with the smaller number 
of nuts significantly more often than would be expected by chance (Mean = 0.35, SE = 
0.055,/? = 0.001; Figure 9). In the Volume control condition, the birds had a strong 
preference for choosing the food well with the greater volume (Figure 9) when number of 
nuts was held constant but the volume of one set of nuts was increased (Mean =0.925 SE 
= 0.036,/? < 0.001). In the Area condition, the nutcrackers chose the food well with the 
smaller area of nuts (Figure 9) more often than expected by chance (Mean = 0.425, SE = 
0.060, p = 0.030) when the volume and number of nuts were both held constant. Results 
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for individual birds are shown in Table 2. 
Discussion 
In the current study I tested the ability of Clark's nutcrackers to make a relative 
number discrimination by choosing the larger of two quantities of pine nuts. I tested a 
large number of conditions, and used quantities of higher magnitudes than are typical in 
these types of tests for animals. The nutcrackers' performance was significantly above 
chance for 20 out of the 21 conditions that I examined. Thus, even for very fine 
discriminations, the nutcrackers were adept at choosing the larger pile. Compared to 
many other animals tested with a similar paradigm, the nutcrackers performance appears 
to be quite sophisticated. Previous studies of various species, mostly large brained social 
mammals including primates, have consistently demonstrated that the ability to 
discriminate between two quantities is limited to a maximum set size of four (reviewed in 
Gallistel 1989, Dehaene 1997). Exceptions to the set size limit of four have been shown 
in dolphins (Jaakkola et al. 2005), Asian elephants (Elaphus maximus, Irie-Sugimoto et 
al. 2009) and one individual African grey parrot (Pepperberg, 2006). The nutcrackers in 
this study, on the other hand, were proficient at contrasts including up to 8, 10 and even 
16 items. Thus, within the animals tested so far, Clark's nutcrackers appear to be at the 
high end of the spectrum with regard to number discrimination abilities. 
I am not aware of other tests of number discrimination using this paradigm in 
birds. However, experiments using different procedures suggest that many birds are able 
to discriminate quantities of objects. For example, female brown-headed cow birds, an 
obligate brood parasite, prefer to lay eggs in host nests containing three eggs as opposed 
to nests with only one egg (White et al. 2007). Black-capped chickadees, Poecile 
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atricapillus, change the number of "chicks" and "dees" in their vocalizations depending 
on the perceived level of threat of a predator (Templeton et al. 2005). Ravens and 
jackdaws discriminate temporal vocalizations on the basis of number of elements 
(Koehler 1951). The cawing of crows also appears to be based on a simple number scale 
with an upper limit of about six (Thompson 1969). Thus, number sense might form the 
basis of communication in these species of birds. In a recent study, pigeons were trained 
to rank order pairs of stimuli consisting of one, two, or three elements (shapes or pictures 
on a computer screen). When tested with novel pairs of stimuli (quantities ranging from 1 
to 9), pigeons were significantly above chance in the novel pairings (Scarf et al 2011). 
The results of my study, in conjunction with those of Scarfs group, seem to support the 
notion that unlike most mammals, which can discriminate a maximum of only four 
objects (except elephants and dolphins, which can discriminate up to 6 items), 
discrimination of a larger number of objects may be possible among birds. 
The nutcrackers in this study showed a ratio effect, but no significant effects of 
distance or magnitude. The birds' ability to discriminate between the two quantities, 
while remaining above chance, declined as the ratio between the quantities became finer 
(as predicted by Weber's law). Thus they demonstrated a ratio effect that is consistent 
with results from other animals (e.g. Agrillo et al. 2009 and 2010; Brannon and Terrace 
2000; Buckingham et al. 2007; Cantlon and Brannon 2006; Gomez-Laplaza and Gerlai 
2011; Meek and Church 1983; Vallortigara et al. 2001). Other birds also seem to 
demonstrate a ratio effect. For example, Scarf and colleagues (2011) found that pigeons' 
(rank ordering of novel pairs of shapes on a computer screen) performance also declined 
with tighter ratios. For the nutcrackers in the current study, the distance effect was less 
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pronounced. The nutcrackers showed a slight (non-significant) tendency for increased 
accuracy as the distance (disparity) between the two numerosities increased. In contrast, 
in at least two studies, pigeons showed a significant distance effect. Roberts (2010) 
presented pigeons with red and green lights that appeared briefly in sequence, with the 
more frequent stimulus defined as 'A' and the less frequent stimulus defined as 'B\ The 
pigeons were required to choose a comparison stimulus that was the same color as the 
more frequent of the two stimuli. Three experiments clearly indicate that the pigeons' 
behavior is governed by a distance effect. In a similar study, Scarf and colleagues (2011) 
found that when rank-ordering novel pairs of shapes on a computer screen, pigeons were 
more accurate as the distance between the numerosities of a pair increased. Although it is 
difficult to make comparisons across species from studies using these different 
paradigms, it is possible that nutcrackers are more accurate than pigeons when the 
distances between the two numbers to be discriminated are small. 
The nutcrackers in the current study did not demonstrate a significant effect of 
magnitude for the conditions I tested. At constant distances, they were able to 
discriminate large quantities as successfully as smaller quantities. The only other animal 
that I am aware of that also does not show a magnitude effect is the Asian elephant 
(Elephas maximus). When tested with similar procedures as in the current study, 
elephants successfully discriminated objects up to a quantity of six; and only one of the 
nine elephants showed a magnitude effect (Irie-Sugimoto et al.2009). Thus, like the 
nutcrackers in the current study, most elephants did not have increasing difficulty with 
larger numbers (at a constant distance of 1, 3v4 was no more difficult than lv2), despite 
the fact that more total food was available in the larger contrasts. In contrast, in one of the 
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few studies to examine this effect in birds, Robert's (2010) pigeons showed a significant 
magnitude effect when choosing the more frequent of two stimuli. 
To determine which features the nutcrackers may be relying on to make choices, I 
also conducted three additional types of tests (Number, Volume, and Area controls). In 
the Number controls, I simultaneously presented the birds with two different quantities of 
pine nuts, but held the volume of food and the area of the two choices at a constant. 
Contrary to my expectations, the birds mostly chose the smaller number of items (i.e. 
they chose 1 whole nut over 2 half nuts). I expected the nutcrackers performance to be 
similar to that of young human children. Before reaching Piaget's concrete operational 
stage (around age 6 or 7), children prefer two half graham crackers over one whole 
graham cracker (i.e. Cordes and Brannon 2008). When asked why they make this choice, 
they explain that "two is more than one". The nutcracker's behavior seems to be more 
consistent with that of human adults, who also seem to prefer unbroken food when given 
a choice (i.e. Geier et al. 2006). The nutcrackers' behavior may also be consistent with 
optimal foraging theory (MacArthur and Pianka 1966), which states that organisms 
forage in such a way as to maximize their net energy intake per unit time. In order to 
forage optimally, nutcrackers may be hardwired to choose whole nuts, because broken 
pieces may be of poorer nutritional value, more difficult to carry, or they may decay more 
quickly. 
In the Volume controls, I simultaneously presented the birds with two different 
volumes of pine nuts, but I held the number and area (of the array) of the two choices at a 
constant. As I predicted, the birds overwhelmingly chose the quantity with the larger 
volume of food (i.e. they chose 2 whole nuts over 2 half nuts). This behavior is also 
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consistent with optimal foraging theory (MacArthur and Pianka 1966), because animals 
should be able to assess food patches and determine which has a larger volume of food. It 
should be adaptive for animals to be able to discriminate the amount (volume) of food 
material, and ignore number of items. This preference for the larger amount is so 
prevalent that it is often referred to as the "natural choice procedure" (Silberberg et al. 
1998). 
In the Area condition, I simultaneously presented pines nuts in a large array and a 
small array, but held the number and volume of the nuts constant. The nutcrackers chose 
at chance in two of the three conditions; and chose the smaller array in one of the 
conditions (they chose 2 whole nuts that were close together over 2 whole nuts that were 
farther apart). This is contrary to my prediction that the nutcrackers might deem the 
larger array more appealing, as it may seem like more food. Unlike the nutcrackers in this 
study, young (pre-operational) human children commonly mistake a larger array of 
objects as "more". For example, children shown two rows containing an equal number of 
pennies believe that the longer row has a larger quantity. They continue to hold this 
misconception even if the rows start out at the same length and then one of the rows is 
then spread further apart, and even after they have counted the pennies. Unlike young 
human children, the nutcrackers behavior (at chance or choosing the smaller array) seems 
to suggest that they are aware of the equivalence of the nut material in both sets. One 
reason that the nutcrackers may have chosen the smaller array in one of the three 
conditions is that to forage optimally, animals should select a patch in which food items 
are close together; thus searching/handling time is decreased and energy intake is 
increased. 
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It is not yet clear which evolutionary factors may have been responsible for the 
development of such a keen number sense in nutcrackers. The Clark's nutcracker is a 
relatively asocial corvid, yet it demonstrates advanced number comprehension. Their 
ability to discriminate among numbers is as good (or better) than those of much more 
social birds (i.e. pigeons, Scarf et al. 2010) and mammals. Thus, living in a large social 
group does not appear to predict proficiency at discriminating numbers; and social 
intelligence hypotheses are not supported. One clue about how advanced number 
comprehension may develop in a species may stem from the fact that both elephants 
(Rensch 1957, Foley et al. 2008) and nutcrackers have remarkable long-term memory, 
and both seem to excel at number discrimination. For example nutcrackers cache up to 
33,000 seeds each season, and need to remember their locations to retrieve them several 
months later. This increased pressure to keep track of such a large number of nuts over 
long distances may have driven the development of enhanced number cognition, as an 
adaptive specialization, in the nutcracker. Similar results from these two very distantly 
related organisms (nutcrackers and elephants) suggests that these unrelated animals with 
similar evolutionary pressures developed enhanced number cognition as a homoplastic 
trait (convergent evolution model). This in turn could suggest that numerical and spatial 
cognition may be controlled by the same brain areas or neural circuits. Imaging studies 
suggest that the intraparietal sulcus may control both number cognition and spatial 
memory (Dehaene 1997). The hippocampus also is important for spatial memory; and 
neuroimaging work suggests that it may also be involved in controlling number sense 
(van Opstal et al. 2008, Hubbard et al 2008). Research suggests that compared with other 
corvids, the nutcracker may have a relatively larger hippocampal volume to body size 
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ratio (Krebs et al. 1989, Sherry et all989, Basil et al. 1996). 
Scientists have also been interested in how animals represent numbers in memory. 
Two main representational systems have been posited, the object-tracking system and the 
analog-magnitude system. In object-tracking, animals represent small numbers as discrete 
numerosities in an "object-file" or "mental slot" (Uller 2008). Because of the small 
capacity of these "files", animals using this system are limited to a set size of about four 
(i.e. Feigenson et al., 2002, Hauser et al. 2003, Uller et al. 2001, McComb et al. 1994; 
Kitchen 2004; Uller and Lewis 2009; Uller et al. 2003, Mitchell et al. 1985, Kilian et al. 
2003, Ward and Smuts 2007). The results from the nutcrackers do not support an object 
file model, as the nutcrackers were quite successful with quantities larger than four. The 
other possibility is that animals represent numbers using an analog magnitude system in 
which objects are represented in a less precise way (Dehaene 1997, Shettleworth 2010). 
In this model it is not necessary for animals to recognize absolute numbers or to label 
each separate object (e.g., Meek and Church 1983). Thus, if using an analog-magnitude 
system, an animal will presumably be able to discriminate quantities larger than four. The 
behavior of the nutcrackers in the current study, as well as that of sea lions (Abramson et 
al. 2011), dolphins (Jaakkola et al 2005), and elephants (Irie-Sugimoto et al 2009) in 
other studies may be consistent with an analog magnitude system of representation. 
Conclusions 
The ability of many diverse animal species to comprehend numbers may represent 
the evolutionary underpinnings of the more sophisticated numerical skills found in 
humans, yet the origins of numerical cognition remain unclear (Uller 2008; Shettleworth 
2010). Here I present evidence for the tendency of a bird species, the Clark's nutcracker, 
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to select the larger of two simultaneously presented sets of food items, for set sizes up to 
16, in manner that may exceed the abilities of many large brained social mammals 
(including apes). The nutcracker has a unique set of ecological pressures that may have 
driven the development of a proficient number sense. Because the nutcracker is relatively 
asocial, it does not appear that living in a large group influences the development of a 
keen number sense. Rather, the nutcrackers' skill at discriminating numbers may be tied 
to its remarkable spatial memory, both from an evolutionary standpoint, and a 
neurological one. Additional tests of numerical ability in nutcrackers and related corvids 
(as well as other animal that store and do not store food) will be important to help us 
understand which pressures drive the evolution of numerical cognition, and which 
mechanisms and representational systems are utilized. 
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CHAPTER IV 
AN INVESTIGATION OF CACHE-PROTECTION BEHAVIOR 
IN THE ASOCIAL CLARK'S NUTCRACKER (NUCIFRAGA COLUMBIANA) 
Abstract 
I examined cache-protection behavior in the Clark's nutcrackers, a relatively 
asocial corvid bird. Past work with scrub jays indicates that this social corvid flexibly 
uses cache-protection strategies when they are observed making caches. I conducted 
several experiments to test whether nutcrackers, like scrub jays, alter caching and 
recovery behavior when observed, by caching food in locations that are far away from an 
observer, that are dimly lit, and that are behind a visual barrier. I found that, like scrub 
jays, nutcrackers engage in several different cache-protection behaviors (i.e. they 
preferentially cache in far locations and recover from in-view locations when they had 
been observed caching). The nutcrackers caching behavior was not affected by pilfering 
experience. Furthermore, the nutcrackers engaged in other behaviors that suggest social 
intelligence, such as increasing both caching frequency and caching rate in a hidden 
location when observed making caches. Increased activity in an in-view tray, with little 
caching there also suggests that the nutcrackers may have been exhibiting cache-guarding 
or false-caching behaviors. However, unlike scrub jays, the nutcrackers in this study did 
not increase caching in general when they were observed, nor did they suppress caching. 
Overall, nutcrackers cached more nuts and recovered a larger proportion of nuts that they 
61 
had cached, in comparison with scrub jays. Although there are some slight differences in 
the cache-protection behavior of the relatively asocial Clark's nutcracker and the more 
social scrub jay, both species seem to employ many similar (and some unique) cache-
protection strategies. Thus, I suggest that group size may be a less important predictor of 
social intelligence than foraging pressures related to caching. 
Introduction 
Social intelligence hypotheses (i.e. social function of intellect, Humphrey 1976; 
social brain hypothesis, Dunbar 1998) posit that living in complex social groups may 
enhance the cognitive repertoire of an organism. Being aware of the behavior of others 
and modifying one's own behavior in the presence of others may provide a number of 
advantages (Kraus & Ruxton 2002), such as increased mating opportunities (King and 
Cowlishaw 2007), predator avoidance (Jolly 1996), and foraging advantages (King and 
Cowlishaw 2007). Social animals have been shown to alter their behavior in the presence 
of others (Seed et al. 2009). For primates, there is evidence that group size is correlated 
with relative brain size, and living in large groups also predicts complex cognitive 
capabilities (Barett et al. 2002, Barton 1996; Dunbar 1998; Reader and Laland 2002; 
MacLean et al. 2008; Isler and van Schaik 2009). However, it is yet to be determined if 
social intelligence hypotheses can be extended to groups of animals other than primates. 
A few studies have examined social intelligence hypotheses in birds. For 
example, Bond and colleagues (2003 and 2010) examined one cognitive feature, 
transitive inference, in several species of corvid birds living in groups with varying 
degrees of social complexity. They found that highly social pinyon jays (Gymnorhinus 
cyanocephalus) showed an increased ability to use transitive inference to track multiple 
62 
dyadic relationships, compared with moderately social western scrub-jays (Aphelocoma 
californica). In another comparative study, Templeton, Kamil, and Balda (1999) tested 
relatively asocial Clark's nutcrackers (Nucifraga columbiana) and pinyon jays using both 
a motor task and a discrimination task to examine social learning. Nutcrackers learned 
faster individually than pinyon jays, while pinyon jays learned faster socially than 
nutcrackers. Lefebvre's group (1997) found that in various species of North American 
and British birds, feeding innovation and opportunism were correlated with increased 
forebrain size. These cumulative results provide some evidence supporting social 
intelligence hypotheses in birds. Yet much more work is needed. 
To examine whether social organization plays an important role in predicting 
social intelligence in birds, it is important to conduct comparative research examining 
social intelligence across closely related species of birds that differ with respect to social 
group size. One potentially fhiitful line of research is to study birds that cache food to see 
if they alter their behavior when they are observed caching by another individual (a gauge 
of social intelligence). Caching is the act of storing food (long-term or short-term) in 
times of plenty, to be recovered and utilized in times of scarcity. Many corvid species 
(crows and their relatives) regularly cache and pilfer food; and there is a good deal of 
evidence suggesting that they use cache-protection behaviors flexibly, depending on the 
specific social context of a caching event. For example, when observed caching, several 
corvids increase or decrease caching activity (increase- Eurasian jays, Garrulus 
glandarius, Bossema 1979; decrease- Northwestern crows, Corvus caurinus, James & 
Verbeek 1984; ravens, Corvus corax, Heinrich & Pepper 1998, Bugnyar & Kotrschal 
2002; rooks, Corvus frugilegus, Simmons 1968; grey jays, Perisoreus canadensis, 
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Burnell & Tomback 1985). Ravens (Bugnyar and Heinrich 2005) and magpies (Pica 
pica, Clarkson et al. 1986) prefer to cache out-of-view or in difficult-to-see locations 
when they are observed. Other corvids alter the spacing of a cache when observed 
(magpies, Clarkson et al. 1986; grey jays, Waite & Reeve 1995), repeatedly move their 
caches, or move their caches during private recovery sessions (Eurasian jays Goodwin 
1955, Cramp & Perrins 1994; ravens, Heinrich and Pepper 1998). Some corvids also 
increase cache-protection after they have pilfered the caches of others (scrub jays Emery 
et al. 2004, Clark's nutcrackers, Clary and Kelly 2011). 
A series of studies have extensively examined cache-protection behavior in the 
scrub jay, a relatively social corvid which lives in large flocks and is a generalist forager. 
For example, Dally, Emery, and Clayton (2004,2005a and b) tested scrub jays by 
providing differential caching opportunities in both the presence and absence of an 
observer, to determine if they preferentially cache in locations that make it more difficult 
for an observer to see (and potentially pilfer) their caches. The results indicate that scrub 
jays preferred to cache food in locations far away from an observer, out-of-view, and in 
"shady" locations. These behaviors were exhibited when the birds cached with another 
bird present, but not when they cached in private. During a recovery period, they 
relocated more seeds that were cached near an observer, in-view, and in "sunny" 
locations. Thus, scrub jays behave as if they are aware of another individual's knowledge; 
perhaps they use this knowledge flexibly to confuse potential pilferers. One explanation 
for modifying behavior in the presence of others is an awareness of another's intentions, 
and may be a precursor to a theory of mind (attribution of mental states to oneself and 
others) (Premack and Woodruff 1978, Hare et al. 2001, Emery & Clayton 2008). 
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In order to use a comparative approach towards understanding the evolution of 
social intelligence by examining cache-protection behavior, it is imperative to conduct 
studies that include asocial species. A good candidate for such comparative studies is the 
Clark's nutcracker, which is considered the least social of the corvids. Compared to most 
other corvids which form large flocks and breed or nest cooperatively, the nutcracker 
forms only small flocks as juveniles (Mewaldt 1948, Tomback 1978). Breeding pairs are 
highly territorial (Mewaldt 1956). Foraging individuals prefer to cache alone rather than 
in groups, and they distance themselves from conspecifics by approximately one meter 
(Tomback 1978, 1998). Although less social than other corvids, nutcrackers would 
potentially still benefit from paying attention to other individuals and utilizing cache-
protection strategies. But it is not known whether they are aware of others, or if they alter 
their cache-protection behavior flexibly as do more social corvids, like the scrub jay. 
Nutcrackers are known to occasionally pilfer each other's caches. However, Vander Wall 
(1982) and Bednekoff and Balda (1997) found that when nutcrackers observe another 
bird caching, they often have difficulty finding the food. This suggests that observational 
spatial memory may not have evolved in this asocial species. Clary and Kelly (2011) 
recently conducted a comparative study (a replication of a study with scrub jays, Emery 
et al. 2004) to examine how the experience of having one's cache pilfered affects 
subsequent caching behavior. They trained nutcrackers that any food cached in a tray that 
was near an observer would be "pilfered" (unavailable during recovery), but food cached 
in a tray that was far away from the observer was left intact (available during recovery). 
Nutcrackers that had previous experience with pilfering decreased the amount of caching, 
and recovered more nuts when they had been observed by a conspecific. This suggests 
65 
that nutcrackers, like more social scrub jays, may be sensitive to the presence of others 
and alter their caching behavior accordingly. Therefore, living in a large social group 
may not be a prerequisite for using cache-protection strategies flexibly. 
The purpose of this study was to conduct a set of detailed experiments to 
determine whether asocial Clark's nutcrackers alter their behavior when another bird is 
present in a manner similar to more highly social scrub jays (Dally et al. 2004,2005 a 
and b). Through of series of experiments, this study examines the influence of social 
group size on social intelligence (with regard to cache-protection) in caching corvids. I 
examined whether nutcrackers preferentially cache far away, in dimly lit locations, or 
behind a visual barrier, and whether they change their caching efficiency when observed. 
I predicted that even though nutcrackers are relatively asocial birds, they should prefer to 
cache nuts in locations that are far away from an observer, in "shady" locations, and out-
of-view, but not when caching "in private". I examined whether the birds would 
preferentially recover a larger proportion of nuts that they had cached (while being 
observed) from locations that are brightly lit, near an observer, and in the observer's line 
of sight. I also examined the nutcrackers behavior in the presence and absence of food, to 
determine how social interactions without food differ from caching behavior. Lastly, I 
examined whether experience of pilfering others' caches and having their own caches 
pilfered would subsequently affect the nutcrackers' caching behavior. If the nutcrackers 
exhibit cache-protection behavior that is similar in nature to the more social scrub jay, the 
social intelligence hypothesis will not be supported. If nutcrackers exhibit similar cache-
protection strategies as the scrub jay, it will suggest that the pressures of caching and 





Five captive wild-caught Clark's nutcrackers of undetermined sex and age were 
maintained {ad libitum) on a diet of turkey starter, rowdybush pellets, striped sunflower 
nuts, and mealworms (Tenebrio molitor). They also received 50 pine nuts during daily 
testing or training sessions, which they could eat or cache. During probe training, two of 
the birds exhibited caching behavior at free-feed weight; therefore they were maintained 
on a free-feed diet for the duration of the experiments. Three other birds did not cache at 
free-feed weight, so they were reduced to 90% of free feed weight (by adjusting the 
amount of grain mix), and then they began caching. Water and grit were provided ad 
libitum. The birds were housed in individual cages measuring 60 x 60 x 80 cm (w, d, h) 
in an environmentally controlled room (22° C, 14:1 Oh light: dark cycle). All of the 
nutcrackers participated in previous experiments examining spatial cognition (during 
which they searched for, but did not cache pine nuts), gesture comprehension, inferential 
reasoning, and number discrimination (Gibson & Kamil 2001, Gibson & Kamil 2005, 
Tornick et al. 2011, Tomick and Gibson under review, Tornick and Gibson in 
preparation). However, all of the birds were experimentally naive to caching and 
pilfering. 
Apparatus 
The apparatus used here is similar to that used to test scrub jays (Dally, Emery, 
and Clayton 2005a), but was made larger (by ~ 30%) for the larger nutcrackers. The 
experimental arena (115 cm wide x 115 cm long x 54 cm high) consisted of a wooden 
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platform covered in white laminate, with four wooden posts supporting plastic mesh on 
four sides and the top (Figure 10). Birds were added and removed through a mesh flap on 
one side of the arena. A separate metal cage (115 cm wide x 54 cm long x 54 cm high 
with a central perch) which could house a single conspecific observer was moved to 
either the left or the right side, adjacent to the arena. Two open rectangular plastic utensil 
trays (36 cm wide x 15cm long x 6 cm deep) filled with corn cob filings were provided 
for caching and recovering pine nuts. Each tray was made visually distinct by affixing a 
wooden block (~8 cm wide x 5 cm long x 2 cm deep) which served as a unique marker (a 
green alligator and a blue rhino block) along one of the long edges of the tray (Figure 11). 
To help the birds orient, the two trays were always placed such that the alligator 
was located on the left side of the rhino (with respect to the focal bird). During testing, a 
centrally located bowl contained 50 pine nuts, a large enough quantity to ensure that 
caching was not restricted due to availability. The caching trays were always positioned 
equidistant from the food bowl (see Figures 12, 14, and 16 for the spatial arrangement of 
the trays in each experiment). Training and testing took place in a separate room, adjacent 
to the room in which the birds were housed. An overhead camera Microsoft LifeCam was 
used to view and record the behavior of the birds from an adjacent room. 
Familiarization 
The birds were familiarized with the apparatus and caching trays (in a central 
location in the arena, and in private) and bowl of 50 pine nuts, for 15 minutes each day. 
During these daily sessions, the birds were free to explore the arena, and eat or cache the 
pine nuts. Birds were then removed from the caching arena, and fed a maintenance diet in 
their home cages. After a 24 hour retention period, the birds were allowed a 5 min 
68 
recovery period to either eat or re-cache nuts they had cached (no additional nuts were 
present). Once all five of the nutcrackers were reliably caching nuts (4 or more nuts 
cached for at least 5 sessions) testing began. This familiarization phase lasted a mean of 
17.4 days (SE = 4.08). 
Testing- caching and recovery 
In each daily session, I placed a bird in the testing arena for 15 minutes with the 
two caching trays (see individual experiments for a description of the experimental setup) 
and the bowl of 50 pine nuts. The trials were in one of two conditions: Observed: the 
observer was a different individual Clark's nutcracker, or Private: no observer, the 
observer chamber was empty. Individuals were paired in pseudo-randomized order, so 
that each bird was observed once by each of the other four birds. I also modified the 
location of the observer's cage between sessions, to counterbalance the observer's 
location with respect to the left and right side of the caching arena. At the end of a 15 
minute trial, I removed the birds and trays and recorded the number and exact location of 
each individual pine nut (both outside the trays as well as buried in the corn cob filings in 
the trays). I placed the birds back in their home cages for a 24 hour retention period, and 
fed them a maintenance diet. After the 24 hour retention period, the experimenter 
replaced the nuts and trays exactly as they were found, except that nuts found outside the 
trays were not replaced. 
The next day, I allowed the cacher back in the chamber for a 5 minute private 
recovery period, in which they could re-cache or eat the previously cached nuts. After 
this recovery period, I recorded the number and location of any remaining nuts. I then 
removed the birds, brought them back to their home cages, and fed them a maintenance 
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diet (see above). If a bird cached fewer than four pine nuts in a caching session, the 
recovery procedure proceeded the next day; however I omitted both the caching and 
recovery data (this was a rare occurrence). For each experiment, each bird received four 
"observed" and four "private" trials as a cacher, in randomized order. The order of these 
trials and the identity of the observer were counterbalanced. 
Experiment 1- Effect of Distance 
One cache-protection strategy that an animal can use if it is sensitive to the 
presence of others is to hide food far away from an observer (potential pilferer). Caching 
far from an observer functionally decreases the amount of visual information available to 
the observer that can be used to locate a hidden cache. Recently, scrub jays were given 
the opportunity to cache in one of two caching trays, a tray that was near a conspecific 
observer or a tray that was farther away (Dally et al. 2005a). The birds were also tested in 
private. Daily's group (2005a) found that the scrub jays tended to cache in the far tray, 
indicating that they were sensitive to the presence of the observer. In this experiment, I 
used procedures similar to those used by Dally and colleagues (2005a) to test whether 
nutcrackers also prefer to cache far away from a conspecific, and to provide a direct 
comparison of the effect of distance on caching decisions made by the social scrub jay 
and the asocial nutcracker. I gave the nutcrackers caching and recovery opportunities in 
trays that were either near or far from an adjacent cage, in both observed and private 
conditions. If the nutcrackers are sensitive to the presence of a conspecific during 
caching, then they should hide more nuts in the far tray than in the near tray as was the 
case with the scrub jays, but show no preference in cache location when alone. Likewise, 
nutcrackers should also recover more nuts from the near tray when they had been 
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observed caching, than when caching had been in private. 
Methods 
I placed the two caching trays such that one was "near" and the other "far" from 
the observer cage (Figure 12). In the observed condition, the observer was free to move 
about its cage. After each 15 minute caching session, I recorded the number of nuts 
cached as well as their location (near or far trays). After each 5 minute recovery sessions 
(24 hours after caching), I also recorded the number and location of all nuts (in near or far 
trays). 
Analysis. For the caching analysis, the dependent variable was the number of nuts 
cached in each tray. I used a general linear model (GLM), repeated measures analysis of 
variance (ANOVA). In the ANOVAI used session, social situation (observed or private), 
and tray (near or far) as variables. I used a Kolmogorov-Smirnov procedure to test for 
deviation from normal distribution; and Levene's tests to confirm homogeneity of 
variance. I used paired samples /-tests to compare the total number of nuts cached and 
recovered in private and when observed (to test for general suppression or increase of 
caching), and the total number of nuts cached in near or far trays (to test for a phobia for 
or attraction to the adjacent cage). Next, I used paired samples /-tests to compare the 
number of nuts cached in four comparisons: 1) far/observed vs. near observed, 2) 
far/private vs. near/private, 3) far/observed vs. far/private, and 4) near/observed vs. 
near/private. To control for inflation of P values, I used a Bonferroni correction and 
report obtained alpha (a0bt)- To be consistent with previous studies (Dally et al 2004, 
2005a), I report medians and interquartile ranges (IQR). Alpha was set at 0.05 to 
determine significant effects, and all tests were two tailed. 
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For the recovery analysis, I calculated the number of nuts recovered in each tray 
as the difference between the number of nuts the bird had cached 24 hours prior and the 
number of nuts left in that tray at the end of the 5 min recovery session, regardless of the 
number of nuts eaten or moved (as per Emery et al. 2004, Clary and Kelly 2011). Then I 
calculated the proportion of nuts recovered, by dividing the number of nuts recovered by 
the number of nuts that had been cached the day before. I then conducted the identical 
analyses for the recovery data as I did for the caching data, using the proportion of nuts 
recovered as the dependent variable. 
Results and Discussion 
Caching. The ANOVA revealed a near significant interaction between social 
situation x tray (Fi^ = 6.36, P = 0.06). No significant effects were detected for session 
(F3,I2= 3.60, P = 0.08), tray (Fi,4 = 5.377, P = 0.08), social situation (Fij4 = 4.77, P = 
0.09), or the interaction of session x social situation (F3J2 = 0.94, P = 0.45), session x tray 
(F312 = 0.31, P = 0.82), or session x social situation x tray (F3J2= 0.96, P = 0.44). 
The nutcrackers cached significantly more nuts in the far/observed condition 
(median = 9.5, IQR = 13.5) than the near/observed condition (median = 5, IQR = 8.5) (N 
= 20, fi9= 3.42, a0bt = 0.01, P < 0.01; Figure 13 left panel); however there was no 
significant difference in the number of nuts cached between the far/private condition 
(median = 8.5, IQR = 6.5) and the near/private condition (median = 12, IQR = 11.5) (N= 
20, tig- -2.17, ctobt - 0.01, P - 0.04; Figure 13 left panel). The nutcrackers cached 
significantly fewer nuts in the near/observed condition (median = 5, IQR = 8.5), than in 
the near/private condition (median - 12, IQR - 11.5) (N = 20, tig= -3.61, a^t = 0.01, P < 
0.01; Figure 13 left panel). They also cached more nuts in the far/observed condition 
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(median = 9.5, IQR = 13.5) than they cached in the far/private condition (median = 8.5, 
IQR = 6.5), but this difference failed to reach significance (N = 20, tig= 2.45, Oobt = 0.01, 
P = 0.02; Figure 13 left panel). 
Overall there was no difference in total number of nuts cached by the nutcrackers 
when they were observed caching (total of far and near trays, N = 40) or when they 
cached in private; or total number of nuts cached in far (total of observed and private, N = 
40) or near trays (Ps > 0.05). The data were normally distributed, and did not violate the 
assumptions of homogeneity of variance. 
Recovery. The nutcrackers, on the whole, recovered a large proportion of seeds 
that they had cached (median > 59% in all four of the conditions, Figure 13 right panel). 
However, there was no significant effect of session (F3J2 = 1-27, P = 0.33), tray (Fj^ = 
0.19, P = 0.69), social situation (Fi,4 = 1.33, P = 0.31), or the interaction of session x 
social situation (F3>i2 = 0.74, P = 0.55), session x tray (F3J2 = 2.01, P = 0.17), social 
situation x tray (Fj^ = 1.01, P = 0.37), or session x social situation x tray (F3.12 = 0.26, P 
= 0.85). 
There were no significant difference in the proportion of nuts recovered between 
far/observed vs. near/observed, far/private vs. near/private, far/observed vs. far/private, or 
near/observed vs. near/private (N = 20 for each group, all Ps > 0.05, Figure 13 right 
panel). Overall there was no difference in total number of nuts recovered by the 
nutcrackers when caching had been observed (total of far and near trays, N = 40) or when 
caching had been in private; or total number of nuts recovered from far (total of observed 
and private, N = 40) or near trays (Ps > 0.05). Data were normally distributed and did not 
violate the assumptions of homogeneity of variance. 
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The nutcrackers altered their behavior by hiding more nuts in the tray that was far 
from an observer than they hid in the tray that was nearer to an observer. They also hid 
comparatively more nuts in the tray that was far from an observer than they hid in the 
tray that was far from an empty cage (and they hid fewer nuts in the tray near an observer 
than they hid in the tray near an empty cage). This seems to be similar to the cache-
protection strategy (caching far from a conspeicifc when observed) used by the much 
more social scrub jay (Dally et al. 2005). Thus, cache-protection behavior may be 
adaptive both for animals that live in large social groups as well as for those that are less 
social. Interestingly, unlike scrub jays, which seem to increase caching when they are 
observed (Dally et al. 2005), the nutcrackers did not increase (or decrease) caching in the 
presence of an observer. The nutcrackers simply cached a large numer of nuts both when 
observed (19.5 of the 50 nuts availible in a 15 min session) and in private (18 nuts), but 
hid nuts preferentially in the far tray only when an observer was present. This is 
somewhat inconsistent with another study (Clary and Kelly 2011), in which naive 
nutcrackers as well as those given pilfering experience actually decreased caching, both 
when caching was observed and in private (but not when caching in the presence of an 
inanimate object). In Clary and Kelly's (2011) study however, the private condition 
differed in that a conspecific was present, but behind a visual barrier. Thus, cachers could 
have detected auditory cues, and altered their behavior accordingly. Results from the 
current study suggest that nutcrackers that are naive to pilfering do not increase or 
suppress caching in the presence of an observer, compared to when caching in complete 
privacy. 
During recovery, the nutcrackers recovered a large proportion of the nuts that they 
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had cached in all of the conditions. However, the proportion of nuts recovered was not 
different when the nutcrackers had previously been observed making caches (median of 
38.76%) than when they had cached in private (median of 50%). This seems to be 
different than the behavior that the scrub jays exhibited; the scrub jays increased recovery 
when they were observed and preferentially recovered nuts from the near tray when they 
had been observed caching (Dally et al. 2005a). It is not clear why scrub jays show more 
sensitivity (increased cache-protection) with regard to recovering their caches than the 
nutcrackers. Perhaps the nutcrackers are simply more efficient at recovery; recovering a 
larger proportion of nuts in general, without regard to the specific condition (observed or 
private) or caching tray (near or far). My results also differ from those obtained by Clary 
and Kelly (2011). In their study, naive and experienced nutcrackers recovered more nuts 
in the observed condition than they did when they had cached in private, or when they 
were observed caching by an inanimate object. It is not clear why I did not see a similar 
pattern of results in my study; rather the nutcrackers in the current study simply 
recovered a high proportion of nuts regardless of condition. One possibility is that in 
Clary and Kelly's (2011) study, the nutcrackers were given a 15 minute recovery period, 
compared to only 5 minutes in the current study. Thus, the nutcrackers in the current 
study may have eventually shown an increase in recovery in the near tray if they had been 
given more time (but then a direct comparison to scrub jays would not have been 
possible). 
Experiment 2- Effect of Lighting 
Another cache-protection strategy that an animal can use if it is sensitive to the 
presence of others is to hide food in difficult-to-see locations when an observer is present. 
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Dally, Emery, and Clayton (2004) gave scrub jays the opportunity to cache in either 
"sunny" or "shady" trays, in both private (an adjacent cage remained empty) and 
observed conditions. The scrub jays in that study preferentially cached in the shade when 
they were observed by a conspecific. To examine how social group size might affect 
cache-protection behavior, I tested caching decisions in the relatively asocial nutcracker 
using similar procedures as Daily's group (2004). As in Experiment 1,1 again examined 
the number of nuts cached and recovered in bright and dimly lit trays (when caching was 
observed and in private) to see if the nutcrackers' caching behavior would be affected by 
the amount of illumination at the caching site, and whether they prefer caching in 
difficult-to-see locations when they are observed. If the nutcrackers are sensitive to others 
and alter their behavior when an observer is present, I should expect them to cache more 
nuts in the "shady" tray when observed as compared to the "sunny" tray (or compared to 
the shady tray when caching in private). They should also recover more nuts from the 
"sunny" tray than the "shady" tray when caching had been observed (and more than the 
sunny tray when caching had been in private). 
Methods 
The same birds and apparatus were used as in Experiment 1. An opaque barrier 
(30 cm wide x 4 cm long x 52 cm high) was added to separate the caching arena into two 
distinct sides (Figure 14); but both sides and both caching areas were equally visible and 
equidistant from the observer's cage. The caching arena also had two lamps each with a 
single 60w bulb, one on each side of the partition. The overhead room lights were turned 
off during testing; then on one side of the caching arena the lamp was turned off to create 
a "shady" caching area, while on the other side the lamp was turned on to create a 
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"sunny" caching area. The temperature of the caching substrate was 21° C on the shady 
side and 22.5° C on the sunny side. Over sessions, I counterbalanced which side of the 
chamber was "sunny" or "shady", as whether the observer cage was on the left or the 
right of the caching arena. I placed one cob-filled tray (with its distinctive markings) in 
the "sunny" side of the arena and the other in the "shady" side (see Figure 14). The 
observer was free to move about the cage. After each 15 minute caching session and each 
5 min recovery session (24 hours after caching), I counted the number of cached nuts in 
each tray (sunny and shady trays). 
Analysis. As in Experiment 1, for the caching data, I used a general linear model 
(GLM), repeated measures ANOVA, with session, social situation (observed or private), 
and tray (sunny or shady) as variables. I used paired samples /-tests to compare the total 
number of nuts cached and recovered in private and when observed, and the total number 
of nuts cached in sunny or shady trays (to test for a phobia or attraction to a particular 
illumination). Next, I used paired samples /-tests to compare the number of nuts cached in 
four pairwise comparisons: 1) shady/observed vs. sunny/observed, 2) shady/private vs. 
sunny/private, 3) shady/observed vs. shady/private, and 4) sunny/observed vs. 
sunny/private. For the recovery analysis, I used the same procedures as in Experiment 1.1 
examined the same pairwise comparisons as in the caching analysis (listed above), using 
the proportion of nuts recovered as the dependent variable. 
Results and Discussion 
Caching. No significant effect was detected for session (F3)i2= 0.61 , P = 0.62), 
tray (Fij4 = 2.36, P = 0.20), social situation (Fi>4 = 0.61, P = 0.48), session x social 
situation (F3J2= 0.43, P = 0.73), session x tray (F3J2 = 3.35, P = 0.08), social situation x 
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tray (Fi^ = 0.48, P = 0.53), or session x social situation x tray (F3.12 = 4.58, P = 0.06). 
Likewise, I did not find any significant difference between shady/observed vs. 
sunny/observed, shady/private vs. sunny/private, shady/observed vs. shady private, or 
sunny/observed vs. sunny/private (N = 20 for each group, all Ps > 0.05, Figure 15 left 
panel). There was no difference in total number of nuts cached when the birds were 
observed caching (total of sunny and shady trays, N = 40) and the total number of nuts 
cached in private, or the total number of nuts cached in shady trays (total of observed and 
private, N = 40) and the total number of nuts cached in the sunny trays (Ps > 0.05). 
Recovery. I did not detect any significant effects for session (F3J12 = 1.87, P = 
0.19), tray (Fj)4 = 0.22, P = 0.67), social situation (Fi,4= 0.01, P = 0.97), session x social 
situation (F3,I2 = 0.62, P = 0.62), session x tray (F3J2 = 0.75, P = 0.54), social situation x 
tray (FI^ = 0.10, P - 0.77), or session x social situation x tray (F3.12 = 2.39, P = 0.12). 
The pairwise comparisons also indicated no significant differences between 
groups (N = 20 for all groups, all Ps > 0.05, Figure 15 right panel). There was no 
significant difference between the total mean proportion of nuts recovered when caching 
had been observed (total or shady and sunny trays, N = 40) and the total mean proportion 
of nuts recovered when caching had been private (N = 40), or between the total mean 
proportion of nuts recovered from shady trays (total of observed and private, N = 40), and 
the total mean proportion of nuts recovered from sunny trays (N = 40) (Ps > 0.05). 
As in Experiment 1, the nutcrackers readily cached in both trays, and they cached 
a large number of nuts (i.e. overall mean = 23.5 out of 50, SE = 18.1) in the 15 minute 
caching period. However unlike Experiment 1, in which the nutcrackers altered their 
caching behavior when an observed was present, I did not see that pattern in this 
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experiment. Specifically, the nutcrackers did not demonstrate a preference to cache in the 
shady tray when an observer was present This contrasts with the behavior reported for 
scrub jays, which preferentially cached pine nuts in the "shade" when an observer was 
watching (Dally et al. 2004). Also, as in Experiment 1, in this experiment the nutcrackers 
again did not exhibit social suppression (or increase) of caching in the presence of an 
observer (median of 24.5 nuts out of 50 in a 15 min session when observed, and 22.5 nuts 
in private). 
My data for nutcrackers could be interpreted in several ways. First, it is possible 
that the birds were not sensitive to the presence of the observer; however this is unlikely 
given that they demonstrated sensitivity to the presence of a conspecific in Experiment 1 
(Effect of Distance). Second, it is possible that the nutcrackers were not sensitive to the 
difference between the sunny and shady trays, or that the difference in illumination was 
not great enough; again this seems unlikely as the nutcrackers have very acute vision 
(Gibson & Kamil 2005). A third possibility is that the propensity to cache in the shade to 
hide nuts from an observer, could have been counteracted if the nutcrackers generally 
prefer to cache in the sun. However, this is not supported because in the private 
condition, the birds did not show a preference to cache in the sun compared to the shade. 
The final possibility is that the nutcrackers did not consider caching in the shade to be an 
effective cache protection strategy. Since their vision is so keen, they may be able to see 
equally well in the shady and sunny trays. Extending this logic, they may have been able 
to project their experience onto the observer. Clayton and colleagues have suggested that 
scrub jays may be capable of experience projection, a form of theory of mind (Clayton et 
al. 2007; Emery & Clayton 2004, 2008). If a nutcracker possessed knowledge that, like 
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itself, the observing bird could clearly see into both the sunny and the shady tray, it may 
not show a preference for caching in either tray. 
As in Experiment 1, the nutcrackers also recovered a large number of nuts that 
they cached, but they did not recover more nuts when they had been observed making 
caches. It is not clear how this behavior compares to scrub jays, because the scrub jays in 
Dally, Emery, and Clayton's (2004) study did not recover enough nuts for analysis. 
Therefore, it is inconclusive whether scrub jays preferentially recover more nuts from a 
brightly lit location when they are observed making a cache. However, I can tentatively 
conclude that neither nutcrackers nor scrub jays recover more nuts from a "sunny" tray 
(compared to "shady" tray) when they had been observed. 
Experiment 3- Visual barrier and Pilfer experience 
Another potential cache-protection strategy is to cache out-of-view of an 
observer. Dally, Emery, and Clayton (2005a) provided scrub jays with the opportunity to 
cache in either a location that was visually obstructed from an observer, or a location that 
was in the observer's line of vision. The scrub jays showed sensitivity to the presence of 
the observer by preferentially caching in the hidden location when they were observed, 
but not when they cached in private. Here I used similar procedures to determine if the 
less social nutcrackers would also show sensitivity to an observer. The nutcrackers were 
given the opportunity to cache and recover nuts either in a tray that was in plain view of 
the observer (in-view condition), or a tray that was located behind a visual barrier (hidden 
condition). If the nutcrackers are sensitive to others, then we should expect them to hide 
more nuts in the hidden tray when observed making caches compared to the in-view tray, 
and compared to when they cache in private. We should also expect the nutcrackers to 
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recover a greater proportion of the nuts that they had cached in the in-view tray compared 
to the hidden tray when their original cache-site had been observed, but not when caching 
had been in private. 
Previous work with social corvids indicates that the experience of pilfering 
another's cache, or having one's own cache pilfered influences an animal's decisions 
regarding caching and recovering food stores. For example, individual hand-raised scrub 
jays that were given experience pilfering another bird's cache were more likely to move 
their cache to another site when they had been observed caching (compared to when they 
cached in private). On the other hand, naive birds did not hide their caches in new 
locations (Emery and Clayton 2001). This suggests that individual scrub jays may be able 
to project their experience of pilfering caches onto other birds, and subsequently change 
their cache-protection strategy (Emery & Clayton 2004). Here I provided the nutcrackers 
with experience pilfering the caches of other birds, as well as experience having their 
own caches pilfered, to see how this experience might affect their caching and recovery 
behavior. If experience is important, we should expect an increase in cache-protection 
behavior (both increased caching in the hidden tray when observed and increased 
recovery from the in-view tray when caching had been observed) after experience. 
Methods 
The same birds and apparatus were used as in Experiment 1 and 2. The two cob-
filled trays were located such that one was in-view and the other was behind an "L" 
shaped %" white melamine visual barrier (55cm wide x 20 cm long x 52 cm high) and 
was therefore hidden from the observer (Figure 16). An opaque white barrier curtain was 
added as a partition to the observer cage, so that the observer's location was restricted to 
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the in-view side of the cage. After each 15 minute caching session, the number of cached 
nuts was compared to determine if the nutcrackers prefer to cache in a hidden location 
when a conspecific is watching (but not when alone). The number of nuts (in-view or 
hidden trays) was also counted after 5 minute recovery sessions (24 hours after caching), 
and the proportion of nuts recovered to nuts cached was calculated (see general 
procedures). 
After I completed the initial Visual Barrier tests, I gave the birds experience with 
pilfering the caches of the other birds, and having their own caches pilfered. Each bird 
received four daily sessions of pilfer experience, interspersed with four daily sessions of 
"non-pilfer" experience. For the pilfer-experience, the experimenter placed a single 
caching tray in the center of one side of the caching arena. The focal bird was placed in 
the arena with a bowl of 50 pine nuts, and given the opportunity to cache or eat for 15 
min in the presence of a conspecific observer. Then the birds were removed to temporary 
transfer boxes and the bowl and any leftover (un-cached) pine nuts were removed. The 
observer and cacher were then switched so that the observer was placed into the caching 
arena, and the cacher was placed into the observer cage. Then while the cacher watched, 
the "pilferer" was allowed 5 min to search and either eat or re-cache the other bird's 
hidden pine nuts. The identity of the observer was randomized so that each focal bird was 
observed once by each of the other four birds, and each bird pilfered the other four birds' 
caches once. The location of the observer cage (left or right side of the caching arena) 
was pseudo-randomized. Both birds were then removed to their home cages. After a 4-6 
hour retention period, the experimenter removed most of the remaining nuts (if there 
were any), leaving at least one, but no more than two nuts and some scattered broken 
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shells in and around the tray. The experimenter placed the cacher back into the arena for 
5 min to search and eat or re-cache the remaining nut(s). Thus, during the recovery 
session, the cacher found many fewer nuts than it had hidden. The purpose of these 
sessions was to provide experience that an observing bird may have pilfered their cache 
(an inference was required). 
Alternating with these "pilfer" sessions, every other day the birds were given a 15 
min "non-pilfer" session (for a total of four sessions of this type). These sessions were 
identical to the pilfer sessions, except that the observer cage remained empty so that the 
focal bird cached in private. After the caching sessions, the experimenter left the nuts in 
the tray exactly as the cacher had placed them. After the 4-6 hour retention period, the 
cacher was placed back in the arena for 5 min, and allowed to recover (eat or re-cache) 
their nuts in private. The purpose of including this private caching training on alternating 
days was to prevent the caching behavior from extinguishing. After all of the pilfering 
experience training was complete, Experiment 3 (Visual Barrier) was duplicated in its 
entirety (4 observed trials for each bird with 4 recoveries plus 4 private trials with 4 
recoveries) to see if the results changed due to the pilfering experience. 
Analysis. As in Experiments 1 and 2, for the caching data, I used a general linear 
model (GLM), repeated measures ANOVA, with session, social situation (observed or 
private), and tray (hidden or in-view) as the variables. I used paired samples Mests to 
compare the total number of nuts cached and recovered in private and when observed, 
and the total number of nuts cached in hidden or in-view trays (to test for a phobia or 
attraction to the barrier, or an overall preference or dislike of the in-view area). Next, I 
used paired samples Mests to compare the number of nuts cached in four pairwise 
83 
comparisons: 1) hidden/observed vs. in-view/observed, 2) hidden/private vs. in-
view/private, 3) hidden/observed vs. hidden/private, and 4) in-view/observed vs. in-
view/private. For the recovery analysis, I used the same procedures as in Experiment 1 
and 2.1 examined the same pairwise comparisons as in the caching analysis (listed 
above), using the proportion of nuts recovered as the dependent variable. 
To analyze the results post-pilfer experience, I duplicated the statistical analysis 
(caching and recovery) described above. Then, I conducted an analysis to compare the 
birds' behavior between before and after the pilfering experience, using two-tailed paired 
/-tests, with Bonferroni corrections to compare conditions. Since I did not find any 
significant differences in caching or recovery, before and after the pilfer experience, I 
combined the before and after data to provide additional power to detect changes in 
behavior (N=40, instead of N=20). I conducted the identical statistical analysis for the 
combined data as reported previously, except with a larger N. 
Results and Discussion 
Caching. Prior to pilfering experience, no significant effect was detected for 
session (F3J2 = 0.96, P = 0.44), tray (Fi,4= 0.55, P = 0.10), social situation (Fi;4= 0.02, P 
= 0.88), session x social situation (F3J2 = 0.98, P = 0.44), session x tray (F342 = 0.94, P = 
0.45), social situation x tray (Fi^ = 3.29, P = 0.14) or session x social situation x tray 
(F3.12 = 2.52, P = 0.11). 
The nutcrackers cached more nuts in the hidden/observed condition (median = 
8.5, IQR = 14.5) than they cached in the in-view/observed (median = 5.5, IQR = 8.5); 
however this difference was not significant (N = 20, t\<f= 1.54, a0bt = 0.01, P = 0.14; 
Figure 17 left panel). They also cached fewer nuts in the in-view/observed condition 
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(median = 5.5, IQR = 8.5), than in the in-view/private condition (median = 8, IQR = 
12.5), but once again this difference is not significant (N = 20, tjg= -1.68, a^t = 0.01, P = 
0.11; Figure 17 left panel). The comparisons of hidden/private vs. in-view/private and 
hidden/observed vs. hidden/private were also not significant (all Ps > 0.05). There was no 
significant difference between the total number of nuts cached while observed (total of 
hidden and in-view trays, N = 40) and the total number of nuts cached in private (N = 
40), or between the total number of nuts cached in hidden trays (total of observed and 
private, N = 40) and the total number of nuts cached in the in-view trays (N = 40) (Ps > 
0.05). 
After pilfering experience, the birds demonstrated a similar pattern of behavior as 
before experience. No significant effect was detected for session (F3, ]2 = 0.51, P = 0.69), 
tray (Fi,4= 1.28, P = 0.24), social situation (Fi)4 = 3.55, P = 0.13), session x social 
situation (F3J I2 = 0.35, P = 0.79), session x tray (F3,12 = 2.29, P = 0.13), social situation x 
tray (Fi, 4 = 2.41, P = 0.20), or session x social situation x tray (F3.12 = 0.62, P = 0.61). 
Just as they did before pilfer-experience, after experience the nutcrackers cached 
more nuts in the hidden/observed condition (median = 6.0, IQR = 12.0) than in the in-
view/observed condition (median = 4.0, IQR = 10.8); however this difference was again 
not significant (N = 20, /i9= 0.31, ctobt = 0.01, P = 0.76; Figure 17 middle panel). Fewer 
nuts were cached in the in-view/observed condition (median = 4.0, IQR = 10.8), than in 
the in-view/private condition (median = 10.0, IQR = 8.5), but this difference was not 
significant (N = 20, tig= -1.71, a0bt = 0.01, P = 0.09; Figure 17 middle panel). The only 
difference that I detected is that after pilfering experience, when the nutcrackers cached 
in private, they cached significantly fewer nuts in the hidden tray (median = 5.0, IQR = 
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8.5) than the in-view tray (median = 10.0, IQR = 8.5) (N= 20, t/ g -  -2.81, Oobt= 0.01, P = 
0.01; Figure 17 middle panel). All other pairwise comparisons were not significant (all Ps 
> 0.05). When I compared the results from before and after pilfering experience, I did not 
detect any significant differences in number of nuts cached between any comparisons (all 
Ps > 0.05). 
When I combined the data from before and after pilfering experience I again 
found a similar pattern of behavior as I saw both before and after pilfering experience. 
However, combining the data from before and after pilfering experience allowed me to 
detect a significant interaction of social situation x tray (Fi,4 = 6.34, P = 0.03). There 
were still no significant effects for session (F3; 27 = 0.87, P = 0.46), tray (Fi( 9 = 0.14, P = 
0.72), social situation (Fi,9= 0.81, P = 0.39), session x social situation (F3>27 = 0.45, P = 
0.72), session x tray (F3,27= 2.23, P = 0.11), or session x social situation x tray (F3.27 = 
1.07, P = 0.38). 
For the pairwise comparisons, the major difference using the combined data is 
that I was now able to detect that the nutcrackers cached significantly fewer nuts in the 
in-view/observed condition (median = 6.5, IQR = 8.5), than they cached in the in-
view/private condition (median = 10.2, IQR = 11.5) (N = 40, -2.59, a0bt = 0.01, P = 
0.01; Figure 17 right panel). They also cached more nuts in the hidden/observed 
condition (median = 9.0, IQR = 12) than in the in-view/observed condition (median = 
6.5, IQR = 8.5); however this difference was not significant (N = 40, h9= 1.34, a0bt = 
0.01, P = 0.19; Figure 17 right panel). The birds also cached more nuts in the 
hidden/observed condition (median = 9.0, IQR = 12) than in the hidden/private condition 
(median = 6.7, IQR = 8.8), but again this difference is not significant (N = 40, ^9= 1.63, 
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ciobt = 0.01, P = 0.11; Figure 17 right panel). 
The cache-protection behavior seen in the current study in the asocial nutcrackers 
is similar to the behavior of more social scrub jays. Like scrub jays (Dally et al 2005a), 
the nutcrackers showed a significant decrease in caching in the in-view tray when they 
were observed. The nutcrackers showed a tendency to increase caching in the hidden tray 
when they were observed caching, although the differences never reached significance. 
On the other hand, the relatively social scrub jays demonstrated a significant increase in 
caching in the hidden tray when caching was observed (Dally et al. 2005a). It is not clear 
why the nutcrackers did not cache significantly more nuts in the hidden tray when they 
were observed. I initially thought they might have a phobia of the barrier, and this might 
counterbalance any tendency they might have had to cache more nuts in the hidden tray. 
However, the fact that overall they did not cache differently in the hidden versus the in-
view tray does not support this idea (hidden median =15.5, in-view median = 16.0). If the 
birds did have a dislike of the barrier, then the fact that they cached more nuts in the 
hidden area (observed condition) in spite of this fear is even more remarkable. Unlike 
scrub jays, the nutcrackers did not exhibit an increase in caching (scrub jays showed an 
non-significant increase in caching when observed, Dally et al. 2005a), nor did they 
suppress caching. 
Recovery. Prior to pilfering experience, there was a significant effect of 
tray (Fi,4 = 25.51, P < 0.01) and social situation x tray (Fi)4= 25.52, P < 0.01), but no 
effect of session (F3J2 = 1 -43, P = 0.28), social situation (Fi;4 = 3.36, P = 0.14), session x 
social situation (F3ii2 = 1.91, P = 0.18), session x tray (F3J2= 1-30, P = 0.32), social 
situation x tray (Fi;4 = 0.01, P = 0.97) or session x social situation x tray (F3.12 = 1.85, P = 
87 
0.19). 
When the nutcrackers had been observed making caches they later recovered a 
significantly larger proportion of nuts from the in-view tray (median = 100%, IQR = 
58.33%) than they recovered from the hidden tray (median = 54.2%, IQR = 77.5%) (N = 
20, tig = -3.29, dobt = 0.01, P < 0.01, Figure 18 left panel). The birds also recovered a 
larger proportion of nuts from the in-view tray when they had been observed caching 
(median = 100%, IQR = 0%), than they recovered from the in-view tray when they had 
cached in private (median = 50%, IQR = 0%) (N = 20, tig = 0.93, a^t = 0.01, P = 0.37; 
Figure 18 left panel), but this was not a significant difference. 
In total, there was no difference in mean proportion of nuts recovered when 
caching had been observed (total of hidden and in view-trays, median = 68.8%, IQR = 
65.2%) than when caching had been private (median = 27.2%, IQR = 27.8%) (paired 
samples /-test, N = 20, tig = 1.45, A0BT = 0.03, P = 0.18). However, the nutcrackers 
recovered a significantly larger proportion of nuts from in-view trays (total of observed 
and private, median = 54.4%, IQR = 50.4%) than from the hidden trays (median = 34.3%, 
IQR = 58.8%) (N = 20, T19 = -3.61, Oobt = 0.03, P <0.01). 
Again, after pilfering experience, the birds exhibited a similar pattern of behavior 
as they did before pilfering experience. However, now I was unable to detect any 
significant effects for session (F3) \2 = 0.90, P = 0.47), tray (Fij4= 1.20, P = 0.34), social 
situation (Fi,4 = 2.80 P - 0.17), session x social situation (F3,12 = 0.83, P = 0.50), session 
x tray (F3,12 = 1.70, P - 0.22), social situation x tray (Fi, 4 = 2.10, P - 0.22), or session x 
social situation x tray (F3.12 = 1.92, P = 0.18). 
The main difference from the pairwise comparisons is that when the nutcrackers 
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had been observed caching (just as before pilfering), they again recovered a larger 
proportion of nuts from the in-view tray (median = 91.7%, IQR = 74.4%), than they 
recovered from the hidden tray (median = 32.6%, IQR = 80.1%), but this difference was 
no longer significant (N = 20, tig = -1.41, ctobt = 0.01, P = 0.18, Figure 18 middle panel). 
They also recovered a larger proportion of nuts from the in-view tray when they were 
previously observed caching (median = 91.7%, IQR = 74.4%), than they recovered from 
the in-view tray when they had cached in private (median = 50%, IQR = 65%); but this 
difference was not still not significant (N = 20, //<? = 1.81, Oobt = 0.01, P = 0.09; Figure 18 
middle panel). When the results were compared before and after pilfering experience, I 
found no significant difference in proportion of nuts recovered between any comparison 
before and after pilfering (all Ps > 0.05). 
When the data from before and after pilfering experience were combined, the 
results showed the exact pattern as before pilfering experience. I again detected a 
significant effect of situation x tray (Fj, 4 = 6.38, P = 0.03). No significant effect was 
detected for session (F3) 21 ~ 0.76, P = 0.53), tray (Fi, 4 = 6.38, P = 0.03), social situation 
(F 1,9= 6.44, P - 0.03), session x social situation ^3,27 = 0.63, P = 0.60), session x tray 
(F3,27 = 0.40, P = 0.76), or session x social situation x tray (F3.27 = 2.93, P = 0.08). 
Just as before experience, when the nutcrackers had been observed caching, they 
recovered a significantly larger proportion of nuts from the in-view tray (median = 100%, 
IQR = 62.2%) than they did from the hidden tray (median = 41.1%, IQR = 73.5%) (N = 
40, tsg = -2.53, dobt = 0.01, P = 0.01; Figure 18 right panel). The combined data indicate 
(just as before experience) a larger proportion of nuts recovered from the in-view tray 
when the birds were previously observed caching (median = 100%, IQR = 62.2%), than 
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in the in-view tray when they had cached in private (median = 50%, IQR = 78.8%); this 
difference approached but still did not quite reach significance (N = 40, tw = 2.02, a^t = 
0.01, P = 0.050; Figure 18 right panel). 
With regard to recovery, the asocial nutcrackers showed sensitivity to the 
observer, by increasing recovery from the in-view tray when caching had been observed. 
The nutcrackers recovered a large percentage (overall ~ 45%) of nuts that they cached. 
Overall the nutcrackers recovered more nuts when they had cached in the presence of an 
observer than they did when they had cached in private (but this was not a significant 
difference). Interestingly, overall they recovered significantly more nuts from the in-view 
trays than from the hidden trays (both observed and in private). At first glance this looks 
like either an indication of a phobia of caching behind the barrier, or a preference to 
cache in the open. Upon further inspection though, this difference stems from the fact that 
they recovered significantly more nuts from the in-view tray, but only when caching had 
been observed (not when caching was in private). This is exactly the pattern I would 
expect to see if the nutcrackers are sensitive to an observer and alter their behavior 
accordingly. I had hoped to directly compare of recovery behavior between nutcrackers 
and scrub jays. However, as in the Experiment 2 (Effect of Lighting) due to low numbers 
of nuts recovered by the scrub jays (Dally et al 2005a), a comparison of those data was 
not possible. Therefore, it is not clear whether scrub jays (like nutcrackers) alter their 
recovery behavior when observed making caches. 
Effect of experience. The experience of pilfering did not seem to have a large 
impact on cache-protection behavior, since the pattern of caching behavior exhibited by 
the nutcrackers was similar both before and after pilfering experience. In the observed 
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condition, the nutcrackers again showed a tendency to protect their caches by caching 
less in the in-view tray than the hidden tray when observed (however, like before the 
difference it did not reach significance), but not in private. The only difference in caching 
behavior from before and after pilfer experience is that the nutcrackers actually seemed to 
slightly decrease caching in the hidden tray after pilfering experience, although this 
difference was not significant. Of course, it is possible that the pilfering experience I 
provided was insufficient to induce a dramatic increase in cache-protection behavior. If 
the nutcrackers were given more experience (perhaps by providing additional sessions of 
pilfering and being pilfered) they may have shown an increase in caching in the hidden 
tray and recovery from the in-view tray when observed. The analysis of the combined 
data from before and after pilfer experience again revealed an identical pattern of results 
for caching as in both before and after pilfer experience. When the data were combined, 
the main difference is that I was now able to detect a significant decrease in caching in 
the in-view tray when the birds were observed (as compared to when caching in private). 
Thus, in general, the nutcrackers show flexible cache-protection behavior in the presence 
of a conspecific observer. 
The pattern of recovery behavior (like caching behavior) exhibited by the 
nutcrackers after pilfering experience also suggests a minimal effect of experience. The 
birds' behavior was essentially identical before and after experience with pilfering. 
Again, the nutcrackers recovered the largest proportion of nuts from the in-view tray 
when they were observed (more than both hidden/observed and in-view/private). The 
only difference in recovery behavior from before and after pilfer experience is that 
although the nutcrackers again increased recovery from the in-view tray when caching 
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had been observed, after experience this was no longer significantly different than 
recovery from the hidden tray. Using the combined data I detected the same recovery 
behavior that I saw pre-pilfer experience; the nutcrackers recovered significantly more 
nuts from the in-view tray when observed. 
Thus, the results of this experiment indicate that experience may not be necessary 
for the nutcrackers to demonstrate a pattern of behavior consistent with cache-protection. 
It is possible that sufficient experience with pilfering was acquired either before birds 
were captured, or from routine experience in the laboratory. However, the nutcrackers 
probably did not have an opportunity to learn about pilfering in the laboratory because 
their cages are spatially separated, the birds have no physical contact, and they are unable 
to access each other's food. Therefore, the results of this experiment may suggest that 
either 1) the tendency for the nutcrackers to increase caching in a hidden location when 
observed is innate, or 2) the nutcrackers in this study (which were wild-caught), may 
have learned about pilfering before capture, but this would have been many years before 
the current experiment. To distinguish between these two possibilities, naive birds could 
be tested. The major difference between nutcrackers and scrub jays (Dally et al. 2005a) is 
that scrub jays seem to increase cache-protection after having minimal experience with 
pilfering, while nutcrackers seem to demonstrate the same pattern of behavior before and 
after pilfer experience. 
Experiment 4- Caching efficiency 
It was my impression in Experiment 3 that when the nutcrackers were observed 
by a conspecific, they increased their level of activity in the vicinity of the in-view tray. It 
appeared that the birds increased digging in the cobs, repeatedly caching and un-caching 
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nuts in the in-view tray (and not in the hidden tray). If so; the nutcrackers may have been 
demonstrating a different form of cache-protection behavior, such as false-caching in the 
in-view tray, guarding their cache, or intimidating the observer. To examine these 
possibilities, and to quantify this perceived activity, I created two new variables to 
measure caching efficiency, "caching frequency" and "caching rate". 
Methods 
After the main Visual Barrier experiment was complete, I randomly selected eight 
of those 20 videos (I made sure to include at least one video from each of the five 
nutcrackers) from the observed condition, and eight videos from the private condition. 
First, to examine caching frequency, I watched the videos and scored the number of 
pecks made to each tray (number of times a bird's beak was inserted into the cobs in the 
in-view and hidden trays). Then to calculate caching frequency, I divided the number of 
nuts cached in a tray by the number of pecks to that tray (thus caching frequency = 
nuts/peck). Thus, if the birds cached with perfect efficiency, the ratio of nuts/peck would 
be 1/1 or 1 (one nut cached for every peck to the substrate). By this definition, a low 
score on caching rate would mean that the birds made a large number of pecks to the 
substrate without depositing many nuts, and could indicate false-caching. 
Next, to examine caching rate, I watched all of the videos from the visual barrier 
experiment (N=20), and this time I scored the amount of time a bird spent (without regard 
to behavior) in two of the three sections of the arena (in-view and hidden areas, note: the 
third 'neutral' area was not scored) of the caching arena. Then, to calculate caching rate, I 
divided the number of nuts cached in that tray by the number of seconds spent in that 
section (thus caching rate = nuts/second). On this scale, a score of 1 would indicate that 
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the birds cached with perfect efficiency (one nut cached for every second spent in the 
vicinity of a tray). A low score on caching rate would mean that the birds spent a lot of 
time near a tray without caching in that tray, and might indicate either false-caching or 
cache-guarding behavior. 
I conducted two-tailed paired /-tests to compare caching frequency and caching 
rate in observed vs. private conditions, and in hidden vs. in-view trays. Caching 
frequency and caching rate were also compared among these groups: hidden/observed vs. 
in-view/observed, hidden/private vs. in-view/private, hidden/observed vs. hidden/private, 
and in-view/observed vs. in-view/private. To maintain family-wise error rate, I used a 
Bonferroni correction, and a0bt are reported. 
Results and Discussion 
Number of pecks. In general, the birds made a large number of pecks to the 
substrate in the 15 minute sessions. When the birds were observed, they pecked 
significantly more in the in-view tray (Mean = 275.3, SE = 40.4) than the hidden tray 
(Mean = 35.6, SE = 10.3) (paired /-test, N = 8, t7 = 6.91, cut = 0.01, P < 0.01; Figure 19 
left panel). In the private condition, the birds also made significantly more pecks in the 
in-view tray (Mean = 234.9, SE = 50.3) than in the hidden tray (Mean = 54.4, SE = 15.5) 
(paired t-test, N = 8, ty = 3.40, cut = 0.01, P = 0.01, Figure 19 left panel). There were no 
other significant pairwise differences (all Ps > 0.05). 
In general, the nutcrackers pecked significantly more in the in-view trays (Mean = 
253.7, SE = 31.1) than in the hidden trays (Mean = 46.5, SE = 45.5) (N = 16, // j= -6.40, 
ctobt = 0.03, P < 0.01). There was no difference in number of pecks when the nutcrackers 
were observed making caches (Mean = 156.4, SE = 38.6) than when they cached in 
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private (Mean = 144.6, SE = 34.5) (paired t-test, N = 16, ti5 = 0.10, ctobt = 0.03, P = 0.93). 
Caching frequency. When they were observed caching, the birds cached 
significantly more nuts per peck in the hidden tray (mean = 0.32, SE = 0.10) than the in-
view tray (Mean = 0.05, SE = 0.02) (paired t-test, N = 8, /z = 2.88, cut = 0.01, P = 0.01; 
Figure 19 right panel). There were no other significant pairwise differences (all Ps > 
0.05). In general, the nutcrackers cached significantly more nuts per peck in the hidden 
trays (Mean = 0.31, SE = 0.26) than they did in the in-view trays (Mean = 0.09, SE = 
0.11) (N = 16, tis =, dobt= 0.03, P = 0.01). There was no difference in number of nuts 
cached per peck when the nutcrackers were observed making caches (Mean = 0.19, SE = 
0.06) than when they cached in private (Mean = 0.21, SE = 0.05) (paired t-test, N = 16, 
tis — -0.16, (Xobt= 0.03, P = 0.88). 
Time spent in vicinity of travs. When the birds were observed, they spent 
significantly more time near the in-view tray (Mean = 443.5, SE = 97.9) than near the 
hidden tray (Mean = 75.3, SE = 16.3) (paired t-test, N = 20, tig = -6.79, a0bt = 0.01, P < 
0.01; Figure 20 left panel). In the private condition, the birds also spent significantly 
more time near the in-view tray (Mean = 387.06, SE = 39.62) than the hidden tray (Mean 
= 97.0, SE = 21.28) than (paired t-test, N = 20, tig = 5.69, ctobt = 0.01, P < 0.01; Figure 20, 
left panel). There were no other significant pairwise differences (all Ps > 0.05). 
Overall, the nutcrackers spent significantly more time near the in-view trays 
(Mean = 416.76s, SE = 30.77) than they spent near the hidden trays (Mean = 85.58s, SE 
= 13.19) (N = 40,11 p= -8.85, ctobt= 0.03, P < 0.01). There was no difference in the 
amount of time spent in the vicinity of the trays when the nutcrackers were observed 
making caches (Mean = 259.0s, SE = 38.21) than when they cached in private (Mean = 
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242.03s, SE = 33.05) (paired t-test, N = 40, t}g= 0.35, a0bt= 0.03, P = 0.73). 
Caching rate. In the observed condition, the birds cached significantly more nuts 
per second in the hidden tray (Mean = 0.19, SE = 0.04) than the in-view tray (Mean = 
0.02, SE = 0.01) (paired t-test, N = 20, tig = 4.49, ciobt= 0.01, P < 0.01; Figure 20 right 
panel). In the private condition, the birds also cached more nuts per second in the hidden 
tray (Mean = 0.19, SE = 0.06) than the in-view tray (Mean = 0.04, SE = 0.01), but this 
difference was not significant (N = 20, t!9 = 2.28, cy* = 0.01, P = 0.04; Figure 20 right 
panel). There were no other significant pairwise differences (all Ps > 0.05). 
In general, the nutcrackers cached significantly more nuts per second in the 
hidden trays (Mean = 0.19, SE = 0.34) than they did in the in-view trays (Mean = 0.10,SE 
= 0.03) (N = 40, Ug = 3.71, a0bt = 0.03, P < 0.01); but there was no difference in number 
of nuts cached per second when the nutcrackers were observed making caches (Mean = 
0.10, SE = 0.02) than there were when they cached in private (Mean = 0.12, SE = 0.03) 
(paired t-test, N = 40, tig = -0.56, out = 0.03, P = 0.58). 
When they were observed making caches, the nutcrackers cached with more 
efficiency in the hidden trays, showing both a significantly higher caching frequency 
(more nuts per peck) and a significantly higher caching rate (more nuts per second) in the 
hidden trays. The nutcrackers pecked more in the in-view trays both when they were 
observed and when they were alone. These results may be interpreted in one of two ways, 
either they birds did not like the barrier, or they preferred to be out in the open. However 
closer analysis examining the number of nuts the birds cached per peck to the substrate 
revealed that they only cached significantly more nuts in the hidden tray when they were 
observed caching (but not in the private condition). Thus, it may be likely that the 
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nutcrackers were exhibiting cache protection (guarding or intimidation behavior) or even 
false-caching (deceptive behavior), by pecking a great deal without caching in the in-
view trays. 
The data for time spent in the vicinity of the trays and caching rate show a similar 
pattern. The nutcrackers spent more time near the in-view trays than the hidden trays 
during both private and observed trials. At first glance it seems that the nutcrackers may 
have disliked the barrier, or preferred being near the open tray. However, analysis of 
caching rate (number of nuts cached per second) indicates that the nutcrackers cached 
significantly more nuts per second in the hidden tray, but only when they were observed. 
This strongly suggests that they are sensitive to the presence of the observer, and that 
they alter their behavior when observed by caching more efficiently in the hidden tray 
when observed. These results are different than those obtained for scrub jays, which spent 
approximately the same amount of time in the hidden and in-view areas, even though 
they cached more in the hidden tray when observed (Dally et al. 2005a). Daily's group 
they also found that scrub jays increase caching rate in the hidden tray when they are 
observed (Dally et al, 2005a). Thus, the relatively asocial nutcrackers behave similarly to 
the more social scrub jay, in terms of altering caching rate according to social situation 
(observed versus private). 
Considering the analysis of caching frequency (the amount of time spent in each 
area) in conjunction with the analysis of caching rate (the number of nuts deposited in 
each area), I can gain a clearer picture of what the birds are actually doing. Taking these 
results together (increased caching frequency and increased caching rate in the hidden 
tray when observed, coupled with a large amount of time spent pecking without caching 
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at the in-view tray when observed), I posit that the nutcrackers may have been exhibiting 
false-caching in the in-view tray (observed condition only). If so, this could indicate an 
intentionally deceptive behavior. 
Experiment 5- Control for Social Interactions 
Here I was interested in distinguishing between cache-protection and (territorial-
type) aggression directed towards a conspecific. In Experiment 3 (Visual Barrier), the 
nutcrackers spent the vast amount of time near the in-view tray (in the observed 
condition), and very little time near the hidden tray or in the neutral area (farther away 
from the other bird but still in view). The results from that experiment suggest that the 
birds may have been engaging in a form of cache-guarding behavior or perhaps even 
false-caching. In this experiment, I was interested in determining if the birds would 
demonstrate the same behavior (staying near the observer) in the absence of food. If they 
did, it would suggest that the birds were simply exhibiting aggression (territoriality), 
rather than cache-guarding. The nutcrackers used in this study typically exhibit hostility 
toward each other (personal observation), even though they have lived together for a long 
time, in close proximity. In the laboratory, they must be kept separated or they will attack 
one another. When one bird comes too close to another's cage, the resident will try to bite 
and fly at the "invader" violently (personal observation). Bednekoff and Balda (1997) 
commented that the stress of seeing the "aggressive actions" of the caching nutcrackers 
may have contributed to their difficulty finding others' caches. In the wild, although 
individual behavior varies, nutcrackers often aggressively defend their territories from 
conspecifics (Lorenz 2008). These are bold birds, known to readily approach humans for 
food at campsites and parks, and (anecdotally) sometimes chase large mammals away 
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from their nests. The other possibility is that in Experiment 3, the nutcrackers were 
guarding their food from the other bird, perhaps by intimidation. If that were the case, 
then removal of the food might result in the birds spending less time near the observer. 
Therefore, to tease apart these possibilities (territoriality versus food-guarding), I 
removed the food and repeated the visual barrier experiment. I then compared the amount 
of time spent in each section of the arena in both the presence and in the absence of food. 
I also hoped to answer additional questions such as: do the nutcrackers generally prefer to 
keep a conspecific in-view or do they prefer to hide from the other bird? I also used the 
data to examine whether the individual identity of birds in a pairing had an effect on the 
amount of time spent close or far away from an observer (i.e. were there any pair 
combinations that were especially aggressive or non-aggressive). 
Methods 
The same birds and apparatus were used as in Experiment 1,2 and 3 (with the 
exceptions that the food bowl was not used, and I used masking tape to demarcate the 
floor of the caching arena into three sections. The sections were delineated as follows: 1) 
in-view area- to one side of the barrier and close to the observing bird, 2) hidden area-
also close but visually obscured by the barrier, and 3) neutral area, the large area which is 
farther away and is mostly visible to the observer (Figure 21). The location of the visual 
barrier was counterbalanced between the left and right side of the arena. Each individual 
bird participated in two daily trials, one trial as the focal bird, and one trial as the 
observer. The pairings were counterbalanced, such that each bird was paired only once 
with every other bird as an observer, over a period of 5 days. During each trial, a focal 
bird was placed in the caching arena, and another bird was placed in the observer cage 
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(restricted to the in-view side by the partition, see previous description). I videotaped the 
interaction for 20 min. Later, I watched the first 15 min of each video, and used a 
stopwatch to score the amount of time (in sees) that the focal bird spent in each of the 
three sections. Because the neutral area is much larger than the other two areas, I adjusted 
the time spent in the hidden and in-view sections accordingly. I then re-watched the 20 
(previously recorded) videos from the original visual barrier experiment (caching-
observed condition, pre-pilfer experience). For each video, I marked a line on the 
computer screen with removable tape to delineate the same three sections (as in Figure 
21). I then scored the amount of time spent in each of the three sections. I again adjusted 
the amount of time spent in each section for the relative proportion of the total area of the 
arena. 
Analysis. Initially I conducted an ANOVA comparing pairs of birds (each pair 
was tested twice, once with bird A as the focal bird, and once with bird B as the focal 
bird) to determine if there was an effect of the identity of birds in a pairing (for social 
interactions and caching interactions). Then I used paired /-tests (see previous) to 
compare the amount of time spent in each section during the social interactions (food 
absent). I compared the amount of time spent (adjusted for relative area) between in-view 
vs. hidden, neutral vs. hidden, and in-view vs. neutral. Second, I repeated this analysis for 
the caching (observed) sessions (with food present). Next, the amount of time spent in 
each of the three sections in the social interactions was compared to the amount of time 
spent in each of the three sections during caching sessions, using paired t-tests to make 
the following comparisons: in-view/social vs. in-view/caching, hidden/social vs. 
hidden/caching, and neutral/social vs. neutral/caching. 
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Results and Discussion 
No Food- Social interactions. When food was absent, the nutcrackers spent 
significantly more time in the in-view area (Mean =1018.0 s/sq in (adj), SE = 276.47) 
than the hidden area (Mean = 105.0 s/sq in (adj), SE = 30.86) (N = 20, tig = 3.17, a0bt = 
0.02, P < 0.01; Figure 22 left panel). The birds also spent significantly more time near in 
t h e  n e u t r a l  a r e a  ( M e a n  =  8 9 2 . 0  s / s q  i n  ( a d j ) ,  S E  =  7 4 . 9 6 )  t h a n  t h e  h i d d e n  a r e a  ( N  =  2 0 ,  t J 9  
= -10.54, ctobt = 0.02, P < 0.01; Figure 22 left panel). There was no significant effect of 
pairing (ANOVA F 9,10 = 0.50, P = 0.84), thus there were no differences in the amount of 
time spent in the three sections that differed for any particular pairs of birds. 
Food- Caching. When food was present in the arena, the nutcrackers again spent 
significantly more time in the in-view area (Mean = 1586.0 s/sq in (adj), SE = 166.17), 
than the hidden area (Mean = 269.0 s/sq in (adj), SE = 58.42) (N = 20, tJ9 = 6.79, out = 
0.017, P <0.01; Figure 22 right panel). However now, the birds also spent significantly 
more time near the in-view tray than in the neutral area (Mean = 417.0 s/sq in (adj), SE = 
44.87) (N = 20, tw = 5.68, a0bt = 0.017, P < 0.01; Figure 22 right panel). Again there was 
no significant effect of pairing (ANOVA F 9,10 = 0.59, P = 0.78). 
Comparison of Behavior With and Without Food. There were several significant 
differences in behavior in the presence and absence of food. First, the birds spent 
significantly more time in the in-view area when food was present (Mean = 1586.0 s/sq in 
(adj), SE = 166.17) than they did in the in-view area when food was absent (Mean = 
1018.0 s/sq in (adj) (N = 20, tig = 3.24, a0bt = 0.02, P = 0.01; Figure 22 both panels). The 
birds also spent significantly more time in the hidden area when food was present (Mean 
= 269.0 s/sq in (adj), SE = 58.42) than they did in the hidden area when food was absent 
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(Mean = 105.0 s/sq in (adj), SE = 30.86) (N = 20, t ] 9  = 3.40, cut = 0.02, P  = 0.01; Figure 
22). Lastly, they spent significantly less time in the neutral area when food was present 
(Mean = 417.0 s/sq in (adj), SE = 44.87), than when food was absent (Mean = 892.0 s/sq 
in (adj), SE = 74.96) (N = 20, tig = -6.94, cut = 0.02, P < 0.01; Figure 22). 
The results from this experiment clearly indicate that the nutcrackers spent 
significantly more time close to the observer when food was present than they did when 
food was absent. This strongly suggests that the nutcrackers were exhibiting a form of 
food-guarding behavior. Combined with the results from the caching frequency 
experiment (Experiment 4), in which the nutcrackers pecked intensely without caching in 
the in-view tray when observed, it seems that the nutcrackers may have been exhibiting 
false-caching, a strategy which might be used to intentionally deceive the observer 
(potential pilferer). It is true that, whether food is present or absent, the nutcrackers spent 
a lot of time in the in-view area close to the observing birds. These results suggests that 
the birds spent a good deal of time engaging in social interactions when food is absent, 
and that during caching even more time is spent engaging in cache-related behaviors. The 
birds also spent significantly more time in the hidden area when food was present than 
they did when there was no food available. This is likely because they were spending 
time caching nuts in the hidden area. In the absence of food, there was no need to spend 
time in the hidden area, unless the birds wanted to hide from the observer. Wild 
nutcrackers are territorially aggressively (Lorenz 2008). Thus, given the aggressive 
nature of these birds, it is not surprising that they did not hide from a conspecific. The 
birds spent significantly less time in the neutral area when food was present than when 
food was absent. This can be explained by the fact that when food was present, the birds 
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spent their time either caching in the hidden tray or guarding food (or false-caching) in 
the in-view tray. It is also interesting to note that these patterns (spending time near the 
observer when food was present, etc.) were independent of the identities of the birds that 
were paired in the interactions (with and without food). Therefore, it would seem that the 
propensity of the birds to cache in the hidden zone when observed during testing is 
independent of social relationships. 
Experiment 6- Comparison of the number of nuts cached and recovered by 
nutcrackers and scrub jays 
Since I replicated the experiments with scrub jays closely, a comparison of the 
overall number of nuts cached and recovered by nutcrackers and scrub jays is possible. 
The most comparable study is that of Dally and colleagues (2004), in which scrub jays 
were given a bowl a 50 of pine nuts, and a 15 minute period in which to cache (or eat) 
them. I used the same procedures, except that the caching arena was made larger for the 
larger nutcrackers (see general procedures/apparatus). 
Methods 
Using the data from Experiment 2 (Effect of Lighting) and data from Daily's 
(2004) experiment, I compared the number of pine nuts (out of 50) cached in a 15 minute 
period and the proportion of pine nuts recovered in a 5 minute period between 
nutcrackers and scrub jays (no statistical analyses were conducted). 
Results and Discussion 
The nutcrackers cached more nuts than scrub jays (in Dally et al. 2004) in the 
same 15 minute test interval. The nutcrackers cached a median of 24.5 nuts (total cached 
in sun and shade) when observed (IQR = 18.5) compared to the scrub jays, which cached 
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a median of only 2 nuts when observed (IQR = 5.0). The nutcrackers cached a median of 
22.5 nuts in private (IQR = 17.8), compared to the scrub jays, which cached a median of 
only 3.5 nuts in private (IQR = 12.0) (Figure 23). 
The nutcrackers also recovered a larger proportion (not shown) of the nuts that 
they had cached than the scrub jays recovered in the same 5 minute interval (from Dally 
et al 2004). The nutcrackers recovered a median of 36.5% (IQR = 64.59%) of nuts when 
they had been observed making caches, compared to the scrub jays which recovered a 
median of 0% of nuts when observed (IQR = 61.0%). The nutcrackers recovered a 
median of 37.5 % (IQR = 63.8%) of nuts when they had cached in private, and the scrub 
jays recovered a median 0% (IQR = 7.0%) of nuts when they cached in private. 
The overall number of nuts cached and recovered by nutcrackers in the current 
study seems to generally concur with results from a similar study with nutcrackers (Clary 
and Kelly 2011); even though the nutcrackers in that study were given more time to 
cache (1 hour as opposed to 15 minutes) and recover (15 minutes as opposed to 5 
minutes). It does not seem surprising the nutcrackers cache and recover more than scrub 
jays. In the harsh environment that they inhabit, nutcrackers probably rely more heavily 
on their caches than scrub jays rely on any single food resource. Therefore, nutcrackers 
may be hardwired to recover a large proportion of food that they have cached. This might 
also be a failsafe; in natural conditions it is possible that observers could be unseen. Thus, 
one possible strategy a cacher can use is to relocate food that was seen by an observer. 
On the other hand, if a cacher is unsure of who has seen the caching event, the cacher 
could simply relocate most of the food that was cached. This would serve to confuse both 
seen and unseen observers. This behavior, of course, would theoretically utilize more 
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energy than relocating only food which was surely seen. Therefore, in order for this 
strategy to be profitable, the risk of being pilfered by unseen conspecifics (and 
heterospecifics) would be expected to be very high. This hypothesis remains to be tested. 
Another reason that nutcrackers might cache more food than scrub jays is that 
they are larger in size than scrub jays. Although the average overall length including the 
tail is about the same in the two species (scrubs jays have a relatively long tail), the 
nutcracker has a larger average wingspan (~15%) and a larger average mass (-35%). 
Furthermore, Clark's nutcrackers have a sublingual pouch that they use to transport up to 
82 whitebark pine seeds (Pinus albicaulis, Lanner 1996). In the family Corvidae, the 
sublingual pouch is unique to the two species in the genus Nucifraga, the Clark's 
nutcracker and the Eurasian nutcracker, Nucifraga caryocatactes (Raby and Clayton 
2010). The possession of this pouch may explain why nutcrackers may cache and recover 
more than scrub jays (ease of handling, optimal foraging), which must carry seeds in their 
mouths. 
General Discussion 
The caching behavior exhibited by the nutcrackers in this study indicates that they 
are sensitive to the presence of a conspecific observer, and that they use several different 
strategies to protect their caches. For example, when the nutcrackers were given a choice 
to cache in a cob-filled tray either near an observer or far away, the nutcrackers chose to 
cache farther way. When they cached in private however, they did not show this 
preference. This is very similar to the behavior of scrub jays (Dally 2005a), which also 
cached more in a far location in the presence of an observer. The nutcrackers in the 
current study also significantly reduced caching in a tray that was in plain view of the 
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observer (compared to a visually hidden tray), but they did not reduce caching in the 
same tray when they cached in private (with an empty cage). The nutcrackers also 
showed a tendency to cache more nuts in the tray that was hidden behind a visual barrier 
than they did in a tray that was in plain view of the observer (although not significantly 
more). This is again similar to the pattern of behavior demonstrated by scrub jays (Dally 
et al 2005a), which also showed a (non-significant) propensity to cache more nuts in a 
hidden tray than an in-view tray when observed. 
Another way an animal can protect their food resource is to hide food in difficult-
to-see or poorly lit locations. However, when they were given a choice between shady 
and sunny locations, the nutcrackers did not preferentially cache in the shady location 
when they were observed. This is different than the behavior seen in scrub jays, which 
preferred to cache in a shady location (Dally et al 2004). It is not clear why the 
nutcrackers differed from scrub jays in only this cache-protection strategy. Perhaps the 
difference in illumination between the two studies could account for the lack of 
sensitivity in the nutcrackers. I used a 60 w bulb, while Daily's group did not indicate the 
bulb intensity they used (however the ratio of luminance between the two sides in that 
study was 4:1). It is doubtful that the nutcrackers were unable to distinguish between the 
illumination of the two sides; to the human eye it was clearly much darker on the shady 
side of the arena. It is possible that the caching nutcrackers had no problem seeing the 
tray in the shady area themselves; therefore they may not have considered hiding food in 
the shade a protective strategy. This could explain why they cached in both shady and 
sunny trays, both when observed and in private. 
I also looked at several additional measures of cache-protection, to further 
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examine how nutcrackers might change their behavior with regard to food storing when a 
conspecific is watching. To protect food stores from potential pilferers, another strategy 
that an animal could use is to increase the efficiency of their caching activity in hidden 
locations. This could be accomplished either by increasing either the frequency or the rate 
of caching. First I examined caching frequency by calculating the number of nuts 
deposited per peck in each of several conditions (a novel measure). The nutcrackers 
exhibited a high caching frequency (nuts/peck) in the hidden tray (both when caching 
was observed and in private), however this frequency was only significantly different 
than the in-view tray when caching was observed. In other words, when the birds were 
observed making caches, they cached a lot of nuts in the hidden tray, and pecked more 
without depositing nuts in the in-view tray. This behavior could indicate that the 
nutcrackers may have been actively guarding the area against a possible pilferer through 
the use of intimidation; or they may have been using the activity as a distraction (false-
caching) in an attempt to confuse the observer. I cannot compare this finding with other 
corvids, because I am not aware of any other studies that have examined caching 
frequency or have documented this behavior in birds. 
I also examined caching rate, calculated as the number of pecks in the substrate 
per second. The nutcrackers exhibited a high caching rate (nuts/second) in the hidden tray 
(both when caching was observed and in private), however this was only significantly 
different than the in-view tray when caching was observed. In other words, when the 
birds were observed making caches, they cached nuts quickly in the hidden tray and 
slowly in the in-view tray. This again suggests that the birds spent more time in-view, 
directing activity toward the in-view tray without caching there (observed only). This 
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behavior is consistent with scrub jays, which also increased the rate of caching in a 
hidden tray when observed (Dally et al. 2005a). Further evidence that the nutcrackers 
were engaging in some sort of guarding or deceptive behavior comes from my 
investigation of the amount of time that nutcrackers spent in three regions of the caching 
arena (in-view, hidden, and neutral areas), with and without food available. When an 
observer was present, the nutcrackers spent more time close to the observer near the in-
view tray, compared with when there was no food in the arena. However, the data 
indicate that this time was not spent caching nuts in-view. Taken together, these results 
strongly suggest that the nutcrackers were likely either guarding their food, trying to 
intimidate or confuse the potential pilferer, or making false-caches. 
Interestingly, for nutcrackers, experience did not have a large impact on caching 
behavior; they showed a similar pattern of caching both before and after they were given 
experience pilfering the caches of others and having their own caches pilfered. My results 
concur with another study aimed at examining pilfering experience in nutcrackers. Clary 
and Kelly (2011) found no significant difference in number of nuts cached between 
experienced and naive wild-caught nutcrackers. Scrub jays, on the other hand, seem to 
increase cache protection after pilfering experience (Emery and Clayton 2001). 
Because I used the same procedures, I am able to make a direct comparison of 
cache suppression or increased caching between scrub jays and nutcrackers. The 
nutcrackers in this study did not exhibit cache suppression (or increase) in the presence of 
an observer, in any of the experiments or conditions that I tested, even after pilfering 
experience. This differs from the result obtained by Clary and Kelly (2001). Using a 
slightly different paradigm, they trained nutcrackers that food cached in a tray that was 
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near to an observer would be pilfered (unavailable during recovery). The nutcrackers in 
that study suppressed caching over successive trials when they were observed and during 
the private caching sessions. This reduction was not seen when a "dummy" bird (coke 
bottle) was used as the observer. Importantly, in their study, in the private condition a 
conspecific was present but not visible; thus the birds were not acoustically isolated from 
one another. This suggests that the auditory presence of the conspecific may have been 
sufficient to promote cache-protection. It is not clear why the nutcrackers in the current 
study did not reduce caching in the presence of an observer. Perhaps differences in 
learning history (birds have been together longer), or differences in the training and 
testing paradigm could account for the lack of cache suppression in these nutcrackers. My 
results also differ from scrub jays, which showed an increase in caching when observed 
compared to in private (Dally et al. 2005a). Dally and colleagues suggest that increasing 
caching is a compensatory tactic, used in conjunction with the distance strategy. 
Although it is an energetically costly strategy, increased caching while observed has been 
documented in other species (Bossema 1979; Emery et al. 2004); it may be used when 
other strategies are not possible. In the current study, the nutcrackers may have preferred 
to use other tactics rather than increasing or suppressing caching when observed, such as 
caching in the far tray, along with intimidation and false-caching in the near-tray. 
In general, the nutcrackers cached more nuts than scrub jays. I consistently found 
(across experiments and conditions) that nutcrackers cached approximately 20-40% more 
nuts than scrub jays in the same 15 minute period. Nutcrackers may cache more than 
scrub jays for several reasons. First they are a larger bird than scrub jays, both in 
wingspan (-15% larger) and average mass (-35% larger). Second, the sublingual pouch 
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in nutcrackers may make caching more efficient (easier to transport and handle large 
number of nuts). Lastly, nutcrackers live in a harsher climate and are food specialists. 
Their heavy reliance on their food stores could explain how the ability to cache large 
numbers of nuts may have evolved. 
Sensitivity to the presence of an observer can also be exhibited by the choices an 
animal makes during recovery of food that it had previously cached. Just as with caching 
behavior, the nutcrackers' behavior during recovery also indicates that they are sensitive 
to the presence of a conspecific observer. In the Experiment 3 (Visual Barrier), the 
nutcrackers recovered more nuts from the in-view tray when they had been observed 
caching than they recovered from the hidden tray (or from the in-view tray when they had 
caching in private). My results are consistent with Clary and Kelly (2011), in which 
nutcrackers also recovered a significantly higher proportion of seeds when they had been 
observed caching than when they had cached in private or in front of a dummy. Again, 
for the nutcrackers, experience with pilfering did not seem to have a large impact; they 
showed the same pattern of behavior with regard to recovery both before and after the 
pilfering experience. I cannot compare the nutcrackers performance to that of more social 
scrub jays (Dally et al 2005a), because the scrub jays did not recover enough nuts for 
analysis. 
In all experiments and conditions, the nutcrackers recovered a large proportion of 
nuts they had cached (-40-70%); and in many cases they recovered 100% of the hidden 
food. Nutcrackers recovered approximately 10-50% more nuts than scrub jays in the 
same 5 minute period. My results are also consistent with those from Clary and Kelly 
(2011); in which nutcrackers recovered -68% of nuts they cached in a 15 minute period 
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(a bit more than the nutcrackers were able to recover in a 5 minute recovery period). Just 
as with caching, nutcrackers may recover more than scrub jays for several reasons. Being 
of a larger size and possessing a sublingual pouch may facilitate efficient recovery; and 
food specialization and living in a harsh environment may have driven the need for 
efficient recovery behavior. 
My results suggest that sociality may not be the sole predictor of social 
intelligence. Scientists have tried to examine the relationship between sociality and 
complex cognition by comparing brain size with social group size. These studies have 
produced conflicting conclusions. A relationship between relative brain size and group 
size has been supported in mammals like primates (Barton 1996, Dunbar 1998), 
cetaceans (Marino 2002) and bats (Barton and Dunbar 1997), and insectivores and 
carnivores (Dunbar and Bever 1998). Yet this relationship has been more difficult to 
demonstrate in birds. For example, Beauchamp and Fernandez-Juricic (2004) found no 
relationship between non-breeding flock size and brain size in birds. Emery (2004) also 
found no correlation between social structure and brain size. Comparative work has 
produced conflicting evidence linking complex cognitive abilities with group size. 
Bond's group (2003,2010) found that highly social pinyon jays were better at inferring 
the social dominance of unfamiliar birds using transitivity, than moderately social scrub 
jays. The same group (Bond et al. 2007) also found that highly social pinyon jays were 
better at serial reversal learning than moderately social scrub jays and asocial 
nutcrackers. Templeton, Kamil, and Balda (1999) compared social learning in 
nutcrackers and pinyon jays, and found that nutcrackers learned faster individually while 
pinyon jays learn faster socially. Some studies indicate that Clark's nutcrackers out­
111 
perform other caching eorvids in tests of spatial memory (i.e., Olson et al. 1995, 
Bednekoff et al 1997). However, in other studies (i.e. Gould-Beierle 2000, radial maze) 
nutcrackers did not out-perform pinyon jays and scrub jays, or even non-caching 
jackdaws. In a comparative study, pinyon jays demonstrated better spatial observational 
memory for caches made by other individuals, than did nutcrackers (Bednekoff & Balda 
1996). The two comparative studies that were specifically designed to compare cache-
protection (an indicator of social intelligence) among eorvids both found that less social 
nutcrackers are sensitive to a conspecific observer, and adjust their behavior accordingly 
(the current study and Clary and Kelly 2011). Although findings from these comparative 
studies suggest that different cognitive processes (i.e. transitive inference, serial reversal, 
social learning, and cache-protection) may be governed by different constraints, it 
appears that group size does not solely predict complex cognitive abilities. Furthermore, 
since nutcrackers are considered food specialists and scrub jays are considered generalist 
foragers, I can also tentatively conclude that cache-protection may be a cognitive trait 
that is common to all caching eorvids, regardless of group size or foraging type 
(generalism or specialism). 
In light of my findings, I suggest that environmental pressures related to caching 
may have led to the development of a wide variety of cache-protection behaviors in 
corvid birds. Nutcrackers (genus Nucifraga) are most closely related to crows, ravens, 
and jackdaws (genus Corvus) (Erickson et al 2005). Phylogenies based on caching 
behavior indicate that nutcrackers (considered specialized cachers), and birds in the genus 
Corvus (considered moderate cachers), shared a recent common ancestor that was either a 
moderate or a specialized cacher (deKort and Clayton 2006). This common ancestor (or 
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an earlier one) may have developed increased social intelligence as an adaptive 
specialization to cope with the pressures of food hoarding and cache-protection. It is also 
possible that caching behavior and associated cache-protection strategies may have been 
lost and gained several times throughout evolutionary history. It is yet to be seen if other 
caching animals (like caching rodents) that also developed food hoarding through 
convergent evolution, also developed cache-protection strategies and advanced social 
intelligence. Thus it will be important to conduct comparative studies in closely related 
species in other groups of animals. 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Summary of Background and Purpose 
This research examined several cognitive abilities in the Clark's nutcracker. The 
Clark's nutcracker is a close relative of crows and ravens (Ericson et al. 2005), corvid 
birds which have been shown to possess many advanced cognitive abilities. Along with 
phylogenetic research, studies of social and caching behavior also suggest that these two 
genera (Nucifraga and Corvus) shared a recent common ancestor (Ekman & Ericson 
2006, deKort & Clayton 2006, Figure 24). Thus, I was interested in examining whether 
this genetic relationship would predict that the nutcrackers in this study would 
demonstrate similar cognitive abilities as those seen in closely related corvids in past 
work. Also, the nutcracker possesses several unique ecological characteristics among 
corvids, which make them an important species to include in studies of cognition in 
corvids. For example, the nutcracker is the only species of corvid that lives in a high, 
cold, alpine habitat (900-3,900 m or 3,000-12,900 ft). Unlike other corvids, it is a 
specialist forager, which subsists mainly on the seeds of Pinus species (Lanner 1996). 
Also, they are thought to be the least social of the corvids (Templeton et al. 1999). 
Furthermore, although Clark's nutcrackers have been studied extensively for their 
remarkable spatial memory (they cache and recover astonishing numbers of pine seeds 
each autumn, Lanner 1996, Balda & Kamil 2006), little else is known about their 
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cognitive abilities. 
Since the Clarks' nutcracker is the least social of the corvids, and the only species 
considered to be a specialist forager, it is an excellent species to include in comparative 
studies aimed at shedding light on the importance of socio-ecological factors like group 
size and foraging strategy in predicting complex intelligence. For example, scientists 
have posited that living in a large dynamic group drives the need for a large brain, and by 
extension, the development of complex cognitive abilities (Humphrey 1976, deWaal 
1982, Jolly 1996, Barrett et al. 2002, Byrne & Whiten 1988 Owen 2009). There has been 
support for this idea in primates (i.e. lemurs, Jolly 1966), but additional research is 
needed to examine whether correlations exist across diverse groups of species between 
social complexity and individual "intelligence" (deWaal 1982). If these "social-
intelligence hypotheses" are supported, the Clark's nutcracker, the least social of the 
corvids, should fall on the low end of the spectrum for "intelligence" among corvid birds. 
Others scientists have posited that foraging pressures are more important in driving 
complex cognition. For example generalist foragers, driven by the need to find and 
exploit various food resources, may have developed a wider cognitive repertoire than 
specialist foragers (Altshuler & Nunn 2001). Thus, if a generalist foraging hypotheses is 
supported, then the nutcrackers would be expected to be less proficient at solving 
problems than generalist foraging corvids. On the other hand, the nutcrackers heavy 
reliance on caching, recovering, and protecting food stores may have led these birds to 
develop unique cognitive abilities, as adaptive specializations for coping with these 
extreme foraging pressures. 
In this body of work I examined cognitive abilities in Clark's nutcrackers, in three 
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diverse areas of cognition: 1) inferential reasoning by exclusion, 2) numerical cognition, 
and 3) social cognition. I selected these areas because (with a few exceptions) they have 
not been previously studied in nutcrackers. This research was expected to fill several gaps 
in the literature, and to address questions regarding the evolutionary origins of cognition 
in corvids, and perhaps, by extension, other groups of animals. 
Inferential Reasoning by Exclusion 
The first broad area of cognition I investigated was inferential reasoning by 
exclusion (Chapter II). Inferential reasoning by exclusion (also called exclusion 
performance or EP) is a specific type of reasoning, which has been defined as "the ability 
to select the correct alternative by excluding other alternatives" (Premack and Premack 
1994). In Experiment 1,1 used procedures that have been used previously to examine 
inferential reasoning in a variety of animals (i.e. primates, Call 2004; corvids Schloegl et 
al 2009, Schloegl 2011, Mikolasch et al 201 la and b). I trained several Clark's 
nutcrackers on a two-way object choice task, by baiting one of two containers with lids 
while a bird watched, and then allowing the bird to retrieve the food from the baited 
container. During testing, I baited one of the two containers out of sight, and then 
presented both containers, but showed the bird the contents of only the baited, only the 
empty, or neither of the containers (control). The critical test was the "empty" condition, 
in which the birds were shown the contents of only the empty container. In order to solve 
the problem, inferential reasoning by exclusion is thought to be required. That is, the 
thought process that may be necessary to solve the problem is such: if the food is not in 
this container I can exclude it as a choice, therefore I should select the other container. 
All of the birds were able to solve this problem immediately. When shown only an empty 
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container; they chose the other (baited container). However, it is possible that rather than 
using inferential reasoning to solve the problem, the birds could have simply avoided the 
empty cup (a simple associative mechanism). 
To examine this possibility, I conducted another type of test (Experiments 2 and 
3) that was less likely to be solved by associative processes (such as avoiding an empty 
vessel). The birds were trained that two distinctive objects were always found hidden in 
opaque containers, which were always positioned at the same two locations. During 
testing, one of the two objects was found in a transparent "trash bin", and was 
unavailable. To solve this problem, the birds had to infer that if one of the objects was in 
the "trash", then the other object should still be available in its previously learned hidden 
location. Only one out of the six birds tested was consistently able to make this inference 
(Experiment 3). This suggests that associative mechanisms likely accounted for my 
earlier results (i.e. the birds may have solved the initial problem by avoiding the empty 
cup. The failure of five of the six birds to solve the problem may have resulted from the 
difficulty of the task, a lack of motivation or attention to the critical features of the task 
by the other birds, or a failure to learn the role of the trash can. However, the fact that one 
bird was able to solve the more difficult task suggests that animals may be capable of 
using multiple mechanisms to solve problems of inference by exclusion. Indeed, the fact 
that most of the nutcrackers failed to solve the more complex inference tests may have 
resulted from their perseverance of using the same associative mechanisms that they used 
successfully in the initial task. 
Several conclusions can be drawn from this study. The results from Experiment 1 
are largely consistent with similar tests in two other seed-caching corvids, ravens 
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(Schloegl et al. 2009) and carrion crows (Mikolasch et al 201 la). However a non-caching 
corvid, the jackdaw, did not solve the task, choosing at chance when they could not see 
the food (Schloegl 2011). Since the nutcrackers demonstrated the ability to reason using 
inference, as well or better than ravens and other social caching corvids (and other social 
mammals), the results of this study do not support the idea that sociality drove the need 
for complex reasoning abilities (like the ability to make inferences). The fact that seed-
caching nutcrackers performed similarly to other seed-caching corvids seems to indicate 
that inference by exclusion may have evolved as an adaptive specialization to the 
pressures of caching and recovering food (Mikolasch et al. 201 la, Kamil 1987, 
Shettleworth and Hampton 1998, deKort and Clayton 2006). Seed-caching birds may 
need to pay close attention to the absence or presence of food. This may have led to the 
development of inferential reasoning abilities in caching species (Mikolasch et al. 201 la). 
Thus the results of this study suggest that other factors (like foraging strategy or genetic 
relatedness) may be more important than sociality in predicting the ability of corvid birds 
to reason. 
However, as pointed out previously, the procedure that has typically been used 
may not be the best way to test inferential reasoning, because the problem can be solved 
by a simpler mechanism. In Experiments 2 and 3 (inference with a trash bin) I used a 
novel paradigm, therefore I cannot compare the performance of nutcrackers with other 
corvids. The task I created may have been too difficult, or the training I used insufficient, 
such that the majority of birds could not solve the problem. Therefore, other birds 
(especially corvids and mammals) should be tested on this novel task to see if more 
animals can master the problem. Future work could also focus on honing the testing and 
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training procedures (beyond the basic task that has typically been used in the literature, 
and that I used in Experiment 1), to develop a more accurate way of examining inferential 
reasoning by exclusion, that can eliminate associative explanations. 
Numerical Cognition 
In Chapter III, I examined numerical cognition in nutcrackers, by testing their 
ability to discriminate between two different quantities of food. I used a two-way object-
choice procedure, which has been used extensively to test relative quantity judgment in a 
wide variety of mammals. Because the nutcracker stores and recovers large numbers of 
pine nuts each season and has an exceptional spatial memory, I expected that this species 
might have enhanced number comprehension. To test this, I simultaneously presented 
the birds with two sets of nuts of different quantities, in 21 different comparisons (i.e. 1 
nut vs. 2 nuts, 2 nuts vs. 3 nuts, up to 8 nuts vs. 16 nuts), to see if the mildly food 
deprived nutcrackers could choose the larger of the two quantities. The comparisons also 
varied with respect to the ratio of the two numbers. The nutcrackers successfully chose 
the larger of two quantities above chance in all but one of the 21 conditions I tested. The 
only condition the nutcrackers could not discriminate (above chance) was 8v9. The 
nutcrackers performance was consistent with Weber's law; the birds had more difficulty 
as the ratio of the two numbers in the comparison approached 1 (ratio effect), and they 
showed a slightly higher accuracy as the disparity between the two numbers increased 
(mild distance effect). They did not show a significant effect of magnitude, however; at 
constant distances, the birds did not have increasing trouble with larger contrasts (i.e. 
they did not have more difficulty with 4 vs. 5 than they had with 1 vs. 2). 
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I also ran three types of control tests, to determine which features the nutcrackers 
use to make their selections. The Number controls assessed whether the birds would 
choose by the number of objects, when the volume and area were both held constant. 
There were three Number control conditions, for example the nutcrackers were given a 
choice between 2 half nuts and 1 whole nut. I predicted that the birds would choose the 
larger number of nuts. However for the most part, they did not do so. Rather, they had a 
tendency to choose the side with the whole nuts rather than cut pieces when the volume 
(and approximate area) was the same. The Volume controls assessed whether the birds 
would choose by volume, when number and area were held constant, (i.e. choose 2 
whole nuts over 2 half pine nuts). I predicted that they would be able to choose the 
larger volume when given these types of choices. As predicted, the nutcrackers 
consistently demonstrated the ability to discern which pile had the larger volume of "nut 
material". The Area controls, assessed whether the birds would choose by area when 
number and volume were held constant. Here the birds were given a choice between two 
piles of nuts with the same volume and number (i.e. 3 nuts spaced close together versus 
3 nuts spaced farther apart). I predicted that the birds would choose the larger array, 
because they would consider the larger array to have more food. On the contrary, the 
birds mostly chose the side where the food covered a smaller area. 
The results from the controls tests are consistent with an optimal foraging model, 
in which animals behave as if to maximize energy intake. The results from the Number 
controls (i.e. the birds' preference for 1 whole nut over 2 half nuts) suggest that the 
nutcrackers were able to recognize that the two choices held equivalent volumes of food. 
Thus the birds demonstrated a preference for unbroken food when the total volume was 
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held constant. The birds did not make a common mistake made by young children, who 
tend to think that 2 is more than 1 without regard to total volume. Rather, they behaved 
more like adult humans (i.e. Geier et al. 2006). In the Volume controls, the nutcrackers 
had no problem discriminating the larger of two volumes when number was held 
constant (i.e. a preference for 2 whole nuts over 2 half nuts). This is logical, as animals 
should be able to choose a pile that has a larger volume of food over a pile that has the 
same total number of items but a lesser volume. In the Area controls, the nutcrackers 
chose the array with the smaller area (i.e. they chose 2 nuts spaced close together over 2 
nuts spaced farther apart). This may be an exhibition of foraging efficiency. In general, 
animals may be hardwired to choose food that is closely packed, to save energy in 
harvesting. On the other hand, this ability is not innate in small human children, who 
incorrectly choose a large array over small array, even when both contain the same 
number of items. Older children eventually lose this misconception. Thus, the 
performance of the nutcrackers in this study is more similar to that of post pre­
operational children than to that of younger children. 
In this study, the nutcrackers demonstrated numerical abilities that may exceed 
the abilities of many large brained social mammals (including apes and young children). 
Here the nutcrackers selected the larger of two simultaneously presented sets of food, for 
set sizes up to 16, whereas most mammals (except dolphins, elephants and African gray 
parrot) have been limited by a set size of about 4. Similar to many of the mammals 
tested previously, the nutcrackers appear to behave according to Weber's law, showing 
decreased performance as the ratio between the two numbers approaches 1 (ratio effect), 
and an slight increase in performance as the numbers increased in disparity (distance 
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effect). However, another common effect seen in mammals is the magnitude effect 
(which states that at constant distances larger numbers are more difficult to discern), was 
not seen in the nutcrackers in this study. 
My results also suggest that the nutcrackers use an analog magnitude system to 
represent numbers, in which larger numbers are represented in a fuzzy way. The use of 
an analog magnitude system has also been suggested for a few large-brained social 
mammals (i.e. elephants and dolphins). The other representational system that has been 
suggested for mammals is the object-tracking (or object-file) system, which allows 
animals to hold individual numbers in a sort of "filing cabinet" with limited number of 
"slots". Scientists have suggested that the use of an object-file system may explain why 
many mammals (including primates) are limited to discriminating numbers up to about 
four. The results of this study do not support the use of an object-file representational 
system by nutcrackers. 
Similar tests have not been previously conducted in other corvids, so a 
comparative analysis is not possible. Nevertheless, some preliminary explanations for 
the results of this study can be postulated. Since the nutcrackers demonstrated number 
competence on par or exceeding that of social animals, it does not appear that living in a 
large social group drove the need for complex numerical abilities. Rather, other 
evolutionary pressures (i.e. the need to keep track of large numbers of stored seeds, or 
number of seeds in a cache) may have driven the need for numerical abilities in 
nutcrackers and other animals. The nutcracker may have developed a keen number sense 
as an adaptive specialization to cope with their unique ecological pressures (i.e. intense 
food-hoarding). It also seems likely that enhanced number abilities may be tied to long-
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term or spatial memory, as both may be controlled by the same brain areas 
(hippocampus Krebs et al. 1989, Sherry et al. 1989, Basil et al. 1996; intraparietal sulcus 
Dehaene 1997). However, more tests are needed to examine numerical ability in 
nutcrackers and related corvids (as well as other animals that do and do not store food), 
to shed light on which pressures drive the evolution of numerical cognition. 
Social Cognition 
Chapter IV was specifically designed as a direct test of social intelligence 
hypotheses. Here, I replicated a series of studies that were aimed at comparing social 
intelligence in the highly social scrub jay (Dally et al 2004 and 2005a), and the less 
social Clark's nutcracker. Specifically, I wanted to know if nutcrackers, like scrub jays, 
use cache-protection behaviors flexibly when an observer (potential pilferer) is present. I 
set up a caching arena and an adjacent cage that could hold a conspecific observer 
(observed condition), or remain empty (private condition). I placed a bowl of 50 pines 
the nutcrackers in the arena, and gave the nutcrackers a 15 minute period in which they 
could eat or cache in one of two locations (trays filled with corn cob filings) in the arena. 
Twenty-four hours later, I gave the birds a 5 minute recovery period, to find and eat or 
re-cache any nuts they had cached the day before. I conducted various tests to determine 
if the nutcrackers alter their caching behavior when an observer is present. 
In Experiment 1, the caching trays were arranged so that that one was near the 
observer's cage and the other one was farther away. Here I found that when the 
nutcrackers were observed making caches, they cached significantly more nuts in the far 
tray compared to the near tray. They also cache significantly fewer nuts in the near tray 
when they cached with an observer than they cached in a tray that was near an empty 
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cage (private condition). In Experiment 2, the birds did not alter their caching or 
recovery behavior with regard to a "sunny" or a "shady' tray when they were observed 
caching; thus they do not appear to use the cache-protection strategy of caching in dimly 
lit location. In Experiment 3,1 examined the nutcrackers caching decisions, by giving 
them a choice to cache behind a visual barrier that obstructed the view of the caching 
site from the observer, or in a site that was in plain view of the observer. When given a 
choice, the nutcrackers reduced caching in the tray that was located in-view of the 
observer (compared to the amount of caching in that tray in private). Furthermore, the 
birds recovered more nuts from the in-view tray when they had been observed making 
the caches than they recovered when they had cached in private. Next, I gave the 
nutcrackers experience both pilfering and having their own caches pilfered to see if this 
would serve to increase cache-protection. There was no difference in behavior before 
and after the pilfering-experience. 
In an additional analysis (Experiment 4), I examined whether caching efficiency 
might be altered when an observer is present. Using videos from the visual barrier 
experiment (Experiment 3), I scored the number of pecks to each tray, and calculated 
caching frequency by dividing the number of nuts cached by the number of pecks made 
to that tray. I also scored the amount of time spent near each tray, and calculated caching 
rate by dividing the number of nuts cached by the amount of time spent near that tray. 
When they were observed caching, the nutcrackers increased both caching frequency 
and caching rate in the hidden tray. The birds spent a great deal of time pecking in the 
in-view tray without caching there. Next, I wanted to determine whether the birds were 
exhibiting territorial aggression or true cache-protection behavior (Experiment 5). To 
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examine this, I repeated Experiment 3 (Visual Barrier) with the food removed from the 
caching arena. I then compared the amount of time spent in each area of the caching 
arena when food was present and when food was absent. The nutcrackers spent more 
time near the in-view tray than near the hidden tray in both cases, but they spent 
significantly more time near the in-view tray when food was present than when food was 
absent. The results from this experiment (combined with the results from Experiment 4) 
strongly suggest that the nutcrackers were exhibiting cache-protection behavior directed 
at the in-view tray when they were observed; for example guarding their caches, trying 
to intimidate the observer, or even making false caches to confuse the observer. As far as 
I am aware, this is the first empirical study to demonstrate this behavior among corvid 
birds. 
The results from this direct comparison of caching behavior in the relatively 
asocial nutcrackers and the more social scrub jay (Dally et al. 2004,2005a), has allowed 
me to draw some conclusions about the role of social group size (and the role of 
caching) in predicting social intelligence. Foremost, because the nutcrackers 
demonstrated some cache-protection behaviors that are similar to more social scrub jays, 
(as well as some unique behaviors), the results of this study do not support social 
intelligence hypotheses. Cache-protection strategies that both nutcrackers and scrub jays 
(Dally et al. 2005a) demonstrated include caching far from an observer, and recovering 
more from near and in-view locations when they had been observed. Like nutcrackers, 
scrub jays also increase caching rate (number of nuts/sec) when they are observed. 
However, unlike scrub jays (Dally et al. 2004), which prefer to cache in the shade when 
observed, the nutcrackers did not show a preference to cache in a dimly lit location (as 
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opposed to a brightly lit location). Another difference is that scrub jays increased the 
amount of caching (number of nuts) when they were observed, while nutcrackers did not 
increase (or suppress) caching in the presence of the observer. The nutcrackers simply 
cached (and recovered) more nuts (in all conditions, both observed and private) than 
scrub jays did. This is likely due to their larger size and the possession of a sublingual 
pouch. Also it is likely that evolutionary pressure from increased reliance on stored 
seeds led to their proficiency at caching and recovery. Also, unlike scrub jays (Dally et 
al. 2005a), the nutcrackers in this study did not increase cache-protection behavior after 
pilfering-experience. Thus, these wild-caught nutcrackers may have been innately 
sensitive to the presence of a conspecific observer and altered their behavior 
accordingly, or they may have learned and remembered from experiences they had years 
ago, prior to capture. Since both nutcrackers and scrub jays cache food, the results of 
this study suggest that ecological pressures of caching or having a common ancestor that 
developed the cognitive capacity to alter one's behavior to protect food from 
conspecifics, may predict this type of social intelligence. 
Limitations 
There were several limitations of this collective body of work. Foremost, this 
work was limited by the inclusion of data from a very small number of animals. Testing 
a larger number of birds will be important to verify the results obtained in this study. 
Furthermore, the nutcrackers used in this study have been in captivity for a long period 
of time, and their age at capture is unknown. Thus, differences in age among individuals 
might be a factor that can explain why some birds succeeded while others failed at 
various tasks. The sex of the birds is also unknown; therefore individual differences in 
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behavior that were demonstrated in these experiments may be attributed to innate 
differences in behavior between males and females. Differences in individual learning 
history of the birds (prior to capture) may also have impacted the results obtained here. 
Because the birds have been in the laboratory for a long time, they have been exposed to 
several types of experiments prior to testing in this study. These experiences may have 
altered the nutcrackers' behavior, making interpretation of my results more difficult. 
Likewise, this artificial experience may render a comparison with the behavior of wild 
birds invalid. For example, the fact that birds had been housed together, and may 
recognize each other, might have affected the results in the social cognition experiments 
(Chapter IV). Thus, these experiments should be repeated using a larger number of 
hand-raised birds (of known sex and age) with known and potentially limited prior 
experience. It would also be interesting to repeat these experiments in a wild population 
of birds, to see how their behavior would compare with the behavior of these captive 
birds. Comparisons with birds from other laboratories (i.e. scrub jays) should be 
interpreted cautiously because of differences in learning history in animals that were 
raised in different laboratories. Ideally, multi-species comparative research would be 
conducted in the same laboratory. 
Conclusions 
Collectively, the results from these three cognitive studies in the Clark's 
nutcracker, suggest several conclusions. First, the cumulative results of this research do 
not seem to support social intelligence hypotheses (i.e. social function of intellect, 
Humphrey 1976), at least for corvid birds. Even though they are the least social of the 
corvids, the nutcrackers demonstrated inferential reasoning and social intelligence on par 
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with more social corvids (i.e. ravens, crows, scrub jays). The exact numerical tests I used 
here have not been conducted in other corvids, so it is entirely possible that other corvids 
may exceed the abilities of nutcrackers in this realm. This is unlikely though, as 
jackdaws and ravens were limited by a set size of about 6 or 7 using a different paradigm 
(Koehler 1951). Thus, it seems that group size is not an important predictor of complex 
cognition, as least not for corvids and the types of cognition examined here. 
The social-brain hypothesis is also not supported by my results. In recent years, 
there have been over 50 comparative analyses of social and ecological variables that 
have been used to explain variation in whole brain size (vertebrates, Healy and Rowe 
2007). Results from individual studies have produced conflicting evidence about 
whether a correlation exists between brain size (corrected for body size) and various 
cognitive traits. For example, Lefebvre and colleagues (2002) found that in widely-
divergent groups of birds, cognitive processes (i.e. tool use) were correlated with large 
brains. However, due to large difference in methodology (data collection and analyses) 
there have substantial problems interpreting what brain size means (Pravosudov and 
deKort 2005). The Clark's nutcracker has a total brain mass of 5.3g (Miklovsky 2003). 
The nutcrackers total brain volume/body size ratio is neither the smallest nor the largest 
among corvids (extrapolated from Garamszegi and Eens 2004); yet their performance 
was on par with corvids with larger brain/body ratios, for most of the tasks in three 
broad areas of cognition in which they were tested in this research. This suggests that 
total brain volume/body size is not a good predictor of complex cognition. 
Others have looked at specialized parts of the brain, and tried to correlate these 
with various types of cognitive behavior. For example, the adaptive specialization 
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hypothesis predicts that food-caching birds should have an enlarged hippocampus and 
better spatial memory compared to non-caching species (Pravosudov and deKort 2005). 
However although many studies support this premise (Krebs et al. 1989, Sherry et al, 
1989, Healy and Krebs 1992, Basil et al. 1996,Garamszegi and Eens 2004), Brodin and 
Lundborg (2003) failed to find a significant relationship between food-caching behavior 
and hippocampal volume. Pravosudov and deKort (2005) also found discrepancies 
among correlations of hippocampal volume and food-caching propensity. Thus, they 
strongly suggest that more data are needed "to justify generalizations about brain 
evolution in birds and to avoid possible spurious correlations". It was once believed that 
the Clark's nutcracker possesses the largest hippocampal volume/ body size ratio among 
caching corvids, (Garamszegi and Eens 2004), and this was thought to be causally related 
to their exceptional spatial memory. However, differences in methodology (i.e. different 
storage methods for tissues used in analyses, etc) for measuring hippocampal volume 
have now caused scientists to question this idea (Pravosudov and deKort 2005). I 
performed a simple comparison of data taken from Garamszegi and Eens (2004), who 
claim to have found a significant correlation between caching and hippocampal volumes. 
However, the data therein do not seem to support the idea that nutcrackers (which rely 
most heavily on caching) have a larger hippocampal volume/body mass ratio compared 
with other corvids that rely less heavily on caching (i.e. nutcrackers 44.7 mm3/130.8 g= 
2.926; carrion crows 136.8 mm3 /417g = 3.05; scrub jays 24.9 mm3/75.5 g = 3.03; taken 
from Garamszegi and Eens 2004). Interestingly the hippocampus is important for spatial 
memory, and some scientists believe that this area may also control numerical cognition 
(i.e. Dehaene, 1997). If this were true, it could explain why nutcrackers, which have 
129 
exceptional spatial memory (i.e. Kamil & Balda 1985, Gibson & Kamil 2001a and b, 
Gibson & Shettleworth 2003), demonstrated such extreme proficiency at discriminating 
different number combinations in the current research. In any case, scientists are 
beginning to conclude that looking at whole brain size or the size of various brain parts 
may not be the most useful way to predict which complex cognitive traits are likely to be 
present in a given species. Perhaps it would be more beneficial to examine neural density 
in certain regions of the brain, as opposed to looking at the overall size of the brain. It 
would also be sensible to examine entire neural networks instead of focusing on 
individual brain areas. 
My data can be used to examine several ecological hypotheses aimed at 
understanding factors which may influence the development complex cognition in a 
species. For example, the ecological-intelligence hypothesis, which predicts that 
generalist foragers should develop a wider cognitive repertoire than specialist foragers 
(Altshuler & Nunn 2001), is not supported by my findings. The Clarks' nutcracker, a 
highly specialized forager, demonstrated cognitive abilities that are similar to other 
generalist foraging corvids. On the other hand, the extractive foraging hypothesis (Parker 
& Gibson 1977), which states that difficulty extracting foods from their casing (i.e. nuts) 
may drive the need for complex intelligence (Gibson 1986), may be supported by these 
data. Clark's nutcrackers rely on the seeds of pine trees, which must be pried out of a 
pine cone. These birds use their beak in a precise manner like a needle-nose pliers, to 
retrieve the nuts from deep within the cone. The birds typically cache the nuts with the 
shells intact. Then upon retrieval, the nuts must be carefully manipulated to crack the 
hard outer shell and remove a papery film from around the actual pine seed. This the 
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birds do very deftly, sometimes by standing on the nuts and using their beaks to remove 
the seed, which is usually extracted in one piece (personal observation). Other corvids 
may also rely on nuts and other foods that are difficult to extract, thus they may have 
developed a large cognitive repertoire. Another possibility, the ephemeral food supply 
hypothesis, which states that food sources that are scarce, seasonal, or patchy, require 
extra cognitive capacities to monitor their availability (Clutton-Brock and Harvey 1980, 
Milton 1981), could also be supported by my findings. Clark's nutcrackers (and perhaps 
other corvid species) must keep track of pine nuts which are seasonal; in fact they have 
increased pressure to do so, as this food source becomes unavailable during harsh winters 
at high altitudes. Furthermore, these nuts decay easily if left exposed too long, so after 
extraction the birds need to cache them fairly quickly (and they must be able to keep 
track of when and where they were cached). Similarly, the cognitive mapping hypothesis 
(Milton 1988) states that the pressures of locating patchily distributed but potentially 
predictable food sources may drive complex cognition (due to the need for a mental 
representation of the environment). This hypothesis may also be supported in nutcrackers 
and other corvids. 
It seems likely that caching behavior and the need to protect caches from pilferage 
may drive the need for complex cognitive abilities, like keeping track of who is watching 
and where, and altering one's behavior flexibly. However, many animals that do not 
cache food (i.e. chimpanzees Call 2004) also demonstrate similar cognitive abilities. 
Furthermore some animals that do store food may not demonstrate these abilities. Thus, 
food caching cannot be the sole predictor of complex cognition. It will be important to 
test more caching corvids and other groups of food-hoarding animals to see if cognitive 
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abilities like social intelligence and the ability to reason are present, and to help us 
decipher which factors predict them. Future work could focus on comparative cognitive 
experiments with seed-caching rodents (i.e. chipmunks, rats, hamsters, gophers), other 
caching bird species (i.e. chickadees, woodpeckers), and perhaps even food-hoarding 
invertebrates (i.e. ants, spiders, crabs). Another distinct possibility is that many factors, 
such as food-caching and protection, a patchily distributed or seasonal food supply, 
difficulty of food extraction (and others traits like pair-bonding, long developmental 
period, etc.) work in combination to cause an organism to develop complex cognitive 
skills. 
Since the Clark's nutcrackers in this study demonstrated cognitive abilities similar 
to closely related corvids like ravens, crows, and scrub jays, a major implication of this 
research is that a common ancestor of the caching corvids may have developed these 
cognitive traits (reasoning abilities, number competence, and social intelligence) as 
adaptive specializations, and subsequently passed them on to the Clark's nutcracker and 
other extant caching corvids. For example, on a simple test of inferential reasoning by 
exclusion (Chapter II, experiment 1), the nutcrackers performance was similar to that of 
ravens and carrion crows. However, ravens and crows have not yet been tested on a more 
difficult task that rules out associative mechanisms (like the one I used in Chapter II, 
Experiment 3). If ravens and crows solve the more difficult problem, like one individual 
nutcracker in this study did, then I can conclude that the common ancestor of birds in the 
genera Nucifraga and Corvus (Figure 24) or an even earlier predecessor may have 
developed the ability to reason using inference by exclusion. To determine if an earlier 
ancestor also possessed this cognitive trait, inferential reasoning could be tested in other 
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close relatives like magpies (Pica pica, a non-caching corvid) and scrub jays 
(Aphelocoma). In another example, nutcrackers performed similarly to scrub jays in tests 
of social intelligence (cache-protection behavior), thus the ancestor common to both 
(Figure 24), or an earlier ancestor, may have developed these abilities as a strategy to 
cope with cache-pilferage. It would be very interesting to test more distantly related 
caching corvids, like gray jays (genus, Perisoreus) to see if they also use cache-
protection behavior flexibly. Furthermore, it will be important to test ravens and scrub 
jays (as well as more distant caching and non-caching relatives, like magpies Pica pica) 
on closely replicated numerical discrimination tasks (Chapter III) to determine if number 
sense is linked closely with caching or other behavioral traits, and to determine if the split 
between birds that possess these traits and those which do not occurred farther back in 
evolutionary history. We may be able to pinpoint a common ancestor that developed 
these abilities (social, inferential, numerical); however the fact that these traits could have 
been gained and lost many times presents challenges. Another potentially fruitful line of 
research would be to replicate my studies (in these several areas of cognition) in the only 
other member of the genus Nucifraga, the Eurasian or spotted nutcracker (.Nucifraga 
caryocatactes). This species lives in a different habitat, at lower altitudes, but still caches 
and relies on pine nuts for survival. Though there is a good deal of information about the 
natural history of this species, I am not aware of any cognitive testing that has been 
conducted as of yet. Thus it would helpful, from a comparative standpoint, to examine 
which ecological factors differ among these two nutcracker species (N. columbiana and 
N. caryocatactes), to help inform us about which factors are important for these traits to 
develop. In any case, it is clear that much more comparative work is needed. 
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Although the main goal of this research was to compare the performance on 
several cognitive tasks between the asocial Clark's nutcrackers and more social corvids 
(and other social animals), the work herein is not truly comparative in the sense that none 
of the studies examined multiple species. Ideally, comparative experiments such as this 
should be conducted with several related species in the same laboratory. In this way, the 
learning history of the animals, as well as the exact methodological procedures to be used 
can be better controlled. However, truly comparative studies using multiple species are 
rare. Obtaining and maintaining a large population of animals of numerous species 
requires a great deal of space, money, and time. For many laboratories, these constraints 
are prohibitory. Therefore, more funding is needed for truly comparative work, which 
will help us to answer questions about the evolutionary underpinnings of cognition in 
animals, and ultimately help us understand the unique cognitive traits that have arisen in 
humans. 
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lv2 8* 7* 8* 7* 4 34* 85* 
lv3 6 7* 5 6 5 29* 72.5* 
lv4 8* 7* 8* 7* 8* 38* 95* 
lv5 7* 8* 8* 6 7* 36* 90* 
2v3 6 7* 6 6 3 28* 70* 
2v4 7* 8* 4 7* 5 31* 77.5* 
2 v5 6 7* 6 3 7* 29* 72.5* 
3v4 5 6 7* 5 2 25* 62.5* 
3v5 8* 7* 4 7* 6 32* 80* 
3v8 7* 8* 4 6 1* 32* 80* 
4v5 6 7* 3 5 4 25* 62.5* 
4v6 8* 7* 7* 7* 7* 36* 90* 
4v8 4 6 7* 7* 7* 31* 77.5* 
5v6 3 7* 6 5 1* 28* 70* 
6v7 6 7* 7* 6 5 31* 77.5* 
6v8 5 5 7* 5 6 28* 70* 
6v9 7* 8* 5 6 5 31* 77.5* 
6vl2 6 4 6 6 3 25* 62.5* 
8v9 5 4 6 4 4 23 57.5-NS 
8vl0 5 8* 4 5 7* 29* 72.5* 




n.A 84.5 73.8% 72.6 69.0 
Table 1. Binomial probabilities for individual birds (and totals) in each condition. 
"Correct" means the subject chose the larger of the two numerosities in the 
condition. A * indicates performance significantly different than chance (P < 0.05). 
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Sony Puck Starr Betsy Susan 
Total 
out of 40 
Total 

















1LV2S 4 1* 2* 4 3 14* 35* sm 
2Lv4S 3 1* 3* 2* 3 12* 30* sm 




50 12.5 37.5 33.3 41.7 
Volume controls 
lLvlS 7* 8* 7* 7* 8* 37* 92.5* 
2Lv2S 8* 8* 7* 8* 7* 38* 95* 




91.7 100 83.3 95.8 91.7 
Area controls 
2Cv2F 2* 2* 3 3 2* 12* 30* sm 
3Cv3F 3 3 3 3 6 18 45-NS 




41.7 33.3 37.5 50 50 
Table 2. Binomial probabilities for individual birds (and totals) in the Number, 
Volume, and Area controls. A * indicates performance significantly different than 










Susan Fitz Starr Betsy 
Figure 2. Results for Experiment 1, all three conditions. Number of correct choices 
(choosing the baited cup) out of sixteen are shown for each bird in each condition. A 













Sessions 123 456 789 10 11 12 13141516 
Figure 3. Results for Experiment 1 (empty condition), raw data from individual 
birds showing correct and incorrect choices across sessions. For example, Susan 
chose correctly during the first session and seven subsequent sessions. Note that 
Starr chose correctly in 16 out of 16 sessions. A * indicates performance 




Incorrect | || a-w 
Sony 
Correct • • 
Incorrect # V -B V - » •  
Starr 
~ _A/V Incorrect IHi M ~ _ YJYY Incorrect • • • • • 
Betsy 
AAA Incorrect • 1 1-I •
Puck 
- AVVA Incorrect ^ ^
Fitz JKA/ Incorrect •-« tf 
Sessions 1234 567 89 10 Sessions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Figure 4. Results for Experiment 2, raw data for each bird across sessions. The 
birds choices were random, that is, they did not significantly chose the food type 
that was still available (all P > aobt). 
156 
Susan Sony 
z JUVUA :: VWM'V 
Starr * 
Correct HW ••••••••• 
Incorrect Li f ::: MM\_ 
Betsy Puck 
::: / wwi 
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Figure 5. Results for Experiment 3, raw data for each bird across sessions. One bird 
(Starr) consistently chose the toy that was not in the "trash" (a * indicates 
performance significantly above chance, where P < a0bt). 
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Figure 7. Regression showing the effects of ratio and distance (Weber's law). The 
nutcrackers had more difficulty as the ratio of the two quantities to be 
discriminated increased (approached 1). Performance improved as the distance 






















V = -0.4315x+ 86.002 
R2 = 0.1504 
y=-0.3111x+79.97 
R2 = 0.0504 
y=-1.0348x+ 78.867 
RJ = 0.2748 
-constant distance = 1 
constant distance = 2 
-constant distance = 3 or more 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
Sum of the two quantities 
Figure 8. Regression showing the effect of magnitude. There is no significant effect 
of magnitude; at constant distances (binned into constant distances of 1, 2, and 3 or 





Figure 9. Pooled results from the Number, Volume, and Area controls. 
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caching arena observer cage 
entr mce flap 
Figure 10. Experimental apparatus for cache-protection study 
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Figure 11. Caching trays. 
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Figure 13. Results for Experiment 1 (Effect of Distance); caching (left panel) and 
recovery (right panel). These box plots show the median, 25th percentile and 75th 
percentile of the number of nuts cached (out of 50) and the proportion of nuts 
recovered. The error bars indicate minimum and maximum values. The A 
represents the mean number of nuts cached or the mean proportion of nuts 
recovered. Data are pooled across birds. A * indicates a significant difference among 
groups (paired /-tests with Bonferroni correction). 
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Figure 15. Results for Experiment 2 (Effect of Lighting); caching (left panel) and 
recovery (right panel). Median, 25th percentile and 75th percentile of number of 
nuts cached (out of 50) and recovered (proportion of nuts cached) are shown. The 
error bars indicate minimum and maximum values. The • represents the mean 
number of nuts cached. Data are pooled across birds. There were no significant 























mvi«w OKfRVfP PSIVATf 
AFTER EXPERIENCE 
* r, 
Tr* iAVttw OMMVtO 
„r 
COMBINED 
Figure 17. Results for Experiment 3 (Visual Barrier); caching before (left panel) and 
after (middle panel) pilfering experience. The right panel shows the combined 
caching data from before and after pilfering experience. The box plots show the 
median, 25th percentile and 75th percentile of number of nuts cached (out of 50). 
The error bars indicate minimum and maximum values. The • represents the 
mean number of nuts cached. Data are pooled across birds. A * indicates a 
significant difference among groups (paired /-tests with Bonferroni correction). 
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hidden inviflw hidden m% 
M&tKVtO MtVAU 
BEFORE EXPERIENCE 
hidden in view 
OBSERVED 
hidden in view 
PMVATf 
AFTER EXPERIENCE 
hidden in view hidden in view 
OtSERVEO PRIVATE 
COMBINED 
Figure 18. Results from Experiment 3 (Visual Barrier); recovery before (left panel) 
and after (middle panel) pilfering experience. The right panel shows the recovery 
data from before and after pilfering experience combined. Median, 25th percentile 
and 75th percentile of nuts recovered (after a 24-hour retention period) are shown. 
The error bars indicate minimum and maximum values. The • represent the mean 
proportion of nuts recovered. Data are pooled across birds. There were no 


























0.00 hidden in view 
OBSERVED 
I. 
hidden in view 
PRIVATE 
Figure 19. Results from Experiment 4 (Number of pecks and caching frequency). In 
the visual barrier experiment, the nutcrackers pecked more in the in view trays, but 
they cached significantly more nuts per peck in the hidden side when observed 
compared to the in view side (more efficient). They pecked more without caching in 
the in-view tray (which may indicate false-caching). A * indicates a significant 


























0.00 hidden in view hidden in view 
OBSERVED PRIVATE 
Figure 20. Results from Experiment 4 (Time spent and caching rate). In the visual 
barrier experiment the nutcrackers spent more time near the in-view trays, but they 
cached significantly faster in the hidden side when observed compared to in private 



















Figure 21. Setup for Experiment 5 (Control for social interactions). I divided the 
arena into three sections, and videotaped social interactions in the absence of food. I 
calculated the amount of time spent in each of the three sections in 15 minute 
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Hidden In view Neutral 
SOCIAL (NO FOOD) 
JL 
* * 
Hidden In view Neutral 
CACHING (OBSERVED) 
Figure 22. Behavior in the presence and absence of food. Proportion of time spent in 
each of three sections of the arena in 15 minute social sessions (no food) was 
compared with time spent in these sections during caching sessions, when food was 
present. A * indicates a significant difference among groups (planned comparisons 
two-tailed paired /-tests, P < 0.05). The nutcrackers the largest proportion of time 
near the in-view tray when they were observed and food was present, suggesting 
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shade shade sun sun shade 
OBSERVED 
shade sun sun 
OBSERVED PRIVATE PRIVATE 
CLARK'S NUTCRACKERS SCRUB JAYS 
Figure 23. Comparison of the number of nuts cached by asocial nutcrackers and 
social scrub jays. Median, 25th percentile and 75th percentile of pine nuts cached (in 
a 15 minute period) are shown. The error bars indicate minimum and maximum 
values. Data are pooled across birds. Generally, the nutcrackers cached a larger 
number of nuts than scrub jays. The nutcrackers also recovered (24 hours later) a 
larger percentage of nuts that they had cached compared to scrub jays (not shown). 
Scrub jay data were reproduced with permission (Dally et al. 2004). 
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common ancestor of nutcrackers 
(Nucifraga). scrub jays 
(Aphelocoma). and pirn on jays 
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common ancestor of nutcrackers, 






















Figure 24. Phylogenetic tree (based on three genes) resulting from a maximum 
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